APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Political party filed suit against the county election commission and the State election coordinator requesting injunctive relief to prevent a county election commission from allowing a replacement for a candidate in another party’s primary election for the office of state representative who had withdrawn from the race after the qualifying deadline; the plaintiff party also sought a declaration that the withdrawal of the original candidate did not allow for a replacement under the circumstances presented. The primary election ensued, and the replacement candidate advanced to the general election; thereafter, the trial court denied the injunction and granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss the action. After the appeal was filed but before argument, the general election was held and the other party’s candidate was elected. We have determined that this case is moot and, accordingly, dismiss the appeal; we deny the request for damages for a frivolous appeal.

The petitioner, Anthony Dowlen, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing the petition stated a colorable claim for relief and the post-conviction court erred in dismissing the petition without the appointment of counsel. Following our review, we find the trial court erred in dismissing the petition as it stated a colorable claim thus warranting the appointment of counsel. Accordingly, we reverse the order of summary dismissal and remand the case for further proceedings pursuant to the
Post-Conviction Procedure Act.

This is the second appeal stemming from the divorce of the parties. After a remand from this Court, the trial court established the amount of alimony in futuro that Wife owed to Husband based on Wife’s ability to pay and Husband’s need for alimony. The trial court also declined to grant a downward deviation in Wife’s child support payments based on her payment of extraordinary educational expenses. The trial court’s ruling was based on a proposed parenting plan never agreed upon by the parties yet referenced by this Court in its initial opinion. We affirm the trial court’s award of alimony in futuro. However, we vacate the trial court’s denial of a downward deviation and remand the decision to the trial court for further consideration.

The Petitioner, Edward Lee Hood, Jr., appeals the coram nobis court’s dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis in which he challenged his 2009 convictions of two counts of rape of a child and two counts of incest. After a review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

The defendant, Glenn Fred Glatz, appeals his Sevier County Circuit Court jury convictions of attempted sexual exploitation of a minor and contributing to the delinquency of a minor, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred by admitting certain testimony into evidence. Because the evidence was insufficient to support the defendant’s conviction of attempted sexual exploitation of a minor, that count is reversed, and the charge is dismissed. We affirm the defendant’s conviction of contributing to the delinquency of a minor.

I join in the majority opinion except that portion of the opinion which examines the issue of evidence admitted in violation of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b). This issue is waived. The State correctly argues it is waived. Defendant acknowledges the issue is waived, but seeks relief in plain error review.

Plaintiff filed claims of slander, defamation, and interference with prospective economic advantage against defendant deputy sheriff in his individual capacity. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on the basis that he was entitled to immunity. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed plaintiff’s claims on the basis of immunity. Because we cannot discern whether the trial court relied on the proper law in its ruling, we vacate the trial court’s judgment. 

Defendant, Morrieo Allen, was indicted for the offense of first degree felony murder in the perpetration of robbery. At the conclusion of the State’s case-in-chief, Defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal, asserting that the State failed to prove venue in Shelby County and that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction. The trial court denied Defendant’s motion. A jury found Defendant guilty as charged, and the trial court sentenced Defendant to life in prison. On appeal, Defendant argues that (1) the trial court erred by denying his motion for judgment of acquittal when the proof at trial was insufficient to prove venue in Shelby County; and (2) that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. Having reviewed the record on appeal and applicable law, we find no error. The judgment of the trial court is therefore affirmed.

This appeal involves a contentious dispute over the designation of the primary residential parent for a child born to the unmarried parties. Having carefully reviewed the voluminous record before us, we reverse the decision of the trial court and designate the mother as the primary residential parent. The case is remanded for entry of a permanent parenting plan consistent with this court’s opinion.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Petitioner, Derrick Wade, received an effective thirty-year sentence for his convictions for two counts of second degree murder, two counts of especially aggravated robbery, and attempted first degree murder. The Petitioner filed a timely post-conviction petition, which was denied after a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel and that his pleas were not entered knowingly or voluntarily because he was under duress due to the circumstances of his plea. After a thorough review of the record, we discern no error and affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

This appeal stems from a workplace injury on a construction site. On his first day on the job, Marc Douglas Swindle (“Plaintiff”) fell from the roof of a building that was under construction. It is undisputed that Plaintiff was authorized to work on the job site and that he was working in the course and scope of his employment when injured. What is disputed is the identity of his employer: whether he was in the employ of the general contractor or one of the subcontractors. Plaintiff initially filed a claim with the Tennessee Bureau of Workers’ Compensation, Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims, naming the general contractor as his employer; however, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his workers’ compensation claim when the general contractor filed a response stating that Plaintiff was not its employee. Thereafter, Plaintiff and his wife filed this tort action in circuit court to recover damages from the general contractor, two of its subcontractors, and the owner of the property for the injuries he sustained at the construction site. Finding it undisputed that Plaintiff’s injuries were sustained in the course and scope of his employment, the circuit court held that it was without jurisdiction to consider the tort claims because the workers’ compensation exclusive remedy doctrine applied. For these reasons, the court dismissed the complaint. Plaintiffs appeal. We affirm.

