APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant was convicted by a Shelby County jury of first degree murder and especially aggravated kidnapping. He was sentenced by the jury to life without the possibility of parole for the murder conviction. He also received a sentence of twenty-five years for the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction, to be served consecutively to his life sentence. The events of this case arose out of a confrontation between rival gangs living in the Hurt Village Apartments in Memphis. The defendant, a high-ranking member of the Gangster Disciples, was prosecuted for the crimes on a theory of criminal responsibility. In this appeal as of right, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions. After a thorough review of the extensive record in this case, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to show that the defendant, acting with the intent to promote the commission of the charged offenses, directed and aided other members of the Gangster Disciples in the commission of the offenses. His convictions for first degree murder and especially aggravated kidnapping are, therefore, affirmed.

The Defendant was convicted by a jury of driving under the influence of an intoxicant, second offense. In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by admitting the results of his breath-alcohol test. The Defendant argues that the State failed to prove that he was continuously observed for twenty minutes prior to taking the test, and that one of the requirements for the admissibility of the test results was therefore not satisfied. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Srirasack Srisavath, was convicted of possession of marijuana with intent to sell. The trial court imposed a sentence of one and one-half years and assessed a fine of $2,000.00. In this appeal of right, the defendant challenges the propriety for the investigatory stop which led to the discovery of the marijuana. Because the stop was not adequately supported by articulable facts, the trial court erred by overruling the motion to suppress evidence. The judgment is, therefore, reversed and the cause dismissed.

This appeal involves the dissolution of an eighteen-year marriage by the Chancery Court for Lewis County. The trial court awarded the wife the divorce after concluding that the husband's continuing extramarital affair amounted to inappropriate marital conduct. To protect the "moral integrity of the marital relationship," the trial court granted the wife sole custody of the parties' two minor children and declined to grant the husband any visitation rights. In addition, the trial court ordered the husband to pay more than the minimum child support required by the child support guidelines because he was willfully underemployed and because he would not be exercising standard visitation with the children. The husband asserts on this appeal that the trial court's decisions with regard to custody and visitation, child support, and the division of the marital estate lack evidentiary support. We have determined that the trial court's disapproval of the husband's extramarital affair inappropriately colored its decisions regarding visitation and child support. Accordingly, we affirm the manner in which the trial court divided the parties' marital estate and reverse the trial court's visitation and child support awards.

In this divorce case, Husband appeals from the trial court's decisions classifying, valuing, and dividing the parties' property incident to their divorce and asserts that he is entitled to an award much greater than the $250,000 granted to him by the trial court. Wife also appeals the trial court's classification and distribution of property, asserting that Husband was not entitled to any portion of her separate property and that there was no marital property. An additional issue was raised by a post-judgment ruling by a successor trial judge setting aside the order of the prior judge declaring the parties divorced. We affirm the divorce and reverse the award to Husband.

Patient with a history of papillary carcinoma underwent a fine needle aspiration which confirmed a diagnosis of cancer in her neck region. Patient underwent surgery to remove the cancerous tissue which resulted in hypoparathyroidism and injury to her recurrent laryngeal nerve, risks commonly associated with the procedure. Patient brought informed consent action against doctor, claiming that, had the inherent risks of the procedure been disclosed to her, she would have sought a second opinion and had the procedure performed at a different facility by a different surgeon. The doctor moved for summary judgment, which the trial court denied. Finding there are no material, disputed facts remaining, we reverse and remand.

This case is before this Court on appeal from the Chancery Court for Perry County wherein cross-motions for summary judgment were filed. The Defendant's motion for summary judgment was granted. The trial court concluded that there were no genuine issues of material fact such that Defendant was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law on its counter-claim against Plaintiff finding that Daniel's Landing Road is a public road. The standard of review is clear, we review the decision of the trial court de novo with no presumption of correctness on appeal. The issue on appeal is whether Daniel's Landing Road is a public road and, if so, whether it remains a public road absent abandonment or closing pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Sections 54-10-201, et seq. We conclude that Daniel's Landing Road is a public road and affirm the trial court.

This case involves the alleged breach of an oral contract and a claim of negligent misrepresentation. Defendant's agent contacted the plaintiffs, an Elvis impersonator, the members of his band, and members of the Jordanaires to book them for a performance nine months hence. Plaintiffs reserved the time, but no written agreement was ever executed. Weeks before the performance, Defendant informed Plaintiffs that their services would not be required. Plaintiffs sued alleging breach of an oral contract and negligent misrepresentation and now appeal the trial court's decision to grant summary judgment to Defendant on both issues. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

The petitioner appeals the general sessions court's denial of an order of protection and questions the proper avenue to appeal a general sessions court's ruling on an order of protection. We hold that, because the general sessions court has concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit and chancery courts to hear petitions for orders of protection, this court is the proper one to hear an appeal of the grant or denial of such an order. Because we find that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court's denial of the order in this case, we affirm the trial court.

