APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

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State vs. Carolyn Pickett

01C01-9710-CC-00472

Originating Judge:J. Curtis Smith
Franklin County Court of Criminal Appeals 08/31/98
Longworth vs. Nunez

03A01-9709-CV-00388
Court of Appeals 08/31/98
David F. Summers v. K.U.B and Larry Brinton, et al

03S01-9703-CH-00029
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Fairly stated, the issues referred to the panel for findings and conclusions are (1) whether the chancellor erred in computing the employer's liability for permanent total disability benefits based upon a percentage of benefits payable to the employee up to age 65, (2) whether the chancellor erred in holding the employer liable for all benefits payable until the time of the employee's death, from a cause other than the compensable injury, on September 8, 1996, and (3) whether the chancellor abused his discretion by refusing to order the claimant's counsel to remit a portion of his fee because the claimant died before the expiration of 4 weeks. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the judgment should be affirmed as to all three issues. The employee or claimant, Summers, was fifty-four years old at the time of the trial. He had worked for the employer, Knoxville Utilities District, since 1965. On June 2, 1993, he suffered a compensable neck injury, which injury was superimposed upon three prior disabilities, none of which entitled him to an award of workers' compensation benefits. As a result of the compensable injury, for which the chancellor found him to be thirty percent permanently disabled, combined with the pre-existing physical disabilities, the claimant is permanently and totally disabled. The trial judge so found and, as required by Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-28(a)(1)1, apportioned the award thirty percent to the employer and seventy percent to the Second Injury Fund, to age 65. The employer contends, by its first issue, that its liability should be limited to thirty percent the first 4 weeks of benefits. 1 5-6-28(a)(1) If an employee has previously sustained a permanent physical disability from any cause or origin and becomes permanently and totally disabled through a subsequent injury, such employee shall be entitled to compensation from such employee's employer or the employer's insurance company only for the disability that would have resulted from the subsequent injury, and such previous injury shall not be considered in estimating the compensation to which such employee may be entitled under this chapter from the employer or the employer's insurance company; provided, that in addition to such compensation for a subsequent injury, and after completion of the payments therefor, then such employee shall be paid the remainder of the compensation that would be due for the permanenttotal disability out of a special fund to be known as the "second injury fund" therein created.
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Billy Joe White,
Knox County Workers Compensation Panel 08/31/98
Henry Mitchell Brummitt v. Lockheed Martin Energy Systems

03S01-9707-CV-00089
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with T.C.A. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The plaintiff alleged that he became totally disabled on account of anxiety and depression caused by several specific, acute and sudden stressful job-related incidents, all of which were denied by the defendant. The trial judge found that the plaintiff's mental problems were the result of a "gradual build-up of stress caused by the plaintiff's overreaction to his work," and hence not compensable. The plaintiff appeals the dismissal of his complaint. Review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the finding, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. T.C.A. _ 5-6- 225(e)(2); Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). The application of this standard requires this Court to weigh in more depth the factual findings and conclusions of the trial courts in workers' compensation cases. See Corcoran v. Foster Auto GMC, Inc., 746 S.W.2d 452, 456 (Tenn. 1988). I The plaintiff is 58 years old. In June 1976 he was employed by the defendant's predecessor as a fire truck driver. Promotions came his way and in 1984 he was named maintenance officer of all the fire and guard facilities at the Y-12 plant in Oak Ridge. 2
Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. James B. Scott
Knox County Workers Compensation Panel 08/31/98
State vs. Samuel Howard

02C01-9707-CR-00274
Shelby County Court of Criminal Appeals 08/31/98
X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX

X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX

Originating Judge:Wyeth Chandler
Supreme Court 08/31/98
Memphis Publishing Co. vs. TN. Petroleum Underground

01S01-9710-CH-00232
Supreme Court 08/31/98
Barbara White vs. William H. Lawrence, M.D.

02S01-9701-CV-00007
Supreme Court 08/31/98
State vs. Gary Russell

02C01-9712-CC-00475
Madison County Court of Criminal Appeals 08/31/98
Spooner vs. State

03C01-9608-CR-00283
Hancock County Court of Criminal Appeals 08/31/98
Sarah Taylor v. Harman Automotive, Inc.

02S01-9708-CH-00074
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the findings, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2); Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). The application of this standard requires this Court to weigh in more depth the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court in a workers' compensation case. See Corcoran v. Foster Auto GMC, Inc., 746 S.W.2d 452, 456 (Tenn. 1988). The issue raised in this case is whether the trial judge erroneously set aside a previously approved settlement of the plaintiff's workers' compensation case against the defendant. We find it was error to set this judgment approving the settlement aside. We reverse the judgment which did so and reinstate the judgment approving the settlement. Prior to April 17, 1995, the plaintiff and the defendant reached an agreement to settle the plaintiff's claim against the defendant. The parties filed a joint petition seeking court approval of the agreement. On April 17, 1995, the petition was heard by Chancellor Morris, sitting by interchange for Judge Whitenton in Hardeman County. After hearing the plaintiff and other statements, Chancellor Morris found the settlement was proper, was understood by the plaintiff, and gave her substantially what she was entitled to under the Workers' Compensation Act. On May 4, 1995, the plaintiff filed a petition to set aside the settlement because "her workers' compensation settlement was procured by fraud, or in the alternative, the settlement did not secure to her in a substantial manner the benefits under the workers' compensation law of the State of Tennessee." 2
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Dewey C. Whitenton,
Hardeman County Workers Compensation Panel 08/31/98
State vs. Andre Chamberlain

01C01-9710-CR-00490
Davidson County Court of Criminal Appeals 08/31/98
James Jackson vs. State

01C01-9609-CR-00387
Davidson County Court of Criminal Appeals 08/31/98
City of Fulton vs. Hickman-Fulton

01S01-9710-FD-00215
Weakley County Supreme Court 08/31/98
Harden vs. Danek

03A01-9801-CV-00020
Court of Appeals 08/31/98
State vs. Charles Treadwell

01C01-9705-CR-00166
Davidson County Court of Criminal Appeals 08/28/98
State vs. Drexell Ridley

01C01-9705-CC-00171

Originating Judge:W. Charles Lee
Lincoln County Court of Criminal Appeals 08/28/98
01C01-9710-CR-00460

01C01-9710-CR-00460
Davidson County Court of Criminal Appeals 08/27/98
Walter Kendrick vs. State

01C01-9703-CR-00107

Originating Judge:Walter C. Kurtz
Davidson County Court of Criminal Appeals 08/27/98
01C01-9707-CR-00237

01C01-9707-CR-00237

Originating Judge:Thomas H. Shriver
Davidson County Court of Criminal Appeals 08/27/98
In State v. King, ____ S.W.2D ____ (Tenn. 1998), Our Supreme Court

01C01-9707-CR-00237

Originating Judge:Thomas H. Shriver
Davidson County Court of Criminal Appeals 08/27/98
Alan Head vs. State

01C01-9802-CR-00082

Originating Judge:Jerry L. Smith
Court of Criminal Appeals 08/27/98
State vs. Macarthur Monie

02C01-9710-CC-00413
Fayette County Court of Criminal Appeals 08/26/98
State vs. Anthony Robinson

02C01-9707-CR-00275
Shelby County Court of Criminal Appeals 08/26/98
State vs. Adrian Wilkerson & Steven Murphy

01C01-9610-CR-00419

Originating Judge:J. Randall Wyatt, Jr.
Davidson County Court of Criminal Appeals 08/26/98