APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner appeals the denial of post-conviction relief on his conviction for the sale of .5 grams of cocaine, a Schedule II controlled substance. In his pro se petition for post-conviction relief, the petitioner alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to thoroughly investigate and keep him informed of vital information regarding his case. After the appointment of post-conviction counsel and a hearing on the petition, the court denied the petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner filed a timely appeal to this court, raising the sole issue of whether the post-conviction court erred in finding that he had effective assistance of trial counsel. Based upon a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner was originally convicted by a Henry County jury of first degree felony murder and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. The conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. The petitioner sought post-conviction relief, which was denied by the post-conviction court. In this appeal, the petitioner contends she is entitled to post-conviction relief based on (1) newly discovered evidence and (2) ineffective assistance of counsel. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the post-conviction court correctly denied post-conviction relief.

This case involves a dispute over the scope of the right of the defendant to use the plaintiffs' property as a means of ingress and egress to various sections of the defendant's property. The deed to defendant's 1,600 acre tract, which surrounds plaintiffs' 151 acre tract on 3 sides, included a 26 foot wide north-south easement over plaintiffs' property. Plaintiffs alleged that defendant refused to confine his activities within the easement, thereby trespassing and committing waste upon their land. The trial court determined that defendant was entitled to use the 26 foot wide easement running in a north and south direction on the Conatsers' property and a second 20 foot wide route of ingress and egress branching off of the 26 foot easement in a northwesterly direction. The court rejected defendant's claim that he was entitled to a third easement along another east and west direction route and awarded plaintiffs $2,500 in damages for trespass. We affirm the trial court's rulings on the scope of defendant's easement and modify the damages to the $5000 originally awarded by the trial court.

The defendant was declared a motor vehicle habitual offender in Benton County Circuit Court. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred because the first qualifying underlying conviction occurred more than five years before the date the state's petition was filed. Because no statute of limitations applies under the Motor Vehicle Habitual Offenders Act, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

The Monroe County grand jury indicted the defendant on two counts of selling or delivering over .5 grams of cocaine. At the conclusion of a bench trial, the trial court found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had sold cocaine in the alleged amounts on the dates in question. However, immediately after making this determination, the trial court sua sponte announced that it was dismissing the indictment because of a fatal wording error. Through this appeal the State contends that the dismissal was erroneous and asks that the case be remanded for sentencing. Following our review of the record and applicable caselaw, we find the State's issue to have merit and, therefore, reverse the trial court's dismissal and grant the requested remand for sentencing.

This appeal involves a motorcycle rider who was seriously injured when his motorcycle crossed metal plates covering a portion of the highway surface that was under construction. After voluntarily dismissing his first suit, the rider filed a second suit in the Circuit Court for Lincoln County against the corporation he believed to be responsible for placing the metal plates across the highway. The rider insisted on proceeding against this corporation even after he was informed that he had sued the wrong party. The corporation moved for a directed verdict at the close of the motorcycle rider's case-in-chief, asserting that he had failed to prove that it was responsible for the road construction. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the rider's complaint. The rider now challenges the directed verdict on two grounds. First, he asserts that he presented enough evidence of the contractor's responsibility for the construction to take the case to the jury. Second, he asserts that the corporation should not be permitted to argue that he sued the wrong party because it had not specifically identified or described this party in its answer as required by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 8.03. We have determined that the corporation's denial of involvement with the construction project at issue was was not asserting an affirmative defense governed by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 8.03 and that the trial court properly granted the directed verdict. Therefore, we affirm the judgment dismissing the motorcycle rider's complaint.

Pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated sections 55-10-601 to 55-10-617, the State of Tennessee filed a "petition and notice" to have the Appellant/Respondent, Ben Warren Miller, declared an Habitual Motor Vehicle Offender. The Appellant filed, in one pleading, an "Answer and Motion to Dismiss." In the answer, the Appellant admitted all material allegations which would support a judgment declaring him to be an habitual motor vehicle offender. In his motion to dismiss, the Appellant argued that no summons was issued with the petition, and the trial court violated the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure in signing an order which required, in part, that Appellant "may be held in violation of this order" if he did not appear and defend the petition to be declared an habitual motor vehicle offender. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss and rendered a judgment declaring Appellant to be an habitual motor vehicle offender. On appeal, the Appellant does not challenge the substantive grounds for having him declared an habitual motor vehicle offender. However, in three issues, he argues that the judgment should be reversed and the petition dismissed because: (1) The trial court's order entered subsequent to the filing of the petition required Appellant to appear and defend or "he may be held in violation of this order," (2) the trial court's order giving notice of the hearing on the petition was not signed by an assistant district attorney, (3) the trial court did not have the authority to issue an order directing the Appellant to appear at a hearing on the petition and did not have the authority to state in the order that he might be held in violation of the order if he did not appear and defend the petition. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Kenneth Stomm, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The single issue presented for review is whether the petition was properly dismissed without an evidentiary hearing. The judgment is affirmed.

