APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Daniel Thomason appeals from the aggravated robbery conviction he received at a jury trial in the Davidson County Criminal Court. Thomason is serving an eight-year sentence in the Department of Correction for his crime. In this appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence that he accomplished the robbery “by display of any article used or fashioned to lead the victim to reasonably believe it to be a deadly weapon.” Because the record before us is does not contain all of the relevant evidence presented at trial, we are precluded from reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence and therefore affirm.

The Defendant, Michael Thomas, appeals as of right from the denial of post-conviction relief after an evidentiary hearing. On appeal, he asserts that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary and that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. We find no merit to the Defendant's assertions; thus, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I join with Judge Ogle in concluding that the Appellant's double jeopardy rights were not violated. I would also make the observation that, similar in purpose to the DUI statute, the stated public policy purpose in enacting the Motor Vehicle Habitual Offender Act was to remove from the highways those offenders who have "demonstrated their indifference to the safety and welfare of others." Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-602(2).

The defendant, David Scarbrough, was convicted of two counts of felony murder, two counts of theft, and aggravated burglary. The trial court imposed sentences of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole for each of the murders, a sentence of six years for the aggravated burglary and sentences of 11 months, 29 days for each of the thefts. All sentences are to be served consecutively. In this appeal of right, the defendant presents the following issues for review: (1) Whether the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions; (2) whether the defendant's statement to police was made knowingly and voluntarily; (3) whether the trial court erred by denying the defendant's challenge for cause of a juror; (4) whether the trial court erred by denying defendant's motion for continuance; (5) whether the trial court erred by refusing a jury instruction on facilitation of felony murder; (6) whether the trial court erred by admitting photographs of the crime scene; (7) whether the trial court erred by refusing to permit a private investigator to testify; (8) whether the trial court properly refused to allow the testimony of a psychologist during the guilt phase of trial; (9) whether the sentences were excessive; and (10) whether the trial court erred by denying the defendant's motion for a writ of error coram nobis based on newly discovered evidence. Because the trial court erred by failing to instruct on the lesser included offense of facilitation of felony murder and because such error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the felony murder convictions are reversed and the causes are remanded for a new trial. The remaining convictions are affirmed.

The petitioner, Daniel M. Banks, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Because the petitioner was provided the effective assistance of counsel and knowingly and voluntarily entered his pleas of guilt to possession of marijuana with intent to sell, possession of over 0.5 grams of cocaine with intent to sell, and possession of drug paraphernalia, the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant, James L. Hunsaker, was charged with ten counts of rape of a mentally defective victim, Class B felonies, in violation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-503. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the first nine counts of the indictment, involving offenses alleged to have occurred between the autumn of 1992 and the spring of 1994, as barred by the statute of limitations. The trial court ruled that concealment was inherent in the victim’s mental defect and that the statute of limitations was tolled. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-2-101. The defendant filed a motion for interlocutory appeal to this court. Because the first nine counts of the indictment are barred by the statute of limitations, the judgment of the trial court is reversed. Each of the nine counts is dismissed.