State of Tennessee v. Lisa Ann Avery
W2000-01741-CCA-R3-CD
The Defendant was indicted by the Carroll County Grand Jury for one count of introduction of drugs into a penal institution. The Defendant moved for pretrial diversion, but the request was denied by the District Attorney General. The Defendant filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the trial court to review the denial. The trial court denied the petition, finding that the District Attorney General did not abuse his discretion in denying the Defendant's request for pretrial diversion. The Defendant then pled guilty to one count of introduction of drugs into a penal institution and requested judicial diversion. The trial court denied judicial diversion and sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to four years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction, suspended after sixty days confinement. The Defendant now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in denying her pretrial diversion, judicial diversion or full probation. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Originating Judge:Judge C. Creed McGinley |
Carroll County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 07/16/01 | |
Linda Sue Pinkard v. Findlay Industries, Inc.
M2000-01320-WC-R3-CV
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employer insists (1) the trial court's finding of permanent partial impairment or disability is contrary to the preponderance of the evidence, (2) the trial court erred in denying the employer's request for the appointment of a neutral physician, and (3) the award of permanent partial disability benefits on the basis of 6 percent to the body as a whole is excessive. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the judgment should be affirmed. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (2) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the General Sessions Court of Warren County Affirmed. JOE C. LOSER, JR., SP. J., in which ADOLPHO A. BIRCH, JR., J., and JAMES WEATHERFORD, SR. J., joined. Patrick A. Ruth, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Findlay Industries, Inc. William Joseph Butler and Frank D. Farrar, Lafayette, Tennessee, for the appellee, Linda Sue Pinkard. MEMORANDUM OPINION At the time of the trial on March 17, 2, the employee or claimant, Linda Sue Pinkard, was 36 years old with a ninth grade education and no special skills or training. She did have experience as a production worker and was employed by Findlay, a sewing factory, for more than ten years. On November 24, 1998, while lifting material onto a table at work, she felt a sudden pull in her back. Later that night she felt numbness in her legs and tingling in her toes. She was sent to Riverpark Hospital for emergency care and presented with a panel of possible treating physicians, from whom she chose Dr. Robert Dimick, a neurosurgeon, in Nashville. Dr. Dimick released her after providing conservative care. Thereafter, she saw Dr. John Thompson on the recommendation of her attorney. Dr. Dimick diagnosed low back pain and spasm, degenerative disc disease, a protruded disc and stenosis, with mild to moderate pressure on the nerve roots. The doctor conceded the injuries could have been caused or aggravated by trauma at work. Without measuring her loss of motion or sensation, Dr. Dimick estimated her permanent impairment rating at zero percent. Dr. Thompson, an orthopedic surgeon in Sparta, opined that the claimant's injuries were work-related. He estimated her permanent impairment at 17 percent to the whole body and restricted her from lifting more than 2 pounds occasionally, 1 pounds frequently or 5 pounds repetitively. He prescribed standing no more than 3 minutes at a time or more than 5 minutes of each hour, no more than occasional bending, stooping, kneeling and no squatting, climbing, crouching, crawling or twisting. Dr. S. M. Smith, an orthopedic surgeon in Jamestown, saw the claimant for an independent medical examination and evaluation in July 1999. Dr. Smith diagnosed a ruptured disc at L5-S1. He estimated the claimant's permanent impairment at 19 percent to the whole body and prescribed permanent restrictions. The claimant's own testimony, supported by other lay proof, was that she could not work within her restrictions. She was unable to continue in a janitorial service job that she had held before her injury at Findlay. She did return to work for Findlay at a lower paying job in the parts room, but is concerned whether she would be able to find any work if she lost her job. Upon the above summarized evidence, the trial court found the claimant's permanent medical impairment to be 15 percent to the body and awarded permanent partial disability benefits based on 6 percent to the body as a whole. Appellate review is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the findings of fact, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225 (e)(2). This tribunal is not bound by the trial court's findings but instead conducts an independent examination of the record to determine where the preponderance lies. Galloway v. Memphis Drum Serv., 822 S.W.2d 584, 586 (Tenn. 1991). Where the trial judge has seen and heard the witnesses, especially if issues of credibility and weight to be given oral testimony are involved, considerable deference must be accorded those circumstances on review, because it is the trial court which had the opportunity to observe the witnesses' demeanor and to hear the in-court testimony. Long v. Tri-Con Ind., Ltd., 996 S.W.2d 173, 177 (Tenn. 1999). The appellate tribunal, however, is as well situated to gauge the weight, worth and significance of deposition testimony as the trial judge. Walker v. Saturn Corp., 986 S.W.2d 24, 27 (Tenn. 1998). The extent of an injured worker's vocational disability is a question of fact. Story v. Legion Ins. Co., 3 S.W.3d 45, 451 (Tenn. 1999). The appellant contends the trial judge should have rejected Dr. Smith's opinion because his examination was conducted in the claimant's attorney's office and because Dr. Smith's opinion is -2-
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Sp. J.
