APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Marcus Anthony Pearson, appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court did not sufficiently set forth findings of fact and conclusions of law with regard to each argument raised in his Rule 36.1 motion. Additionally, the Defendant contends that his consecutive sentences are illegal because he was not resentenced in accordance with this court’s prior order, and as such, adequate Wilkerson findings were never made to support the imposition of consecutive sentences. Lastly, he claims the amended judgment forms were not entered in a timely fashion. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This case originates in a dispute over the administration of two trusts created for Joseph Peter Meersman, Jr. (“Meersman”). Meersman has filed multiple lawsuits against former trustees Michael Castellarin (“Castellarin”) and Regions Bank (“Regions”) (“Defendants,” collectively) alleging that they mismanaged the trusts. The trusts were terminated by court order in 2015. Laila Rumsey (“Rumsey”), Meersman’s partner, sued Defendants in the Chancery Court for Davidson County (“the Trial Court”) alleging that she too was damaged by Defendants’ actions. Defendants filed motions to dismiss, which the Trial Court granted based on the statute of limitations. Rumsey filed a motion to alter or amend within thirty days of entry of judgment but, contrary to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 59.04, did not serve Defendants within thirty days. The Trial Court denied Rumsey’s motion as untimely. Rumsey appeals. Rule 59.04 requires such a motion be both “filed and served” within thirty days of entry of judgment. Rumsey failed to serve Defendants timely. Therefore, Rumsey’s motion to alter or amend was untimely and did not toll the time in which to file a notice of appeal. We dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

This appeal concerns a disciplinary action taken against a prisoner. Rodger Broadway (“Petitioner”), an inmate at Turney Center Industrial Complex, was found guilty of Class B Defiance by the prison’s disciplinary board (“the Board”) for cursing at another inmate while in the gym. Petitioner, pro se, filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court for Hickman County (“the Trial Court”) against the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”) and multiple officials (“Respondents,” collectively). The Trial Court upheld the Board’s decision. Petitioner filed a motion to alter or amend, which the Trial Court denied as untimely even though Petitioner delivered the motion to the appropriate individual at his correctional facility within the time fixed for filing. We vacate the Trial Court’s judgment and remand for the Trial Court to consider Petitioner’s motion to alter or amend on its merits.

A father appeals the termination of his parental rights to one minor child. Discerning no error, we affirm

The Defendant was convicted in the Knox County Criminal Court of disrupting a lawful
meeting, a Class A misdemeanor, and received an eleven-month, twenty-nine-day sentence
to be served on supervised probation. On appeal, the Defendant claims that the evidence
is insufficient to support her conviction and that the statute prohibiting disruption of a
lawful meeting is unconstitutionally vague as applied to her. Based on our review, we
affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant has filed an application for interlocutory appeal, see Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure 9, seeking review of the trial court’s February 14, 2025 order denying his motion to dismiss a presentment charging him with aggravated stalking. See
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-315 (2023). The Defendant asserts that interlocutory review of the trial court’s order is required to prevent irreparable injury to the Defendant; to prevent needless, expensive, and protracted litigation; and to develop a uniform body of law. Tenn. R. App. P. 9(a)(1), (2), and (3). The State has filed an answer in opposition to the Defendant’s application. Following our review, the Defendant’s application for interlocutory appeal is DENIED.

The appellant appeals the circuit court’s finding that her minor children are dependent and neglected. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Defendant, Nicholas S. Collins, was convicted by a Sullivan County jury of the following offenses: domestic assault, a Class A misdemeanor (count 2); assault, a Class A misdemeanor (count 3); and aggravated domestic assault, a Class C felony (count 5). He received an effective sentence of seven and one-half years’ incarceration. Defendant appeals, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Upon review of the entire record, the briefs and arguments of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The appellant appeals the circuit court’s findings that her minor child is dependent and neglected and a victim of severe abuse. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Before the court is the pro se Defendant’s “Application for Extraordinary Relief.” See Tenn. R. App. P. 10. The Defendant raises two issues for this court’s review:
1. Whether Unicoi County Court(s) are moving [in] clear absen[ce] of jurisdiction?
2. Whether Unicoi County Court err[ed] in denying Petitioner access to Court by vehicle of habeas corpus?
The Defendant alleges that he was arrested illegally, that the trial court denied him counsel in violation of his constitutional rights, and that the trial court refused to hear a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He seeks dismissal of his charges.
The pleading contains no documentation in support of the Defendant’s allegations.1 As such, the pleading is wholly insufficient for this court to engage in any review of the trial court’s actions. See Tenn. R. App. P. 10(c).