The Defendant, Jeremy Randall C. Ledbetter, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of two counts of rape of a child, a Class A felony; two counts of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony; two counts of soliciting sexual exploitation of a minor, a Class B felony; and one count of exploitation by displaying sexual acts to a minor, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-522 (2018) (rape of a child), 39-13-504 (2018) (aggravated sexual battery), 39-13-529(a) (soliciting sexual exploitation of a minor) (Supp. 2011, Supp. 2012, Supp. 2013), 39-13-529(b)(1) (displaying sexual acts to a minor). The Defendant is serving an effective eighty-one years for the convictions. On appeal, he contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, (2) the State’s election of offenses was inadequate, (3) the trial court erred in denying his motion for a severance, (4) the court erred in admitting evidence, and (5) his sentence is excessive. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal arises from a lawsuit alleging racial discrimination in the workplace. Mona Word (“Word”), an African-American woman who worked in the Knox County Clerk’s Office for 19 years, sued Knox County Clerk Foster D. Arnett, Jr. (“Arnett”) in his individual and official capacity, Knox County, Tennessee (“Knox County”), and the Knox County Clerk’s Office (“Defendants,” collectively) asserting a number of claims, including violations of the Tennessee Human Rights Act (“the THRA”). According to Word, she was denied opportunities for promotion because of her race, and was singled out for discipline because of her race, as well. Defendants filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, which the Circuit Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”) granted. Word appealed to this Court. Accepting Word’s factual allegations as true as is required at the motion for judgment on the pleadings stage, we hold that Word alleged enough to withstand Defendants’ motion with respect to certain of her claims against Knox County and Arnett in his individual capacity. However, we affirm the Trial Court’s dismissal of Word’s claims against Arnett in his official capacity and the Knox County Clerk’s Office, as well as Word’s claims for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The judgment of the Trial Court thus is affirmed, in part, and reversed, in part, and this cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

The Petitioner, Garrick Graham, filed a pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. The Sullivan County Criminal Court granted the motion in part and denied the motion in part, and the Petitioner appeals the trial court’s denial. Based upon our view of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Bradley Townsend, appeals the Roane County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his two convictions of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony, and resulting sentence of eight years. On appeal, he contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to request jury instructions on certain lesser-included offenses. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the Petitioner received the ineffective assistance of counsel with regard to his conviction of aggravated sexual battery in count twenty-one. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court as to that count and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Petitioner, Jamaal Mayes, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2003 guilty-pleaded conviction for attempted rape of a child. Petitioner argues that the statute of limitations should be tolled on due process grounds to assert a laterarising claim, namely that he did not become aware that he was subject to community supervision for life until more than ten years after his plea. After a hearing, the postconviction court dismissed the petition as untimely. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Timothy J. Pagliara (“Plaintiff”) filed suit against Marlene Moses and MTR Family Law, PLLC (collectively, “Defendants”), alleging malicious prosecution, civil conspiracy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress.  Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6), which the Trial Court granted.  Plaintiff timely appealed to this Court.  Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the Trial Court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims.

This appeal concerns the propriety of the defendant’s burglary conviction.  A Knox County grand jury indicted the defendant, Abbie Leann Welch, for misdemeanor theft in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-103, and burglary, a Class D felony, in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-402, for her involvement in a scheme to enter a Walmart retail store, steal merchandise, and have another individual return the merchandise for a gift card.  The defendant previously had been banned from Walmart retail stores for prior acts of shoplifting.  In this case, because the defendant entered Walmart without the effective consent of the owner—said consent having been revoked by letter—and committed a theft therein, the State sought an indictment for burglary rather than criminal trespass.  We hold that the plain language of the burglary statute does not preclude its application to the scenario presented in this case and that, because the statute is clear and unambiguous on its face, we need not review the legislative history to ascertain its meaning.  Application of the burglary statute in these circumstances does not violate due process or prosecutorial discretion.  We affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals. 

In 2014, the Petitioner, Antwion Dowdy, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder and four counts of aggravated assault, and the trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment. The Petitioner appealed his convictions to this court, and we affirmed the judgments. State v. Antwion Dowdy, No. W2015-02342-CCA-R3-CD, 2016 WL 7654950 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Feb. 21, 2016), no perm. app. filed. Subsequently, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the postconviction court denied after a hearing. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

A Giles County jury convicted Timothy T. Millican, Defendant, of one count of theft of property with a value of at least $10,000 but less than $60,000. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range I standard offender to four years at thirty percent release eligibility, which the trial court suspended to five years’ supervised probation following the service of a year in jail. On appeal, Defendant asserts that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction. After a thorough review of the record and applicable case law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I write separately in this case because I respectfully disagree with one point in the majority’s analysis, namely, the conclusion that Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-14-402(a) is clear and unambiguous.

The Petitioner, Vernon Walton, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his December 5, 2016 guilty plea conviction of attempted first degree murder, for which he is serving a sixteen-year sentence. He contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying relief based upon his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and entry of an involuntary guilty plea. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

On September 21, 2015, the Davidson County Grand Jury indicted Petitioner, Michael Delk, for aggravated rape of a child, aggravated sexual battery, sexual exploitation of a minor, and ten counts of aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor. On May 4, 2017, Petitioner pled guilty to one count of rape of a child and one count of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to serve twenty-seven years at one hundred percent for rape of a child and eight years at one hundred percent for especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, consecutive to the first count, for a total effective sentence of thirty-five years to serve at one hundred percent. On July 20, 2018, Petitioner filed an untimely pro se Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. After a hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition as time-barred. Following a thorough review of the record and applicable case law, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

On March 24, 2015, a Shelby County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant-Appellant, Reginald Parnell, for two counts of aggravated assault. On May 21, 2018, the day he was set for trial, the Defendant accepted a plea agreement and entered an Alford plea to each count of aggravated assault in exchange for a concurrent term of three years’ probation. On June 15, 2018, represented by newly retained counsel, the Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which was denied by the trial court following a hearing. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the Defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Upon our review, we affirm.

In January 2015, the Sequatchie County Grand Jury indicted Defendant, Willard C. Land, for first degree premeditated murder. Following a trial in February 2018, a jury found Defendant guilty of the lesser-included offense of second degree murder, for which Defendant received a sentence of thirty-five years’ incarceration. On appeal, Defendant contends that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of Defendant’s prior threats and acts of violence against the victim and others, and he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.