APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A county regional planning commission denied the petitioner’s application to place a quarry in an agricultural zone. The zoning laws included certain requirements for quarrying. None of the zones, however, permitted quarrying, and all the zones prohibited any unpermitted uses. The petitioner sought a writ of certiorari. The trial court granted summary judgment to the county respondents, concluding that the planning commission did not act illegally, capriciously, fraudulently, or without material evidence. Because the zoning laws for the agricultural zone did not permit quarrying and explicitly prohibited unpermitted uses, we affirm the grant of summary judgment.

The Petitioner, Monoleto D. Green, acting pro se, appeals from the order of the Davidson County Criminal Court summarily dismissing his second petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus. Pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals, we affirm.

After being indicted on multiple charges in two separate cases, Jamarea Dashon Alderson, Defendant, entered an open guilty plea to the offenses of aggravated assault, two counts of simple possession of marijuana, possession of oxycodone, possession of hydrocodone, and evading arrest.  The trial court denied alternative sentencing and sentenced Defendant to serve an effective sentence of five years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days, ordering partial consecutive sentencing.  Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing and ordering consecutive sentencing.  Defendant also challenges the trial court’s admission of testimony about pending charges during the sentencing hearing.  Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. 

This action involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her minor children. Following a bench trial, the court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to establish the following statutory grounds of termination: (1) the persistence of conditions which led to removal; (2) substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans; and (3) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of the children. The court also found that termination was in the best interest of the children. We affirm the trial court’s termination decision.

Father appeals the termination of his parental rights, arguing that termination was not in his child’s best interests. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

The Plaintiffs filed suit against the former father-in-law of one of the Plaintiffs, complaining that, following alleged statements the former father-in-law made to a third party, the third party moved money that had been invested with the former son-in-law. The former father-in-law sought to dismiss the claims that were asserted against him, both pursuant to a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12 motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and pursuant to a petition under the Tennessee Public Participation Act. After initially dismissing the Plaintiffs’ complaint for failure to state a claim and denying a motion to alter or amend, the trial court held a separate hearing regarding dismissal under the Tennessee Public Participation Act. Ultimately, the trial court ruled that dismissal under the Tennessee Public Participation Act was appropriate and concluded that the former father-in-law was entitled to costs and attorney’s fees in connection with this litigation, both in relation to the Tennessee Public Participation Act petition and the Rule 12 dismissal. For the specific reasons stated herein, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal under Rule 12, vacate its dismissal—and award of costs and attorney’s fees—under the Tennessee Public Participation Act, and affirm the award of costs and attorney’s fees that stemmed from the trial court’s Rule 12 dismissal.

This appeal concerns the termination of parental rights. Tamara R. (“Mother”) is the mother of minor child Tayla R. (“the Child”). Jesse R. (“Legal Father”) is the Child’s legal father, having married Mother on the day that the Child was born. The Child was removed into state custody based on Mother’s drug use while pregnant and environmental concerns in the home. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”), and the Child’s foster parents Autumn M. (“Foster Mother”) and Drannon M. (“Foster Father”) (“Foster Parents,” collectively), filed a petition in the Chancery Court for Putnam County (“the Chancery Court”) seeking to terminate Mother’s and Legal Father’s parental rights to the Child. The Chancery Court terminated Mother’s and Legal Father’s parental rights on several grounds. Aside from a few token visits with the Child, Mother and Legal Father essentially did nothing on their case, declining to cooperate with DCS or even allow DCS inside their residence, an RV camper. Neither Mother nor Legal Father paid any child support whatsoever for the Child. We affirm.

The defendant, William Paul Climer, was indicted by the Dyer County Grand Jury for one count of aggravated kidnapping and two counts of aggravated assault. On September 8, 2023, the defendant pled guilty to one count of aggravated assault. Per the terms of his plea agreement, the defendant agreed to be sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender with the length and manner of service to be determined by the trial court. Additionally, the State agreed to dismiss the aggravated kidnapping charge and the second count of aggravated assault. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the defendant to a term of six years’ incarceration and imposed a fine of $2500. On appeal, the defendant contends the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing and in imposing a fine without making the appropriate findings. Upon our review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s denial of alternative sentencing; however, the trial court failed to make the appropriate findings concerning the imposition of the $2500 fine, and therefore, we remand the matter to the trial court to determine if a fine is appropriate and make such findings as necessary.