Originating Judge:Larry Ross, Judge |
Warren County | Workers Compensation Panel | 07/16/01 | |
State of Tennessee v. Kathleen Malley
W2000-01064-CCA-R3-CD
The Defendant, Kathleen Malley, entered a guilty plea to theft of over $60,000, a Class B felony, in exchange for an agreed sentence of eight years incarceration. Following a sentencing hearing to determine the manner of service of that sentence, the Defendant was ordered to serve six months in jail followed by twelve years of probation. She was also ordered to pay $100,000 in restitution. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by refusing to grant her full probation. We find no error. Thus, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Originating Judge:Judge Joseph B. Brown |
Shelby County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 07/16/01 | |
John Patterson v. The Phelan Company, Inc.
W1998-00598-SC-WCM-CV
The workers'compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated _50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found the plaintiff sustained a twenty-two and one-half percent permanent partial disability to the body as a whole as a result of an on-the-job injury to his neck. The defendant claims the evidence does not support the finding. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Authoring Judge: Don R. Ash, Sp. J.
Originating Judge:George R. Ellis, Chancellor |
Gibson County | Workers Compensation Panel | 07/13/01 | |
Tex Helton, et al vs. Colonial Loan Assoc., Inc. et al
E2001-00060-COA-R3-CV
Tex Helton and his wife sue Colonial Loan Association, Inc., and Lakeview Motors, Inc., seeking damages in connection with Colonial Loan's repossession of an automobile sold to them by Lakeview Motors. The Trial Court granted a summary judgment as to Colonial Loan. The claim as to Lakeview Motors has been concluded and this appeal only concerns the granting of a summary judgment in favor of Colonial Loan. We vacate the order granting summary judgment and remand.
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Originating Judge:John K. Wilson |
Hawkins County | Court of Appeals | 07/13/01 | |
Shirley Shelburne vs. Frontier Health, et al
E2000-02551-COA-R3-CV
This is a negligence action that finds its genesis in the suicide of a county jail inmate. Prior to his death, the decedent had been evaluated by Richard Kirk, a member of a crisis response team operated by the defendant Woodridge Hospital, a facility owned and operated by the defendant Frontier Health. Kirk concluded the decedent did not suffer from any psychiatric illness and did not require further care or treatment. The widow of the decedent, Shirley A. Shelburne, individually and as the next friend of her son, Travis Lee Shelburne, sued Frontier Health on the basis of vicarious liability. In response to the defendant's third motion for summary judgment, the trial court dismissed the plaintiff's action. The plaintiff filed a motion to alter or amend the grant of summary judgment, which was denied. The plaintiff appeals, arguing (1) that this case should be remanded for the trial court to reconsider the evidence submitted in support of the plaintiff's motion to alter or amend in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Harris v. Chern, 33 S.W.3d 741 (Tenn. 2000); (2) that Frontier Health is not entitled to summary judgment, which was granted on the basis of Kirk's alleged statutory immunity; and (3) that Frontier Health's third motion for summary judgment constitutes an improper "appeal" of the denial of its second summary judgment motion by a different trial judge. We affirm.
