APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The appellant, Danny A. Blankenship, doing business as Danny Blankenship Bonding Company, sought permission from the trial court to write bail bonds in Sumner County. The proposed resident representative of the company in Sumner County was the appellant, Glen M. Davis. In the event Davis was not available to write a bond, the proposed substitute was Richard L. Gregory, an employee of the bonding company and also an appellant in this case. The trial court denied the application because Blankenship did not possess sufficient personal assets to support his company’s writing of bail bonds in the general sessions and criminal courts of Sumner County. The appellants appeal as of right from this judgment. Since the evidence supports the findings made by the trial court, the judgment is affirmed.

Appellant, Bobby Love, was convicted in Maury County Circuit Court of the crime of aggravated assault, a Class C felony, by a jury. The trial court found that appellant was a standard offender and imposed a Range I sentence of confinement for six years in the Department of Correction and ordered restitution to the victim.

These cases were heard before the Special Supreme Court on an expedited basis on
July 5, 1996. Due to the fact that our decision in these consolidated cases will affect the election which is set for August 1, 1996, the Court is issuing this Order today, with a more detailed Opinion to follow.

The Court finds as follows:
1. The statutory scheme for judicial selection and evaluation, popularly known as “The
Tennessee Plan”, T.C.A. Section 17-4-101 et seq. does not violate the Tennessee Constitution. State v. Dunn, 496 S.W. 2d 480 (Tenn. 1973).
2. Under the provisions of T.C.A. Section 17-4-114 (c), the Tennessee Plan is not applicable
unless the judicial evaluation commission recommends the retention of a judge. In the forthcoming judicial election, the judicial evaluation commission was not yet fully operational and, through no fault of Justice White, it did not act to recommend her retention as a Supreme Court Justice. Accordingly, the provisions of the Tennessee Plan are not applicable to the election to be held on August 1, 1996, and under T.C.A. Section 17-4-114(c), a political party may nominate a candidate, and independent candidates may qualify under the general election law for the general election which is the regular August election.
3. In accordance with the provisions of T.C.A. Section 2-5-101, independent and primary
candidates should have qualified for the upcoming August 1, 1996, election by filing all nominating petitions no later than twelve o’clock noon, May 16, 1996. Appellants Laska and Hooker attempted to obtain such petitions from Defendant Appellee Thompson, but were unsuccessful in their efforts because of an erroneous interpretation of the law to the effect that Justice Penny White was running unopposed in a “retention election” under the Tennessee Plan.
4. Appellants Hooker and Laska have made good faith efforts to qualify for the upcoming election. Similarly, Justice White has acted in good faith in declaring her candidacy for the Supreme Court.
5. At all times relevant to this Court’s decision, Appellant Hooker lacked the qualifications necessary under T.C.A. Section 2-5-106 to qualify for the office of Supreme Court Justice in the August 1, 1996, election, because Appellant Hooker’s law license was suspended as a result of his failure to meet continuing legal education requirements.
6. The Defendants have raised an issue as to the residency of Appellant Laska, who has
attempted to qualify as a candidate for the Western Grand Division of this State. Considerable proof regarding whether Mr. Laska is a bona fide resident of the Western Grand Division was offered at the Chancery Court hearing on this matter, but the Chancellor did not make a ruling as to Mr. Laska’s residency.

Daniel P. Taylor (“claimant”) filed this suit against the State of Tennessee (?defendant” or “State”) in the Tennessee Claims Commission for damages he allegedly sustained due to the malpractice of his court- appointed attorney. The Claims Commission granted defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The sole issue presented by this appeal is whether the commissioner erred in so doing. We find no error and affirm.

The Probate Court of Putnam County dismissed a claim against the estate of Rupert O. Newman because the claimant lacked standing to make the claim. We affirm.

The determinative issue on appeal is whether the appeals should be dismissed because the appellant did not file notice of the appeal with the clerk of the appellant court designated in the notice of appeal.

In this divorce action, the husband appeals from the Trial Court's determination of the classificatin of property as marital property and the division of the marital estate.

The captioned plaintiff has appealed from an order of the Trial Court reading as follows: This matter came to be heard on June 2, 1995, upon the motion to dismiss filed on behalf of the defendants, Tennessee Department of Labor and Al Bodie, Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Labor. Upon consideration of the pleadings filed and the argument of counsel, the Court finds that this matter should be dismissed on the basis that the Court lacks jurisdiction as the petition for judicial review was not filed within sixty days of the final agency action as required by T.C.A. §4-5-322. Therefore, it is hereby ORDERED that the defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED. Costs shall be taxed to the petitioner. On appeal, plaintiff presents a single issue as follows: Did the Chancery Court err in dismissing this matter for lack of jurisdiction on the basis that the complaint was not timely filed?

The appellant, Daniel G. Hampton, was convicted of driving under the influence, second offense, a Class A misdemeanor, two counts of driving on a revoked license, Class B misdemeanors, and violation of the implied consent law by a jury of his peers. The trial court sentenced the appellant to eleven months and twenty-nine days in the Carter County Jail with all but seventy days suspended for the driving under the influence, second offense; six months suspended in the Carter County Jail for driving on a revoked license on April 9, 1994 which was ordered to run concurrently with the other sentences; and six months in the Carter County Jail with all but twenty days suspended for driving on a revoked license on April 1, 1994 which was ordered to run consecutively to the driving under the influence, second offense conviction.

The issues in this appeal are (1) whether the chancellor erred in granting a judgment against a corporation for back wages, (2) whether the chancellor should have pierced the corporate veil and granted a judgment against the corporation’s principal shareholder and (3) whether the court erred in dismissing the fraud claims against the principal shareholder. We affirm the chancellor’s decision in part and reverse on the fraud claims made directly against the principal shareholder.

The determinative issue on appeal is whether the appeal should be dismissed because the appellant did not file notice of the appeal with the clerk of the appellate court designated in the notice of appeal.

The plaintiff, Evelyn June Thomason, has appealed from a summary judgment
dismissing her suit against the defendant, Metropolitan Government of Nashville and
Davidson County, Tennessee, for personal injuries sustained in a fall on the premises of the
Lentz Health Center, a facility owned and managed by the defendant.

While I concede tha the majority opinion is technically correct and the reasoning employed comports with previous case law, I observe that this Court, or at least this member of this Court, has routinely overruled such motions when the only defect as to the serviceof thenotice of appeal is failure to file a copy with the Clerk of this Court.

This case involves an alleged breach of fiduciary duty by the conservator of an estate. After a bench trial, the trial court held that the plaintiff had failed to prove a breach of fiduciary duty. We find that the trial court misapplied the burden of proof and reverse the trial court’s decision.