The Defendant, William Swafford, was convicted by a Hamblen County jury of especially
aggravated kidnapping, aggravated assault, and rape, for which he received an effective
sentence of fifty-five years’ imprisonment. On appeal, he argues that the evidence is
insufficient to support his conviction of especially aggravated kidnapping and that the trial
court erred by admitting the preliminary hearing testimony of the Defendant’s late wife.
After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

A husband appeals the trial court’s final judgment of divorce with respect to two issues.  Because the husband failed to comply with the applicable briefing rules, we have concluded that he waived his first issue.  We find no support for the husband’s second issue.  Having determined that the husband’s appeal is frivolous, we affirm the trial court’s decision and remand to the trial court for the assessment of damages.

Petitioner, Tracy L. Harris, pleaded guilty in Carroll County Circuit Court to first degree murder and aggravated rape and was sentenced to an effective sentence of life without parole. After unsuccessful challenges to his convictions and sentences in Tennessee and federal courts, Petitioner filed a pro se petition pursuant to the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001 (“The Act”), Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-301, et. seq., requesting DNA analysis on several items and samples taken from the crime scene. After the State responded in opposition, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition without a hearing and found that Petitioner had not met the statutory requirements of the Act. On appeal, Petitioner challenges the post-conviction court’s dismissal of his petition. We conclude that the post-conviction court did not err in dismissing the petition, and we affirm.

The juvenile court terminated a mother’s parental rights to two of her children. The mother appealed and challenges the court’s determination that clear and convincing evidence established grounds for termination and that termination of her rights was in the children’s best interests. We find no error and affirm.

A patient brought a health care liability action against his psychiatrist and the psychiatrist’s employer, alleging the psychiatrist engaged in improper sexualized conduct that caused him psychological injury.  The patient secured an expert witness in support of his suit, but the expert withdrew following the expert’s deposition.  The patient obtained a new expert witness.  However, relying on the cancellation rule, the trial court determined a conflict existed between the second expert’s affidavit and deposition testimony relating to the issue of damages.  The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants and also granted the defendants’ request for an award of discretionary costs.  The patient appeals.  We affirm.

In this accelerated interlocutory appeal, the appellant’s oral motion for recusal made during trial was denied. She then filed a written motion for recusal that apparently has yet to be resolved by the trial court. Because no order denying the motion has been entered, we dismiss the appeal.

The Defendant, Roderick Redmond, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-522 (Supp. 2020) (subsequently amended) (rape of a child), 39-13- 504 (2018) (aggravated sexual battery). The trial court sentenced him to consecutive sentences of thirty years for rape of a child and ten years for aggravated sexual battery, for an effective forty-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, David Alexander Hayes, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court
jury of resisting arrest, a Class B misdemeanor. See T.C.A. § 39-16-602 (2018). The
Defendant was sentenced to ninety days’ probation. On appeal, he contends that the
evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Jaylon Hatch, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of attempted premeditated first degree murder, a Class A felony; aggravated assault in concert with two or more persons, a Class B felony; reckless endangerment by discharging a firearm into a habitation, a Class C felony; and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202 (first degree murder), 39-13-102 (Supp. 2019) (subsequently amended) (aggravated assault), 39-13-103 (Supp. 2019) (reckless endangerment), 39-17-1324 (Supp. 2019) (subsequently amended) (employing a firearm). The trial court imposed an effective twenty-one-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to establish that he was the perpetrator of the conviction offenses because they are based on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction
of resisting arrest. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-16-602(a) (“It is an offense for a person to
intentionally prevent or obstruct anyone known to the person to be a law enforcement
officer, or anyone acting in a law enforcement officer’s presence and at the officer’s
direction, from effecting a stop, frisk, halt, arrest or search of any person, including the
defendant, by using force against the law enforcement officer or another.”). The gravamen
of the Defendant’s challenge is not the sufficiency of the evidence offered to establish his
use of “force.” Instead, the Defendant asks us to focus on when the “force” occurred or
the Defendant’s pre- and post-arrest conduct. Because the State did not offer any evidence
of the Defendant’s use of force before his arrest, the Defendant argues, and I agree, that the
evidence supporting the resisting arrest conviction is insufficient as a matter of law.