Defendant, Jessie Rose Hodge, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s decision to deny judicial diversion for her guilty-pleaded conviction of criminally negligent homicide, a Class E felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-212. Following our review, we affirm.

A Montgomery County jury convicted the Defendant, Decory Sanchez Smith, of first degree felony murder and attempted aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced him to life plus ten years. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and (2) the trial court erred when it sentenced him by imposing a ten-year sentence for his robbery conviction and ordering consecutive sentencing. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Appellee filed a petition in juvenile court seeking to terminate a father’s parental rights.  After a bench trial, the trial court granted the petition and entered an order terminating the father’s parental rights based on the grounds of (1) abandonment by failure to support, (2) abandonment by failure to visit, (3) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody and financial responsibility, and (4) failure by a putative father to timely file a petition to establish paternity.  The trial court also determined termination of the father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest.  We affirm the grounds for termination.  However, we conclude that the trial court failed to make sufficient findings of fact regarding its best interest analysis.  Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s decision that termination of the father’s parental rights was in the best interest of the child and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Defendant, Nathaniel Lee Mitchell, appeals from his Giles County Circuit Court conviction for reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, for which he received a sentence of two years, suspended to two years’ supervised probation. Defendant contends that the trial court erroneously admitted evidence of a prior incident in violation of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b) and that the evidence of his reckless mental state was insufficient. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A mother appeals the trial court’s decision in this post-divorce modification action. We find no error in the trial court’s decision to change the residential parenting schedule and to make the father the primary residential parent. We further find no error in the trial court’s ruling making the father the sole decision-maker on non-emergency medical care and educational matters. However, we reverse the trial court’s ruling that neither parent could obtain a passport for the children or take them out of the country. Further, we vacate and remand the trial court’s decision on the residential parenting schedule for failure to make a specific provision for holiday parenting time.

Devan Shepherd, Defendant, was convicted by a Madison County jury of first degree felony murder, three counts of aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated burglary, and one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, for which he received an effective sentence of life plus twelve years. On appeal, Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; that the trial court erred by granting the State’s motion in limine to prohibit any discussion of Defendant’s age at the time of the offenses; and that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on defense of a third person. Following our review of the record and the parties’ arguments, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In this healthcare liability case, appellant/patient appeals the trial court’s grant of appellee/doctor’s Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02 motion to dismiss and its grant of appellee/doctor’s employer’s Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.03 motion for judgment on the pleadings. The trial court held that appellant failed to comply with the pre-suit notice requirements found in Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26-121. As such, the statute of limitations barred appellant’s claims against the doctor. Having granted the doctor’s motion to dismiss, the trial court applied the common-law, operation-of-law exception to dismiss appellant’s vicarious liability claims against the doctor’s employer. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This appeal concerns two issues: (1) whether a 2024 amendment to the unlawful detainer statute made possession bonds mandatory for all tenants in appeals from the general sessions court to the circuit court, abrogating the decision in Johnson v. Hopkins, 432 S.W.3d 840 (Tenn. 2013); and (2) whether a tenant’s failure to sign an affidavit of indigency filed in lieu of a cost bond deprives the circuit court of subject matter jurisdiction. Here, the general sessions court awarded possession of the property to the landlords and entered a monetary judgment for unpaid rent against the tenants. One of the tenants then filed a timely notice of appeal with an unsigned affidavit of indigency. The general sessions court found the tenant indigent and qualified to proceed on a pauper’s oath. But the circuit court held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the tenant remained in possession of the property and did not post a bond equal to one year’s rent per Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-18-130(b)(2). This appeal followed. The tenant contends that a possession bond was unnecessary under the decision in Johnson because he did not seek to retain possession of the property pending the appeal, and he argues that his failure to sign the affidavit of indigency is a correctable, technical defect. We conclude that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the tenant did not file a properly executed affidavit of indigency in the general sessions court. For this reason, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

This is a property action involving the plaintiffs’ years long pursuit to establish a right-of-way to landlocked property. The trial court dismissed the action for failure to prosecute. We now vacate the order of dismissal and remand for further hearing.

Petitioner, Nathaniel Taylor, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his post-conviction petition. He argues that the post-conviction court erred in dismissing his petition because (1) his petition was unjustly denied in light of established law and under color of law; (2) he should have been appointed counsel and granted an evidentiary hearing in order to present his case; and (3) his conviction was based on the use of evidence gained pursuant to an unconstitutional search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Upon review of the entire record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the post-conviction court’s summary dismissal.

Defendant, Amanda Michelle Owen, appeals the eight-year sentence imposed for her Blount County Circuit Court guilty-pleaded conviction of theft of property valued at $60,000 or more but less than $250,000, a Class B felony, arguing that the trial court erred by imposing a sentence of full incarceration. Because the record reflects that the trial court made the appropriate findings and that those findings are supported by the facts of this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering that Defendant serve the entirety of her sentence in confinement, and, accordingly, we affirm.

A Tennessee LLC sued one of its members seeking injunctive relief, monetary damages, and his expulsion as an LLC member. The trial court issued a temporary restraining order restraining the defendant from misappropriating, using, or disclosing the LLC’s trade secrets and confidential and proprietary business information.  The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint and dissolve the temporary restraining order based upon an arbitration provision, a choice of law provision, and a forum selection clause contained in the LLC’s operating agreement.  The trial court granted the defendant’s motion and held that it lacked jurisdiction and venue based on the forum selection clause and that the LLC failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted due to the arbitration provision.  We conclude that Tennessee law governs the operating agreement and affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the complaint based upon the arbitration provision. However, we reverse the trial court’s holding that it lacked jurisdiction and venue over the LLC’s claims for temporary injunctive relief.

This matter is before the Court upon motion of the Defendant, Craig Kitt, for review of the trial court’s order denying his motion to reduce the amount of his pretrial bond. See Tenn. R. App. P. 8; Tenn. Code. Ann. § 40-11-144. The State opposes.

The Defendant, Caprice Lashon Peete, was convicted by a Tipton County Circuit Court jury of first degree premeditated murder, for which he received a sentence of life imprisonment. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and argues that the trial court erred by not excusing a juror who failed to disclose that she knew one of the State’s primary witnesses, by not allowing the Defendant to cross-examine another State’s witness about the underlying facts of the witness’s 2023 conviction for convicted felon in possession of a firearm, and by allowing the prosecutor to make inappropriate comments in closing argument without an adequate curative instruction by the trial court or the trial court’s enforcing its order that the prosecutor retract the inappropriate comment. The Defendant further argues that he is entitled to a new trial under the doctrine of cumulative error. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A property developer purchased a portion of a two-story building without having fully examined the property prior to acquiring it. The only existing means of accessing the second floor of his property was via a staircase owned by his neighbor. The developer did not have an express easement to use the staircase, and disagreements arose between the developer and his neighbor over the developer’s use of his neighbor’s staircase. In response, the developer filed suit. The developer claimed an easement implied by prior use, an easement by necessity, and/or a prescriptive easement. At trial, the neighbor sought, in effect, an involuntary dismissal at the close of the developer’s proof. The trial court granted that motion, reasoning that the developer failed to meet his burden of proof with respect to all three of his easement theories. The developer appeals. We affirm.