APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Zoran Andric (“Employee”) alleged he was injured in the course and scope of his employment with Costco Wholesale Membership, Inc. (“Employer”). After a hearing, the trial court found Employee suffered a compensable injury to his right foot and awarded 64 percent permanent partial disability. Employer appeals. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the trial court’s finding Employee suffered a compensable injury to his right foot, but we modify the award to 26 percent permanent partial disability to the right foot.

According to the allegations in the pro se post-conviction petition, the Petitioner, Robert Simons, was convicted by a Washington County Criminal Court jury of two counts of aggravated child abuse and six counts of child neglect and received an effective eighteenyear sentence. He alleged that the date of the judgment was April 13, 2012, and that no appeal was filed. He filed a post-conviction petition on February 16, 2016, alleging that the one-year post-conviction statute of limitations should not bar his petition because he was tried pursuant to an invalid indictment, he was asserting actual innocence, and his severe mental disability prevented him from “understanding the laws and rules to present and articulate the violations occurring in the trial court proceedings.” The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition as time-barred after considering the statutory factors that allow for tolling the statute of limitations. See T.C.A. § 40-30-102(b)(1)-(3) (2012). On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred in dismissing the case on the basis of the statute of limitations. We reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand the case for consideration of whether due process requires tolling the statute of limitations pursuant to State v. Nix, 40 S.W.3d 459, 463 (Tenn. 2001), and to consider whether the appointment of counsel is appropriate.

The Defendant, James T. Hutchins, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s order revoking his probation for his criminal exposure of another to human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) conviction and ordering him to serve the remainder of his four-year sentence in confinement. The Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering him to serve his sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Quartez Gary, of attempted first degree premeditated murder and employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective twenty-three-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient as to the element of premeditation and that the trial court’s instructions to the jury were unclear. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The Petitioner, William Darryn Busby, filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis in the Lewis County Circuit Court, asserting that newly discovered evidence entitled him to a new trial. The coram nobis court summarily dismissed the petition, and the Petitioner appeals. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the coram nobis court’s summary dismissal of the petition must be reversed and the case remanded to the coram nobis court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether due process principles require tolling the statute of limitations.

Defendant, Angela Denise Brewer, appeals her jury conviction for premeditated first degree murder, for which she was sentenced to life imprisonment. Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction, specifically challenging the evidence establishing premeditation and that she acted “intentionally.” Having reviewed the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This action arises out of an incident in which an instructor with the Eagleville High School’s Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps pulled a stool from beneath a student participant in a JROTC competition while the student was sitting on it, causing injury to the student. The student’s parents brought suit against the Rutherford County Board of Education under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act to recover for her injuries. Following a trial, the court dismissed the suit, holding that the instructor’s actions were not within the scope of his employment, and therefore, the Board’s immunity from suit was not removed. Plaintiffs appeal. We conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s holding that the instructor acted outside the scope of his employment, and as a consequence, the Board retained immunity from suit. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment. 

Aggrieved of his Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions of first degree premeditated murder, felony murder, and especially aggravated robbery, the defendant, Roger Reed, appeals. In this appeal, he contends that the trial court erred by permitting certain testimony in violation of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b) and that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Because we discern no reversible error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is an appeal from an Amended Final Decree of Divorce entered on November 15, 2017. Because the appellant did not file his notice of appeal within thirty days after entry of the decree as required by Tenn. R. App. P. 4(a), we dismiss the appeal.

Jason Clark (“Defendant”) filed a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02 motion seeking relief from two judgments of conviction. Defendant has no appeal as of right under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3. Because we have no subject matter jurisdiction, we dismiss Defendant’s appeal.

Petitioner, Matthew Jackson, appeals after he failed to receive relief from his third petition for writ of error coram nobis. For a multitude of reasons, including the failure to file a timely petition, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The University of Tennessee at Knoxville terminated the employment of Appellant, a tenured faculty member. Appellant appealed his termination to an administrative hearing officer pursuant to the Tennessee Uniform Administrative Procedures Act. Following a contested hearing, the hearing officer upheld the University’s termination of Appellant.  Appellant then petitioned the chancery court to reverse the decision of the hearing officer.  The chancery court upheld the hearing officer’s decision to affirm the termination of Appellant’s employment and tenure. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the chancery court.

Tyler James Reed, the Petitioner, was convicted of first degree felony murder in the perpetration of a burglary, aggravated burglary, and employment of a firearm with intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony. After this court affirmed his convictions on direct appeal and the Tennessee Supreme Court denied further review, the Petitioner filed a petition for
post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel from lead trial counsel and appellate counsel. He asserts that lead trial counsel convinced him to offer a false proffer to the State, which foreclosed him from testifying at trial, and failed to investigate his mental health and voluntary intoxication at the time of the offenses. He additionally asserts that appellate counsel failed to file a petition to rehear after this court did not specifically discuss several issues raised in his direct appeal. After a thorough review of the facts and applicable case law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