The defendant, Joshua L. Hutcherson, pleaded guilty to four counts of vehicular assault, two counts of driving on a revoked license with a prior DUI, one count of leaving the scene of an accident with injuries, four counts of reckless aggravated assault, and one count of felony reckless endangerment, and the trial court imposed an effective sentence of fourteen years’ incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing and in failing to apply an appropriate mitigating factor. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. However, we remand the case for corrected judgment forms.

The trial court terminated a mother’s parental rights to six children based on abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home and severe abuse. The trial court further concluded that terminating the mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests. Mother appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s ruling.

Defendant, Roger Trino Spencer, Jr., was indicted by the McNairy County Grand Jury for one count of aggravated robbery accomplished with a deadly weapon and two counts of aggravated assault by displaying a deadly weapon. Defendant was convicted as charged by a jury and sentenced by the trial court as a Range II offender to an effective eighteen years’ confinement. The trial court also imposed an effective $15,000 fine and ordered Defendant to pay $971 in restitution. In this appeal as of right, Defendant contends that the State failed to provide sufficient proof of his identity as the perpetrator of the offenses; the State’s improper comments during opening statement and closing argument entitle him to plain error relief; the trial court erred by failing to consider a validated risk and needs assessment in imposing his sentence; and the trial court erred by failing to consider his ability to pay in imposing fines and ordering restitution. Having reviewed the briefs and arguments of the parties and the record on appeal, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A decedent’s stepchildren filed a complaint contesting ownership of a portion of his twenty-acre property. They asserted theories of adverse possession, express oral trust, and breach of contract. The trial court dismissed the complaint. Because we conclude that the allegations of an express oral trust and breach of contract are sufficient to overcome a motion to dismiss, we reverse in part.

Katherine Malone died in an accident in Idaho. Her ex-husband, Patrick Malone, was named guardian of their child, Beatrice Rose Malone (“Rosie”). A trust (“the Tennessee Trust”) was established in Davidson County, Tennessee, for all funds due to Rosie. Katherine Malone’s parents, James William Rose and Jennie Adams Rose (“the Roses”) were the personal representatives of her estate and “Limited Trust Protectors,” of the Tennessee Trust. Mr. Malone, as Rosie’s guardian, filed a wrongful death lawsuit in Idaho and recovered a settlement. The settlement funds were placed in a trust Mr. Malone established in Missouri with Blue Ridge Bank and Trust. The Roses filed this action to transfer the funds to the Tennessee Trust and to find Mr. Malone in civil contempt. The Probate Court agreed with the Roses, finding Mr. Malone in civil contempt and ordering that the funds be transferred to the Tennessee Trust. Mr. Malone and Blue Ridge Bank and Trust appealed. We affirm.

For disobedience of or resistance to a court order to constitute contempt, four elements must be satisfied.  Konvalinka v. Chattanooga–Hamilton Cty. Hosp. Auth., 249 S.W.3d 346, 354 (Tenn. 2008); see Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-9-102(3) (2024) (defining the scope of a court’s contempt power).  This case turns on the second of the four: whether “the order alleged to have been violated . . . [was] clear, specific, and unambiguous.”  Konvalinka, 249 S.W.3d at 354.  Because the order here was not sufficiently specific to support the finding of contempt, I would reverse.

Following a jury trial, a Cheatham County jury convicted Defendant, Jared A. Smith, of three counts of Rape of a Child, four counts of Aggravated Sexual Battery, and three counts of Incest, for which he received a total effective sentence of seventy-eight years’ incarceration. On appeal, Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred by limiting his cross-examination of a police witness; (2) the State’s election of offenses was “vague, ambiguous and unsupported by the evidence,” in violation of his right to a unanimous jury verdict; and (3) the trial court erred by declining to instruct the jury on generic evidence.  Following a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm.