APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is an appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief. The petitioner contends he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel which led to an involuntary guilty plea. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Derrick Williams, pled guilty to three counts of simple robbery, a Class C felony, and one count of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced Petitioner as a Range III persistent offender to fifteen years for each of the simple robbery convictions and twenty-five years for the aggravated robbery conviction, with the sentences to be served concurrently for an effective sentence of twenty-five years. Thereafter, Petitioner filed a pro se petition, with one amendment filed by appointed counsel, for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied Petitioner relief, which resulted in this appeal wherein Petitioner claims ineffective assistance of counsel based on the following: (1) counsel failed to argue that the indictment concerning aggravated robbery was insufficient whereas it did not allege an essential element of the offense, i.e., that Petitioner used a deadly weapon to commit the crime; and (2) counsel pressured Petitioner to plead guilty, which coercion caused his plea to be involuntary and, therefore, constitutionally infirm. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Petitioner appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief after the trial court found it was barred by the statute of limitations. We conclude that due process considerations may have tolled the running of the statute of limitations if trial counsel misled petitioner concerning his intention to pursue an appeal. We, therefore, reverse and remand for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of tolling.

After Defendant was convicted of two counts of aggravated vehicular homicide and one count of driving while license revoked, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of forty-nine years in confinement. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the convictions for aggravated vehicular homicide, the trial court's instructions to the jury were erroneous, the blood alcohol test results were admitted in error, the State's closing argument was improper, and his sentence is excessive. After a thorough review of the record, we find that the trial court improperly applied two enhancement factors. However, the errors affect only Defendant's sentence for one count of aggravated vehicular homicide and, therefore, we reduce this sentence by six months. We affirm the judgment of the trial court in all other aspects.

This appeal involves a dispute between a woman and her former in-laws regarding the title to a tract of property in Prospect, Tennessee and the in-laws' accounting for $35,000 held for the benefit of the woman and her former husband. When she filed for divorce in the Chancery Court for Giles County, the woman also named her in-laws as defendants and alleged that they had misappropriated marital assets and breached a contract to convey the property in Prospect, Tennessee. After agreeing to an irreconcilable differences divorce, the woman proceeded with her claims against her former in-laws. Following a bench trial, the trial court held that the in-laws had accounted for all the funds being held for the benefit of the woman and her former husband and that the in-laws owned the disputed property. On this appeal, the woman takes issue with both of these conclusions. We have determined that the trial court properly found that the property belonged to the in-laws. However, we have also determined that the in-laws did not properly account for $892.15 of the funds they were holding. Accordingly, we modify the final order to award the woman a $892.15 judgment against her former in-laws.

This is an automobile accident case where each party claims she had the green light when she entered the intersection where the accident occurred. In addition to the depositions of the parties, Defendant submitted expert testimony to the effect that Plaintiff's version of the accident was physically impossible while Defendant's version was not. The Trial Court granted summary judgment to Defendant after concluding, as a matter of law, that Plaintiff's negligence was at least 50% under comparative fault principles. We conclude that genuine issues of material fact exist and vacate the judgment of the Trial Court.

An Anderson County jury convicted the petitioner, Randy D. Vowell, of one count of rape and one count of aggravated rape. The trial court sentenced the petitioner to serve concurrent sentences of twenty-three years for aggravated rape and eight years for rape as a Range I standard offender. The petitioner filed a new trial motion, which the trial court denied, and the petitioner appealed his conviction to this Court. We affirmed the decision of the lower court, finding that all of the petitioner's claims of error were meritless, with the exception of the petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, which this court declined to consider because the record on appeal was insufficient to review the petitioner's claim. See State v. Randy D. Vowell, No. 03C01-9709-CC-003383, 1998 WL 573296, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxville, Sept. 8, 1998). This Court also noted that because the petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel had not been waived or decided on its merits, it was open to collateral attack. Id. at *2. The petitioner filed a petition seeking post-conviction relief alleging that he received ineffective assistance from his trial counsel, and the post-conviction court denied his petition. The petitioner now brings this appeal, challenging the post-conviction court's denial of his petition. For the following reasons, we affirm the decision of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Charles Orlando Fields, was indicted for one count of selling one-half gram or more of cocaine within one thousand feet of a school, a Class A felony, and one count of distributing one-half gram or more of cocaine within one thousand feet of a school, a Class A felony. An Obion County Circuit Court jury convicted him of both counts. The trial court merged the distributing cocaine conviction into the selling cocaine conviction and sentenced the defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to thirty-three years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The defendant appeals, contending that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and that his sentence is excessive. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, John Arron Heard, appeals from the judgment of the Hamilton County Criminal Court revoking his community corrections sentence. The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion in ordering the defendant to serve the remainder of his sentence in the penitentiary. After careful review, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

The defendant, Anthony Dwight Cox, appeals from his convictions for aggravated rape and aggravated assault, contesting the sufficiency of the evidence. We affirm the judgments of conviction.

Angela Bright brings this appeal of the Blount County Criminal Court's revocation of her probationary sentence and order placing her Department of Correction sentence into effect. Because the lower court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm.

