APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

I concur in the results reached in the majority opinion, but I disagree with its view of when the defendant’s speedy trial right began and with its view of the due process analysis, which indicates that the burden of proving the state’s improper intent is on the defendant. On the other hand, I do not believe that the record justifies our awarding the defendant the relief he seeks.

The appellant, Galen Dean Eidson, was indicted by a Sumner County Grand Jury for second degree murder. Pursuant to the terms of a plea agreement, Eidson pled guilty to the reduced offense of reckless homicide. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Eidson to four years confinement in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Eidson raises the following sentencing issues for our review: (1) Whether the length of the sentence imposed by the trial court was excessive; and (2) whether the trial court erred in sentencing him to total confinement in the Department of Correction. Upon de novo review, we find that a total confinement sentence of four years is justified in this case. Accordingly, the judgment of the Sumner County Criminal Court is affirmed.

Defendant appeals his conviction at a bench trial for the offense of cruelty to animals. The trial court sentenced him to eleven months and twenty-nine days with all but ten days suspended. He raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction; (2) whether the trial court erroneously admitted evidence outside the facts alleged in the charging instrument; (3) whether the trial court erroneously allowed three witnesses to give opinion testimony; and (4) whether the trial court erred in failing to suspend the entire sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Shane Wendell Yankee, appeals the trial court's summary dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal judgment. The issues presented for review are whether the appeal is permissible under Rule 3 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure and, if so, whether the denial of relief was proper. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, the defendant pled guilty to two misdemeanor counts of fraudulent use of a credit card and was placed on judicial diversion. Thereafter, a warrant was filed in which the defendant's probation officer alleged that the defendant failed to report as directed and failed to pay fines and court costs in a timely manner. After a hearing on the warrant, the trial court revoked the defendant's judicial diversion and entered a judgment against the defendant, requiring him to serve eleven months and twenty-nine days on each count, with the sentences to run concurrently. The defendant now appeals, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by sentencing the defendant to eleven months and twenty-nine days incarceration rather than eleven months and twenty-nine days probation. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The state appeals from the Knox County Criminal Court's dismissal of a three-count presentment against the defendant, Harry M. Nimmons. The trial court premised its dismissal of the presentment upon the lack of a preliminary hearing prior to return of the presentment, although the court found that the lack of a preliminary hearing was not attributable to bad faith by the state. Because there was no showing of bad faith by the state, we reverse the trial court's order and reinstate the presentment against the defendant.

The appellant, Donald Paul Presley, pled guilty in the Anderson County Criminal Court to voluntary manslaughter, a class C felony. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the trial court sentenced the appellant as a Range I standard offender to four years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Moreover, following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered that the appellant serve his entire sentence in confinement. The appellant now appeals the trial court's denial of any form of alternative sentencing. Following a review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant pled guilty to the Class E felony offense of possession of three and one-half pounds of marijuana with intent to manufacture, deliver or sell, and to the Class A misdemeanor of possession of unlawful drug paraphernalia. He now appeals his two-year sentence to the Department of Correction. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This appeal comes to us after multiple hearings in the trial court, and again in our court, on the issue of whether the Appellant's term of probation had expired at the time the alleged probation violations occurred. This issue, which has consumed considerable time of both courts, could have been resolved in less than one minute, if the State's probation officer would have checked with her office and obtained this readily available information on-line. This check would have confirmed that the Appellant's two-year sentence expired before the record in this case was filed on appeal. Because the Appellant completed this sentence on October 17, 2000, the issue of whether continued confinement is warranted based upon violations of conditions of probation is now moot and the appeal should be dismissed. See State v. Edward Shane Rust, No. 01C01-9707-CC-00258 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, July 1, 1998); see also State of Tennessee ex rel. Raymond Lewis v. State, 347 S.W.2d 47 (Tenn. 1961).

The defendant, Thomas Dee Huskey, brings this interlocutory appeal, contending that the double jeopardy protections of the United States and Tennessee Constitutions bar a retrial following the jury's deadlock on four counts of first degree murder. He argues that the trial court failed to declare a mistrial and manifest necessity did not compel one, that prosecutorial misconduct and judicial overreaching precipitated the jury's inability to reach a verdict, and that the trial court erroneously failed to accept the jury's special verdicts. We conclude that double jeopardy does not bar a retrial.

The appellant, Harold J. Douglas, was indicted by a Shelby County Grand jury on one count of second degree murder. Following a jury trial, Douglas was convicted of voluntary manslaughter and was sentenced to fourteen years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Douglas raises one issue for our review: Whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to find him guilty of voluntary manslaughter. Finding the evidence legally sufficient to support the verdict, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The appellant, Antonio Bonds, was indicted by a Shelby County Grand Jury on one count of premeditated first-degree murder. On September 30, 1999, a jury found Bonds guilty of the indicted offense and he was sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, Bonds raises one issue for our review: Whether "the evidence of [his] identity as the culprit is sufficient to support the verdict beyond a reasonable doubt." After review, we find the evidence legally sufficient to support the verdict of first-degree murder. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Marcus Duvalle Hurston, was convicted by a jury in the Madison County Circuit Court of one count of aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced the appellant as a Range II multiple offender to eight years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant raises the following issue for our review: whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his conviction of aggravated assault. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner was originally convicted by a Madison County jury of second degree murder and unlawful possession of a weapon employed in committing the offense. He received an effective 20-year sentence. The petitioner subsequently sought post-conviction relief, which was denied. The petitioner appeals the denial of post-conviction relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel, alleging trial counsel failed to adequately discuss the state's plea offer prior to trial. We conclude that the post-conviction court correctly denied post-conviction relief.

The appellant, Courtney Anderson, was indicted by a Shelby County Grand Jury on multiple counts of theft of property, forgery, and one count of misdemeanor possession of a handgun. Under the terms of a plea agreement, Anderson pled guilty to a reduced number of the charged offenses and was sentenced to an extended term in the Department of Correction. The resulting convictions reflect Class C, D and E grade felony offenses. The trial court found Anderson to be a career offender for all convictions and ordered consecutive sentences. In this appeal, Anderson contends that the effective sentence imposed by the trial court is excessive. After review, we find that Anderson's designation as a career offender for the Class C felony convictions was in error. Furthermore, we are unable to reconcile the effective sentence pronounced by the trial court with the sentences reflected by the judgment of conviction documents presented on appeal. Accordingly, we remand for clarification or correction of the sentence imposed and for resentencing on the Class C felony convictions.

The State sought revocation of the defendant’s probation for his allegedly failing to report to his probation officer within seventy-two hours of his release from jail, failing to provide proof of employment, failing to complete required community service work, failing to provide a DNA sample, and failing to pay probation fees. After a hearing, the trial court revoked the probation, finding that the defendant had violated four of its conditions. On appeal to this court, the defendant presents the sole issue of whether the trial court erred in revoking his probation. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. However, we remand for entry of a corrected judgment.