In 1977, Richard Hale Austin was found guilty by a Shelby County jury of accessory before the fact to the first degree murder of Julian Watkins. Austin's conviction stemmed from his role in commissioning the murder of Watkins, a reserve deputy sheriff. The jury subsequently found the presence of aggravating factor (i)(4), murder for remuneration, and imposed a sentence of death. In 1997, Austin was granted habeas corpus relief in the form of a new sentencing hearing by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. At the re-sentencing hearing, twenty-two years after his original trial, a jury again found the presence of the (i)(4) aggravating factor and again imposed a sentence of death. It is from this sentencing decision that Austin appeals. In this appeal, Austin presents numerous issues for our review, including (1) the disqualification of the Tennessee Supreme Court; (2) challenges to the selection of various jurors; (3) the admission and exclusion of evidence; (4) the introduction of victim impact evidence; (5) prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument; (6) the propriety of the jury instructions; (7) whether application of the (i)(4) aggravator violates State v. Middlebrooks; (8) prejudice due to the delay in imposing a sentence of death; (9) the constitutionality of Tennessee's death penalty statutes; and (10) whether the jury imposed a proportionate sentence. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the imposition of the sentence of death.

The Defendant, David Lunsford, was convicted by a jury of aggravated burglary. In this appeal as of right, he asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. We respectfully disagree; thus, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Raymond Hardie Cox, appeals as of right from the dismissal of his post-conviction petition. He asserts that the trial court erred by dismissing his petition as barred by the statute of limitations. We find no error; thus, we affirm the trial court's dismissal of the petition.

This case seeks declaratory judgment as to whether or not the defendant, Nicholas Reaves Ramsey, was a "covered person" within the omnibus clause of an automobile liability insurance policy. In a non-jury trial the trial judge held that Defendant was not covered under the omnibus clause. We affirm.

Freddie Dean Smith and Anita Ann Smith (“Plaintiffs”) filed a medical malpractice action against
Tony O. Haley, M.D. (“Defendant”). Defendant moved for summary judgment with his affidavit
filed in support thereof. The motion was granted after Plaintiffs failed to file timely any competent
medical proof to defeat the motion. Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Reconsider along with the affidavit
of Joseph Bussey, M.D. The Trial Court granted the motion and reinstated the case to the active
docket. Dr. Bussey later refused to give his deposition because he was not comfortable giving a
deposition after reviewing the medical records and because he did not believe the case was going to “go this far” when he provided the affidavit. Defendant moved to strike the affidavit of Dr. Bussey and requested the Trial Court to reinstate its previous dismissal. The Trial Court granted
Defendant’s motion. Seeking additional time to locate another medical expert, Plaintiffs then filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment pursuant to Rule 59.04, Tenn. R. Civ. P., and for relief from the judgment pursuant to Rules 60.02(1) and 60.02(5), Tenn. R. Civ. P. The Trial Court denied this motion, and Plaintiffs appeal this denial. We affirm. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal As Of Right;
Judgment of the Law Court Affirmed; and Case Remanded.
 

Defendant pled guilty to one count of violating the Habitual Motor Vehicle Offender Act and one count of driving under the influence, eighth offense, both Class E felonies. He was sentenced to consecutive terms of one year and six months for each offense. In this appeal, defendant challenges the trial court's denial of alternative sentencing. Upon our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

We granted review in this workers' compensation case to determine whether the trial court erred in awarding temporary total benefits and death benefits based on the maximum weekly wage where the employee did not earn any wages in the 52 weeks prior to being diagnosed with malignant mesothelioma. On appeal, the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel concluded that the trial court erred in awarding benefits based on the maximum weekly wage because the employee was voluntarily retired at the time of his diagnosis, and that benefits were to be based on the minimum weekly wage. After reviewing the record and applicable authority, we conclude that an employee's voluntary retirement does not preclude workers' compensation benefits for an injury arising out of and in the course of employment and that the trial court properly awarded benefits based on the maximum weekly rate under the facts of this case.

The defendant pled guilty to four counts of obtaining prescription drugs by use of a forged prescription, and the trial court sentenced her to an effective sentence of fourteen years incarceration. The defendant contests the sentences imposed. We affirm the trial court.

The defendant Michael R. Floyd pled guilty to possession with intent to sell over .5 grams of cocaine and over one half ounce of marijuana. For these offenses he received agreed upon sentences of eight (8) years and one (1) year, respectively, as a Range I, standard offender. In addition, his plea agreement included two-thousand dollar ($2,000.00) fines for each offense. Following a subsequent sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the sentences to run concurrently to one another and the defendant to serve six months of this period in the county jail with the remainder to be served on supervised probation. The defendant thereafter brought this appeal contending that the trial court erred by ordering him to serve a period of incarceration. However, we are unable to determine whether error occurred because of the insufficiency of the record on appeal. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

In this workers’ compensation case, the estate of the employee, Robert W. Cunningham, Sr., has appealed from a chancery court judgment dismissing a claim for death benefits filed against the employer, Shelton Security Service, Inc. The employee, who worked as a security guard for the employer, died of heart failure while performing his duties at a store. At the close of the employee’s proof, the trial court granted the employer’s motion to dismiss on the basis that the emotional stress experienced by the employee the night of his death was not extraordinary or unusual for a security guard. The Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel, upon reference for findings of fact and conclusions of law, found that there was sufficient evidence of causation to warrant a trial and, thus, reversed the trial court’s dismissal. Thereafter, the employer filed a motion for full Court review of the Panel’s decision. We granted the motion for review to consider whether the trial court erred in dismissing the employee’s claim on the basis that his heart failure did not arise out of the employment because it was not caused by a mental or emotional stimulus of an unusual or abnormal nature, beyond what is typically encountered by one in his occupation. After carefully examining the record and considering the relevant authorities, we agree with the Panel and reverse the trial court’s judgment. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e); Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law by the Special Workers’ Compensation Panel Affirmed; Judgment of the Trial Court Reversed and Case RemandedE. RILEY ANDERSON, C.J.,