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Originating Judge:Thomas J. Seeley, Jr. |
Carter County | Court of Appeals | 07/13/01 | |
State of Tennessee v. Laverne Long
W2000-02773-CCA-R3-CD
The Defendant, Laverne Long, entered a guilty plea to reckless homicide, a Class D felony, in exchange for a two year sentence as a Range I, standard offender. Following an evidentiary hearing on the Defendant's motion to suspend her sentence, the trial court denied alternative sentencing. The Defendant now appeals as of right from the denial of alternative sentencing. We find no error; thus, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Originating Judge:Judge Arthur T. Bennett |
Shelby County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 07/13/01 | |
Peggy Lane, et al vs. Luella Spriggs, et al
E2001-00163-COA-R3-CV
This case involves the validity of an unsigned warranty deed in the plaintiffs' chain of title. Following a bench trial, the court below reformed the deed to add the missing signature. The defendants appeal, arguing, among other things, that the unsigned deed is inoperative and cannot be reformed. We affirm.
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Originating Judge:Telford E. Forgerty, Jr. |
Cocke County | Court of Appeals | 07/13/01 | |
Jerry Grace, et al vs. Mountain States Health Alliance
E2000-03031-COA-R3-CV
In this medical malpractice suit the Trial Court granted a summary judgment in favor of Mountain States Health Alliance, d/b/a/ Johnson City Medical Center Hospital and five Doctors. The Trial Court overruled the Plaintiffs' motion to alter or amend his determination that all Defendants were entitled to summary judgment. As to the Doctors, the determination was predicated upon the motion to alter or amend not being timely filed, and as to the Medical Center on the grounds that the delay in submitting materials accompanying the motion to alter or amend was not justified. We affirm.
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Originating Judge:Thomas J. Seeley, Jr. |
Washington County | Court of Appeals | 07/13/01 | |
State of Tennessee v. Marcus D. Polk
W2000-01057-CCA-R3-PC
The petitioner, Marcus D. Polk, pled guilty in the Shelby County Criminal Court to criminal attempt to commit first degree murder, especially aggravated robbery, and first degree murder and received a total effective sentence of life imprisonment plus twenty years. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging the ineffective assistance of his plea counsel, which petition was denied by the post-conviction court. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.
Authoring Judge: Judge Norma McGee Ogle
Originating Judge:Judge Joseph B. Dailey |
Shelby County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 07/13/01 | |
James Richard Bishop v. State of Tennessee
E2000-01725-CCA-R3-PC
Petitioner, James Richard Bishop, was convicted of felony murder, especially aggravated kidnapping and aggravated burglary. Following a sentencing hearing, Petitioner was sentenced to life imprisonment for the felony murder and concurrent sentences of twenty years and five years respectively for the especially aggravated kidnapping and aggravated burglary. On appeal, this Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. State v. James Richard Bishop, No. 03C01-9308-CR-00268, 1994 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 536, at *1, Knox County (Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxville, August 18, 1994), perm. to appeal denied (Tenn. 1994). Petitioner filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief in the Knox County Criminal Court, which the post-conviction court subsequently denied. He challenges the denial of his petition, raising the following issue: whether the trial court erred in dismissing his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, based upon a ruling that Petitioner's allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel were without merit. Based upon our review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas T. Woodall
Originating Judge:Judge Richard R. Baumgartner |
Knox County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 07/13/01 | |
Arvil Holt, et a; vs. Zula Parton
E2000-02695-COA-R3-CV
Arvil A. Holt and Beulah Holt Jones ("Plaintiffs") filed this will contest against one of their sisters, Zula Holt Parton ("Defendant"), regarding their Mother's will ("Will"). The case was tried by a jury. During the second day of the jury's deliberations, the Trial Court engaged in ex parte communications with the jury regarding their answers to special interrogatories in a "Special Verdict Form" and their apparent deadlock on the general verdict. The jury foreperson indicated on two occasions that the jury would like to deliberate further. Over objection of Defendant's counsel, however, the Trial Court did not allow for further jury deliberations and entered its judgment. Defendant appeals. We vacate and remand.