The defendant, Anthony D. Bynum, was convicted of possession of anhydrous ammonia, a Class E felony. The trial court sentenced the defendant to three years, one year to be served in the Weakley County Jail and the balance to be served on probation. The defendant was fined $1,000.00. In this appeal of right, the defendant asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that his sentence was excessive. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This is an interlocutory appeal by the state from an order by the trial court excluding a .20 breathalyzer result from consideration in the imposition of an enhanced sentence for a DUI offense. The order is vacated and the cause is remanded for trial.

I concur with the result reached by the majority and consider this case distinguishable from Scisney. In Scisney, Judge Tipton and I, in separate opinions, concluded an intoximeter reading of .04%, by itself, was insufficient to establish “beyond a reasonable doubt” that the blood alcohol concentration was, in fact, .04%. See State v. Mark T. Scisney, C.C.A. No. 01C01-9605-CC-00209, 1997 WL 634515, at *9-11 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 16, 1997, at Nashville). This was because there was a 25% chance that the actual level was below .04% due to the margin of error. Id.

The Defendant, Chianti Fuller was indicted for four offenses: (1) possession with intent to sell 0.6 grams of cocaine, a schedule II controlled substance, (2) possession with intent to deliver 0.6 grams of cocaine, a schedule II controlled substance, (3) simple possession of marijuana, a schedule VI controlled substance, and (4) possession of drug paraphernalia. The Defendant was convicted by a jury of counts (1) and (2), and pled guilty to counts (3) and (4). The trial court merged count two into count one and sentenced the Defendant to nine years and six months for possession of cocaine with intent to sell. The Defendant was also sentenced to nine months to be served concurrently with his other sentence for each of the two misdemeanor convictions. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support the jury verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and (2) the sentence was excessive. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Tony D. Johnson, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of felony possession of cocaine with intent to sell. After a sentencing hearing, the Defendant was sentenced to ten years as a Range I standard offender. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence presented at trial is insufficient to support the jury’s verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and (2) the trial court erred in imposing a ten year sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

After a jury trial, the defendant, a juvenile at the time of the offenses, was convicted of six counts arising out of the shooting deaths of two victims. The jury sentenced him to life in prison for Count One, first degree premeditated murder of the first victim, and for Count Two, first degree felony murder of the first victim based upon robbery of the first victim. The jury sentenced him to life in prison without the possibility of parole for Count Three, first degree felony murder of the second victim based upon premeditated murder of the first victim, and for Count Four, first degree felony murder of the second victim based upon robbery of the first victim. The trial court merged the conviction for Count Two into Count One, and the conviction for Count Four into Count Three. The trial court sentenced the defendant to twenty (20) years for Count Five, especially aggravated robbery, one (1) year for Count Six, possession of marijuana with intent to resell, and ordered the sentences to be served concurrently. On appeal, the defendant challenges the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress and his request for a state-funded mitigation expert, as well as the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions for first-degree murder. After careful review of the record, we hold that the trial court did not err in failing to suppress the defendant's statements. Further, we hold that although the defendant's status as a non-capital defendant did not preclude him from receiving state-funded expert services, our de novo review of the record reveals that the defendant failed to make the required showing of a particularized need for a mitigation expert. Therefore, the trial court's denial of the defendant's request for such services was correct. Finally, we hold the evidence is sufficient to sustain the defendant's convictions for premeditated and felony murder in the first degree. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The post-conviction petitioner, Larry N. Wilson, seeks to set aside his four Davidson County Criminal Court convictions of aggravated robbery and his effective 24-year sentence. The convictions were based on guilty pleas. In his post-conviction proceeding, he posited that the pleas were involuntarily or unknowingly made and that they were the result of the ineffective assistance of counsel. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. Concluding that the record supports that determination, we affirm.

This case involves a medical malpractice claim that was dismissed on summary judgment by the trial court. The plaintiff, Steffone McClendon, appealed to this Court, seeking a reversal of the trial court’s summary judgment. We affirmed the trial court’s decision based on the legislative history and our interpretation of Section 20-1-119 of the Tennessee code. The plaintiff sought a review of this Court’s decision with the Tennessee Supreme Court. Although the supreme court refused to hear the case, it remanded the case to this Court for reconsideration in light of Townes v. Sunbeam Oster Co., Inc., 50 S.W. 3d 446 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) released this year by the middle
section of this Court and recently published.

Indicted for the offense of premeditated first degree murder, defendant was convicted of the lesser-included offense of second degree murder and sentenced to twenty-three years. In this appeal as of right, defendant presents the following issues: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict; (2) whether the trial court erred in failing to grant a mistrial when the state referred to defendant's being in jail pending trial; (3) whether the trial court erred in admitting defendant's prior misdemeanor convictions for impeachment purposes; (4) whether the trial court erred in failing to grant a mistrial when the prosecutor misstated the evidence in final argument; (5) whether the trial court erred in failing to grant a mistrial when extraneous prejudicial information was present during jury deliberations; and (6) whether the sentence was excessive. We find no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.