APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Jonathan Douglas (“Mr. Douglas”) filed a Complaint to Enforce Deed Restrictions seeking to enjoin Five Star Properties, Inc. (“Five Star”) from building a CrossMod home in a subdivision in which the parties each own property. Mr. Douglas argued that the CrossMod is a “mobile home” and is thus prohibited by the parties’ respective deeds. Following a bench trial, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Mr. Douglas. Five Star appeals that judgment. We conclude that the CrossMod home at issue is not a “mobile home,” reverse the judgment of the trial court, and vacate the injunction entered by the trial court.

The Madison County Grand Jury indicted Defendant, Andre Davis, Jr., for one count each of harassment and aggravated stalking. A jury found Defendant guilty as charged, and the trial court imposed an effective two-year sentence. Defendant appeals and argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. After a careful review of the record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Alexis Faxon, was convicted by a Sullivan County jury of reckless driving and
speeding which resulted in a fatal two-car accident. The trial court sentenced Defendant
to consecutive sentences of thirty days’ incarceration for speeding and six months
suspended to probation for reckless driving. Defendant appeals, arguing that the evidence
is insufficient to support her conviction for reckless driving, that the trial court erred by
denying a mistrial based on alleged discovery violations, and that the trial court erred by
admitting photographs and victim impact statements at the sentencing hearing and by
ordering thirty days’ incarceration. Upon our review of the entire record, the briefs of the
parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Plaintiff Terry Case did not make his mortgage payments for several years. The real property which secured his loan was subsequently sold at a foreclosure sale following the postponement of a prior sale date. Mr. Case brought a claim for “wrongful foreclosure,” among others, alleging Defendants Wilmington Trust, N.A. and Wilson & Associates, PLLC violated the notice requirements in the applicable deed of trust by failing to provide him with written notice of the postponement. The trial court granted summary judgment to Defendants, and Mr. Case solely appealed the dismissal of his claim for “wrongful foreclosure.” The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that Defendants failed to satisfy their notice obligations under the deed of trust and that summary judgment on the claim for “wrongful foreclosure” was therefore inappropriate. Defendant Wilmington Trust applied for permission to appeal to this Court, and we granted review to determine (1) whether Tennessee recognizes a common law cause of action for “wrongful foreclosure,” and (2) whether the Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac Uniform Deed of Trust requires written notice of postponement in addition to oral announcement pursuant to section 35-5-101(f) of the Tennessee Code. We further instructed the parties to address whether Mr. Case satisfied the requirements for constitutional standing. We hold that Mr. Case has constitutional standing to bring his claim. However, we also hold that there is no common law cause of action for “wrongful foreclosure” in Tennessee. As a result, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand to the trial court for entry of an order consistent with this opinion.

I concur in the majority’s well-written opinion. I write separately only to clarify a point that is important but tangential to the Court’s resolution of the issues presented. It relates to the majority’s discussion of the Open Courts provision in our Constitution, Tenn. Const. art. I, § 17.

This is a declaratory judgment action concerning the enforceability of covenants not to compete in the medical field. The trial court held the covenants unenforceable as applied to the plaintiff clinicians who provide anesthesia services at local hospitals in Tennessee. We affirm.

Defendant, Jerrell Anderson, appeals his Shelby County convictions for four counts of attempted first degree murder, two counts of aggravated assault, two counts of reckless endangerment, and two counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying two motions for mistrial and in admitting redacted recordings of jail phone calls into evidence instead of admitting the calls in their entirety. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Russell Lynn Onks, was convicted by a Sullivan County jury of four counts of violation of the Tennessee Sexual Offender and Violent Sexual Offender Registration, Verification and Tracking Act of 2004. After a hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of two years, suspended to probation after service of ninety days of incarceration. Defendant appeals, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that he established a primary residence, secondary residence, or a physical presence within Sullivan County to support counts one and two. Upon review of the entire record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, John Allen Hessmer, appeals the Wilson County Circuit Court’s denial of his motion to correct illegal sentences pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1.  Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

An LLC owned seven properties. The members of the LLC were a mother, father and daughter. Mother held the majority voting share. As manager of the LLC, Mother transferred most of its assets to another LLC, whose members were her daughter and son-in-law, without the knowledge of Father. Mother died and her estate sought to recover the assets for the original LLC. The trial court found that Daughter had a conflict of interest and that Mother/Decedent also had a conflict of interest. The trial court also found that the transactions violated Tennessee statutes and the “entire fairness test” of Rock Ivy Holding, LLC v. RC Properties, LLC, 464 S.W.3d 623 (Tenn. 2014). The trial court declared the transactions void. We affirm.

Plaintiff appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his personal injury action based on the doctrine of sovereign immunity and the expiration of the statute of limitations. Because the action was barred by the statute of limitations, we affirm.