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Originating Judge:Ben W. Hooper, II |
Sevier County | Court of Appeals | 07/13/01 | |
Kimberly J. Svacha, et al vs. Waldens Creek Saddley Club, et al
E2000-03121-COA-R3-CV
The trial court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment relying, at least in part, on oral testimony from one of the plaintiffs. This testimony was not transcribed, filed with the trial court, and provided to this court as part of the record on appeal. Due to the somewhat peculiar procedural aspects of this case, we conclude that defendants had the responsibility to file a transcript of this testimony. Because we cannot evaluate the propriety of the grant of summary judgment without having before us this evidence relied on by the trial court, we vacate the grant of summary judgment.
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Originating Judge:Rex Henry Ogle |
Sevier County | Court of Appeals | 07/13/01 | |
Ronald Donnell Moore v. State of Tennessee
W1999-02125-CCA-R3-PC
The petitioner was originally convicted by a Shelby County jury of first degree murder and received a sentence of life imprisonment. His conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. The petitioner filed a pro se post-conviction petition, counsel was appointed, and the petition was denied. In this appeal, the petitioner alleges that this matter should be remanded to the post-conviction court for a new hearing since he was unable to present his claim for relief. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the petitioner is entitled to a new post-conviction hearing.
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Originating Judge:Judge Carolyn Wade Blackett |
Shelby County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 07/13/01 | |
Ronald Shipley v. State of Tennessee
W2000-00434-CCA-R3-PC
The petitioner was originally convicted by a Shelby County jury of rape of a child. The conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. The petitioner sought post-conviction relief, which was denied by the post-conviction court. In this appeal as a matter of right, the petitioner contends that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the trial court correctly denied post-conviction relief.
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Originating Judge:Judge Joseph B. Dailey |
Shelby County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 07/13/01 | |
Investors Group I, LTD. vs. Knoxville's Community Dev. Corp.
E1999-00395-COA-R3-CV
The complaint seeking damages for breach of contract was signed and filed by a general partner of Investors Group I, Ltd., a limited partnership. The Chancellor dismissed the case, holding the complaint was void because a limited partnership is a legal entity, and can neither appear pro se nor by a general partner who is not a licensed attorney. We affirm.
Authoring Judge: Sr. Judge William H. Inman
Originating Judge:Sharon J. Bell |
Knox County | Court of Appeals | 07/13/01 | |
State of Tennessee v. Anthony Perry
W1999-01370-CCA-R3-CD
The defendant appeals his convictions for first degree felony murder, especially aggravated kidnapping, and conspiracy to commit felony murder. After careful review, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for first degree felony murder and especially aggravated kidnapping. Further, we hold that conspiracy to commit felony murder is not a recognizable offense in Tennessee. Therefore, we affirm the defendant's convictions for first degree felony murder and especially aggravated kidnapping. We reverse and dismiss the defendant's conviction for conspiracy to commit felony murder.
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Originating Judge:Judge Joseph B. Brown |
Shelby County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 07/13/01 | |
Donald Miller, et al vs. Choo Choo Partners
E2001-00007-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Originating Judge:Samuel H. Payne |
Hamilton County | Court of Appeals | 07/13/01 | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher M. Flake
W2000-01131-CCA-MR3-CD
The defendant was indicted for attempted first degree murder. A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant of the lesser-included offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter, and the trial court sentenced him to four years imprisonment. In this appeal, the defendant alleges: (1) his insanity defense was established by clear and convincing evidence; (2) the trial court erroneously admitted statements made by the defendant and a weapon seized from his vehicle; (3) the trial court erroneously restricted the testimony of a psychiatrist by disallowing his statement that the defendant was committable if found not guilty by reason of insanity, while allowing him to testify that the defendant stated he believed he would be free to go home within 60 to 90 days if adjudicated not guilty by reason of insanity; (4) the trial court erroneously allowed the state to call a psychiatrist because the defense was not notified pre-trial that he would be an expert witness; (5) the trial court improperly found that a psychiatrist was qualified to testify as an expert; and (6) the trial court erroneously refused the defendant's request to have the opening and rebuttal closing arguments. After a through review of the record, we reverse the judgment of conviction, modify the judgment to “Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity,” and remand for further proceedings pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 33-7-303.
