APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Defendant Terry Muncey appeals, and Plaintiff Tim Taylor cross-appeals, the trial court’s judgment awarding Muncey $1000 in damages on his counterclaim for wrongful injunction against Taylor. We reverse the trial court’s judgment based upon our conclusion that Muncey failed to meet his burden of proving the elements of his claim for wrongful injunction.

The Chancellor granted summary judgment to the defendant on the plaintiff’s fraud claim. Because we believe the plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to make out a claim of fraud, and the defendant has been unable to negate those allegations, we find the fraud claim inappropriate for summary judgment, and we reverse. We also find that the plaintiff has not waived his contract claim, and we remand this case to the trial court for the resolution of both claims.

This is an action by a homeowner against a remodeling contractor and a painter for the failure of the paint inside the house. The Chancery Court of Davidson County dismissed the homeowner’s claims. We affirm.

This is a suit in chancery for declaratory judgment relative to a policy of insurance. The primary question presented is whether or not participation by the insured in a motorbike event known as an "enduro" constitutes "racing" within the meaning of an exclusion in the policy. After the insured died from injuries he received while participatingin an "enduro," the defendant insurance company denied coverage. The lower court found that the particular loss in this case was excluded from coverage. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

In this action filed against TFE, Inc. (hereafter “TFE”), Michael King appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to TFE as related to King’s claims for breach of an alleged employment contract. The trial court granted TFE’s motion for summary judgment based on the court’s conclusion that an employee handbook distributed by TFE did not constitute an employment contract. For the reasons hereafter stated, we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment.

This case involves the refusal of the Metropolitan Department of Codes Administration ("the Department") to issue building permits to the petitioner/appellant landowner. Planning to divide and sell his land, the petitioner made preparations to subdivide this land pursuant to the Department's advice on how to avoid regulation by the Metropolitan Planning Commission ("MPC"). However, due to a new interpretation of existing statutory law, the petitioner's preparations, once completed, were no longer adequate and the Department deemed that the land must undergo review before the MPC as a subdivision. Consequently, the zoning administrator of the Department denied the petitioner the building permits and the petitioner brought suit claiming first that the division of land was not a "subdivision" as that term is defined by statute. Furthermore, the petitioner contended that the zoning administrator's application of the newly-interpreted law to him violated his constitutional rights to equal protection and due process and effected against him the application of a retrospective law. In addition, the appellant claimed that the Department should be equitably estopped from refusing to issue the building permits. The trial court granted the Department's motion for involuntary dismissal of the petitioner's case. We affirm the decision of the trial court on all issues.

This case represents an appeal from the grant of divorce upon stipulation of grounds pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-4-129. The parties to this action, Terry David Mackie ("Husband"), and Sarah Catherine Campbell Mackie ("Wife") were married on November 6, 1984. Husband filed a complaint in Williamson County Circuit Court on March 6, 1997, seeking divorce on the grounds of inappropriate marital conduct and irreconcilable differences. On March 20, 1997, Wife answered and counterclaimed. In her answer, Wife admitted the ground of irreconcilable differences and alleged inappropriate marital conduct on the part of the Husband. Over the next 14 months the parties participated in successive proceedings regarding pendente lite custody of their severely ill minor child. The case was originally set for trial on June 3, 1997. Both parties agreed to continue the case; each sought a scheduling order for the sequence of discovery. The parties were ordered to attend mediation on February 23, 1998. On May 18, 1998, Husband moved to change pendente lite custody and to compel discovery. This motion was to be heard on June 3, 1998. At the June 3, hearing, in an admittedly unorthodox proceeding, the parties stipulated under oath that each had grounds for divorce. At this point in the hearing, both parties were sent into an antechamber to provide for the division of the marital estate and custody of the child. These negotiations are documented in handwritten notes, signed by the parties and their counsel, and appearing in the record.

A construction company sued a hotelkeeper for payment of the balance due on their contract. The trial court ordered the hotelkeeper to pay the balance, as well as pre-judgment interest and attorney fees. We affirm the award of pre-judgment interest, but we reverse the award of attorney fees. We also reverse a $500 offset the trial court granted to the defendant for the plaintiff’s alleged failure to complete a punch list.