The petitioner, Donald Mitchell Green, appeals the trial court's denial of post-conviction relief. In this appeal of right, the petitioner contends that the trial court erred by ordering a dismissal without an evidentiary hearing. The judgment is reversed and remanded to the trial court for the appointment of counsel and an evidentiary hearing.

The defendant, James Kevin Underwood, was convicted of evading arrest, a Class E felony; driving on a revoked license, fourth offense; and possession of drug paraphernalia, the sentences to be served concurrently. Germane to this appeal, the defendant was sentenced for the evading arrest as a Range I offender either to two years in "house arrest" under a community corrections alternative program of which six months are to be served in jail, "day for day," or to six months in jail, day for day, followed by two years in a community corrections alternative program. Either way, the defendant contends (1) that the sentence exceeded the one-year sentence in his plea agreement and (2) that, in any event, the trial court cannot order him to serve six months day for day. We affirm the judgments for the two misdemeanor offenses, but we remand the evading arrest case for resentencing.

The Defendant, Jackie F. Curry, appeals as of right his conviction for three counts of aggravated rape. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to twenty-two (22) years for each count. The sentences were ordered to run consecutively to each other and consecutively to a prior eight-year sentence for which the Defendant was on probation at the time of this incident. The Defendant raises the following three issues in this appeal: 1) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his convictions for aggravated rape; 2) whether the trial court erred in permitting the State to impeach him with two prior convictions for the sale of cocaine; and 3) whether the trial court erred in sentencing the Defendant. The judgment of the trial court is hereby affirmed.

The Defendant, Lewis Woody, filed a notice of appeal which we construe to appeal the judgments of conviction for two forgeries resulting from a negotiated plea agreement, and he also included within the notice, an appeal from the trial court's order denying his motion to tax costs to the State and to "quash execution of garnishment." For the reasons set forth herein, we dismiss his appeal.

This appeal arises from the trial court's granting of a motion of summary judgment. The court ruled that Shop had violated an Agreement which incorporated in its entirety a previous lease of certain property. As a result, Owner was awarded the repair costs for certain repairs that Shop had been responsible for under the lease. Owner was also awarded attorney's fees and expenses. Shop appealed, arguing that certain material facts were in dispute and thus summary judgment was inappropriate. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

The Defendant, Daniel Wade Wilson, appeals as of right his convictions for second degree murder, first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery in the Sullivan County Criminal Court. The trial court merged the second degree murder conviction into the felony murder conviction, and the jury sentenced the Defendant to life imprisonment for the felony murder. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to twenty-three (23) years for the especially aggravated robbery conviction. The sentences were ordered to run consecutively. The Defendant raises the following four issues in this appeal: 1) whether the trial court erred in failing to charge all applicable lesser-included offenses; 2) whether the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the natural and probable consequences rule; 3) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain Defendant's convictions for first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery; and 4) whether the trial court erred in sentencing the Defendant. The judgment of the trial court is hereby affirmed in part and reversed in part, and remanded to the trial court for a new trial on the felony murder charge in Count II and the especially aggravated robbery charge in Count III of the indictment. The case is further remanded for sentencing on the second degree murder conviction in Count I of the indictment

The Defendant pled nolo contendere to one count of felony child neglect, one count of possession of drug paraphernalia, one count of possession of marijuana, and two counts of public intoxication. At issue in this appeal is the sentence for felony child neglect, a Class D felony for which the Defendant received a two-year Community Corrections sentence. Subsequently, based upon a warrant alleging that the Defendant had violated the terms and conditions of his Community Corrections sentence, the trial court revoked the Defendant's Community Corrections sentence and increased his original sentence from two years to four years, to be served with the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court improperly enhanced his two-year sentence for felony child neglect to four years and that the court erred by failing to impose some form of alternative sentencing. We conclude that the trial court properly increased the length of the Defendant's sentence from two to four years and that the Defendant's prison sentence was properly imposed. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Greene County jury convicted the Defendant of reckless aggravated assault, a Class D felony, and the trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to four years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Defendant now appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and the propriety of the sentence imposed by the trial court. After a careful review of the record, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction and that the sentence is proper. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Loudon County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant for driving under the influence of an intoxicant. The Defendant's first jury trial resulted in a mistrial. Following a second trial, a Loudon County jury convicted the Defendant of the offense charged. The trial court sentenced him to eleven months, twenty-nine days incarceration, with all but four days suspended, and fined him $400. The Defendant now appeals his conviction, arguing (1) that insufficient evidence was presented to support his conviction; and (2) that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Upon review of the record, we conclude that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the Defendant's conviction, and we conclude that the Defendant received adequate representation at trial. We thus affirm the judgment of the trial court.