The Defendant, Christopher Paul Drake, pled guilty to the offenses of attempted aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor and attempted sexual exploitation of a minor. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of eight years and placed the Defendant on probation after service of six months in custody. Thereafter, the Defendant was alleged to have committed a “zero tolerance” violation of his probation by being discharged from an outpatient sex offender treatment program. Following a hearing, the trial court revoked his suspended sentences in full. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered the sentences into execution. He also asserts that the trial court erred in admitting the treatment provider’s Notice of Termination despite the provider’s absence from the hearing. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Jordan Ballard, was convicted by a Lake County Circuit Court jury of
aggravated kidnapping, a Class B felony; rape, a Class B felony; aggravated assault, a Class
C felony; and assault, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-304 (2018)
(aggravated kidnapping), 39-13-503 (2019) (subsequently amended) (rape); 39-13-102
(Supp. 2020) (subsequently amended) (aggravated assault); 39-13-101 (Supp. 2020)
(subsequently amended) (assault). The trial court imposed concurrent sentences of ten
years for aggravated kidnapping, ten years for rape, four years for aggravated assault, and
eleven months, twenty-nine days for assault, for an effective ten-year sentence. On appeal,
the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his aggravated
kidnapping conviction. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A decedent’s former employee filed a petition to dissent from the decedent’s last will and
testament and sought a declaration that she is the decedent’s widow. Following a trial, the
court dismissed the petition on the basis that the evidence rebutted the presumption of a
valid marriage between the decedent and the former employee. We affirm.

This appeal concerns the division of marital property, and an award of alimony entered as part of a final decree of divorce.  For the reasons stated herein, we vacate the trial court’s judgment with respect to both subjects and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. 

This accelerated interlocutory appeal is taken from the trial court’s order denying Appellant’s motion for recusal. Because there is no evidence of bias that would require recusal under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendants, Jeffrey August Tate and Steven Ogle, were indicted in separate cases for multiple counts of theft of property and home construction fraud involving separate victims. Before trial, both Defendants filed motions to dismiss the home construction fraud counts in their respective indictments, alleging that a portion of the home construction fraud statute, Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-154(b)(1), was unconstitutionally vague on its face, and Defendant Tate also argued that the statute was vague as applied to him. Following a joint hearing on both Defendants’ motions, the trial court concluded that the home construction fraud statute is unconstitutionally vague on its face. The State appealed both Defendants’ cases pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c), and this court consolidated the appeals. We conclude that the State does not have an appeal as of right pursuant to Rule 3(c) because the record does not reflect that the substantive effect of the trial court’s order resulted in the dismissal of the indictments. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeals.

Paul L. Foutner, Defendant, was indicted for first degree murder, three counts of attempted
first degree murder, reckless endangerment, two counts of employing a firearm in the
commission of a dangerous felony, and one count of felon in possession of a firearm for
his role in a shooting in Knoxville. The trial court dismissed the reckless endangerment
charge before trial, and a jury convicted Defendant of second degree murder, attempted
second degree murder, two counts of reckless endangerment, employing a firearm in the
commission of a dangerous felony, employing a firearm in the commission of a dangerous
felony with a prior violent felony, and felon in possession of a firearm. Defendant received
an effective sentence of 54 years. On appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence to support his convictions for second degree murder and attempted second degree
murder. Because the evidence is sufficient to support the convictions, we affirm the
judgments of the trial court.

Jacob Wyatt Allen, Defendant, appeals from the revocation of judicial diversion after subsequent arrests for driving under the influence, aggravated criminal trespass, driving on a revoked license, driving under the influence, violation of the motorcycle helmet law, and violation of an ignition interlock system.  Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm the revocation of judicial diversion.

The appellee filed a petition for a common law writ of certiorari seeking judicial review of a decision from the board of zoning appeals. Having determined that the petition did not comply with certain statutory requirements, we find that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to take up the writ. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s order, and remand for the entry of an order of dismissal.

This is an appeal from a three-day divorce trial in which both parties presented expert testimony regarding how to calculate the husband’s income for purposes of paying support. The husband raises nine issues on appeal regarding proof of marital fault, the valuation of marital property, and the alimony and attorney fees awarded to the wife. For the following reasons, we vacate in part and affirm the decision of the trial court as modified.

Petitioner, Roy T. Lewis, appeals from the Robertson County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief following a hearing, in which Petitioner alleged that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered because trial counsel did not inform him of his offender classification.  Following a careful review of the record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. 

A Hancock County Jury convicted the Defendant, Shoshanna Cabanting, of vandalism of
property valued at $1,000 or less, a Class A misdemeanor, in violation of Tennessee Code
Annotated section 39-14-408(b)(1). The trial court imposed a sentence of eleven months
and twenty-nine days which was suspended after service of thirty days in jail. On appeal,
the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in imposing the thirty-day term of
confinement because it failed to consider the purposes and principles of the Sentencing
Act. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-103(1)(A)-(C). Upon our review, we reverse the
judgment of the trial court and remand for a limited resentencing hearing.

This is a case involving a contractual relationship between sophisticated business entities in which the Plaintiff-Appellant agreed to order beverage products manufactured by the Defendant-Appellee. The delivered products were nonconforming, and the Plaintiff-Appellant thereafter filed suit asserting common law tort claims and alleging violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. Upon motion of the Defendant-Appellee, however, the trial court dismissed the lawsuit. As part of its order of dismissal, the trial court held that the asserted common law tort claims were barred by the economic loss doctrine and ruled that the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act claim was barred by the statute of limitations. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the trial court’s judgment of dismissal.

In this child support dispute, the mother filed a petition to extend child support for an adult child due to the child’s severe disability. The father filed a motion to dismiss the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, which the trial court denied. Following a bench trial, the court entered an order determining that the parties’ adult son was severely disabled and directing the father to pay child support “going forward” and retroactively. The father sought to amend the final judgment, again raising the issue of the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction and also requesting that the final order be set aside until the child could undergo a vocational evaluation. The trial court denied the motion to alter or amend. The father has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. Upon consideration, we decline the mother’s request for attorney’s fees on appeal.