James P. Jones, Defendant, was convicted of several counts of theft and aggravated burglary. The trial court sentenced Defendant to a twelve-year probationary sentence. A violation of probation warrant was later issued against Defendant. After a hearing, the trial court revoked Defendant’s probation. Defendant now timely appeals the trial court’s decision and argues that he was denied the right to counsel during the revocation hearing. Because we conclude that Defendant did not effectively waive or forfeit his right to counsel, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this case for appointment of counsel and a new probation revocation hearing.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Amanda C. Andrews (“Defendant”) pled guilty to five counts of aggravated burglary and was sentenced to fifteen years as a persistent offender with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered Defendant to serve her sentence in the Department of Correction. Defendant claims the trial court erred by sentencing her to serve her sentence in the Department of Correction. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The plaintiff filed a claim for trespass against the defendants. The trial court found trespass and awarded nominal damages and attorney’s fees to the plaintiff. After a hearing on the parties’ respective motions to alter or amend the judgment, the trial court vacated the award of attorney’s fees and declined to increase the amount of nominal damages to the plaintiff. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

The Defendant, Amanda A. Tucker, pleaded guilty in the Washington County Criminal Court to driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI). See T.C.A. § 55-10-401 (2017). The Defendant reserved a certified question of law regarding the arresting officer’s encounter with and subsequent seizure of the Defendant, which she presents on appeal. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Santory Alexander Johnson, was convicted by a jury of one count of second degree murder. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred in failing to declare a mistrial or issue an adequate curative instruction following prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments; (2) the trial court erred in allowing a witness to testify about statements made by the victim; (3) the trial court erred in allowing a redacted convenience store video to be entered into evidence; (4) the trial court erred in re-playing a 9-1-1 recording already admitted into evidence; (5) the trial court erred in allowing inflammatory autopsy photographs to be entered as evidence; (6) the cumulative effect of these evidentiary errors was not harmless; and (7) the trial court erred in failing to properly consider mitigating factors at the Defendant’s sentencing hearing.1 Following our review, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

A Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B petition for recusal appeal was filed in this Court after the trial court denied a motion for recusal. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion.

This is a case concerning a commercial-property insurance policy dispute. The insured party filed suit upon the insurance company denying theft coverage on a claim. The insurance company claimed that the vacancy clause excluded the theft coverage of the property at issue. The trial court found that the vacancy clause did not apply and that the policy required the insurance company to cover the theft. The insurance company appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

Petitioner, Michael Davis, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for second degree murder. On appeal, Petitioner argues that he was denied due process of law when the post-conviction court refused to grant Petitioner a continuance to present an expert witness and failed to address all of the issues presented in its written order. Additionally, Petitioner claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. After thorough review, we determine that Petitioner was afforded due process and received effective assistance of counsel. Thus, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Stephen D. Lester, Sr., appeals the post-conviction court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief as untimely. On appeal, he argues that due process requires tolling of the statute of limitations because his untimely filing was due to misrepresentations by trial counsel. After review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.

The Petitioner, Donald K. Moore, Jr., was convicted of two murders and a robbery committed in February 1996. For these convictions, he received an effective sentence of life imprisonment plus forty-one years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In August 2017, the Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. In it, he claimed that the trial court improperly adjusted his release eligibility percentage for his seconddegree murder conviction in 1999 by filing a corrected judgment. He further asserted that the trial court violated due process when it corrected the judgment without notice to him. Finally, relying on Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), he contended that his sentence was cruel and unusual because he was a juvenile at the time he committed the offenses. Finding no grounds for relief, the habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the petition. On appeal, the Petitioner maintains that his sentence is void because: (1) the trial court corrected his judgment to reflect the proper release eligibility; (2) the trial court did not follow proper sentencing procedure when it corrected the judgment without notice to him; (3) his sentence is unconstitutional because he was a juvenile at the time he committed the offense; and (4) the corrected judgment violated double jeopardy. After review, we affirm the habeas court’s judgment.

This case involves claims asserted by a cancer patient against his radiation oncologist, the hospital where he was treated, and the developer of the radiation therapy system used to treat the patient. The patient alleges that the defendants failed to disclose that the treatment posed a risk of radiation damage to surrounding tissue and organs and misrepresented the safety of the treatment, such that he would not have agreed to undergo the treatment if he had known of the risks. The patient’s wife also asserted a claim for loss of consortium. All three defendants moved for summary judgment on numerous grounds. The trial court granted summary judgment to each of the defendants, and the patient and his wife appeal. We conclude that the plaintiffs’ claims against all three defendants are barred by the statute of limitations. Accordingly, we vacate in part, affirm as modified, and remand for further proceedings.

This is a jury case. Appellants sued Appellee, hotel, for violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”) and the Tennessee Identity Theft Deterrence Act (“TITDA”). The trial court granted a pre-trial motion for summary judgment as to Appellants’ TITDA claims. The remaining TCPA claims proceeded to trial, and the trial court delivered a modified jury instruction as a sanction against Appellee for alleged discovery abuse. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Appellee. Appellants appeal.  Appellee appeals the trial court’s denial of its request for attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 68. We reverse the trial court’s denial of Appellee’s costs pursuant to Rule 68; the trial court’s order is otherwise affirmed.