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Originating Judge:Judge Bernie Weinman |
Shelby County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 07/13/01 | |
Donald Miller, et al vs. Choo Choo Partners
E2001-00007-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Originating Judge:Samuel H. Payne |
Hamilton County | Court of Appeals | 07/13/01 | |
Dennis Mauk vs. Debra Perry, et al
E2001-00485-COA-R3-CV
The plaintiff seeks a judicial declaration regarding the proper interpretation of a will. The trial court found a will provision leaving "real property and contents" to the decedent's son, the plaintiff Dennis Mauk, is not ambiguous and that the word "contents" includes a 27-year old mobile home on the decedent's property. The decedent's other four children appeal, contending the will is ambiguous. They argue the trial court erred in failing to consider parol evidence as to the meaning of the subject language. They further contend the trial court erred in ordering a $6,000 bequest to the appellants to be paid into court, thus making it subject to the debts of the estate. We modify the trial court's judgment to provide that the share of personal property bequeathed to each of the decedent's children should be burdened with one-fifth of the decedent's debts. In all other respects, the trial court's judgment is affirmed.
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Originating Judge:Thomas R. Frierson, II |
Hawkins County | Court of Appeals | 07/13/01 | |
Tex Helton, et al vs. Colonial Loan Assoc., Inc. et al
E2001-00060-COA-R3-CV
Tex Helton and his wife sue Colonial Loan Association, Inc., and Lakeview Motors, Inc., seeking damages in connection with Colonial Loan's repossession of an automobile sold to them by Lakeview Motors. The Trial Court granted a summary judgment as to Colonial Loan. The claim as to Lakeview Motors has been concluded and this appeal only concerns the granting of a summary judgment in favor of Colonial Loan. We vacate the order granting summary judgment and remand.
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Originating Judge:John K. Wilson |
Hawkins County | Court of Appeals | 07/13/01 | |
Darra Mcmillin v. Mckenzie Special School District,
W2000-02165-WC-R3-CV
In this appeal, the Second Injury Fund (the Fund) insists the trial court erred in (1) awarding permanent total disability benefits and (2) apportioning the award between the Fund and the employer. The employer insists (1) the employee's injury is not compensable, (2) the trial court erred in commuting one-half of the award to a lump sum, and (3) the trial court erred in awarding the employee a scooter and special bed. As discussed below, the panel has concluded judgment should be modified by reducing the lump sum, because it exceeds the statutorily allowed maximum, but otherwise affirmed.
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Sp. J.
Originating Judge:Julian Guinn, Judge |
Carroll County | Workers Compensation Panel | 07/12/01 | |
Provident Life & Accident Ins. vs.Tina Shankles, et al
E2000-02073-COA-R3-CV
This is an interpleader bill filed by Provident Life and Accident Insurance Company against four named Beneficiaries in a policy of insurance issued to their father, Arnold Joe Johnson. Two of the Beneficiaries were children by a former marriage of Mr. Johnson, who were added as such shortly before his death. The two Beneficiaries by a subsequent marriage insisted that the provisions of a divorce decree precluded Mr. Johnson from adding his other two children as Beneficiaries. The Trial Court found that all four should share in the proceeds of the policy equally and entered a summary judgment to that effect. We vacate and remand.
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Originating Judge:W. Neil Thomas, III |
Hamilton County | Court of Appeals | 07/12/01 | |
Thomas White v. Kathy White
M2000-02674-COA-R3-CV
This appeal arises from the Appellant's filing of a Petition to Modify the Final Decree of Divorce in the Circuit Court of Sumner County. The Appellant requested a downward deviation in child support and a reduction in alimony. The Appellant also requested that he no longer be required to reimburse the Appellee for health insurance coverage. The Appellee filed a Counter-Petition requesting an upward deviation in child support. Following a trial on the Petition and Counter-Petition, the trial court entered an order reducing the Appellant's child support obligation to $1,000.00 per month. The trial court declined to modify the award of rehabilitative alimony and health insurance coverage. The Appellant appeals the decision of the Circuit Court of Sumner County setting child support at $1,000.00 per month and refusing to modify the award of rehabilitative alimony and health insurance coverage. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm in part and reverse in part the trial court's decision.
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Originating Judge:Arthur E. Mcclellan |
Sumner County | Court of Appeals | 07/12/01 |