APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

We accepted this extraordinary appeal, see Tenn. R. App. P. 10, to review certain pre-hearing actions of the Davidson County Criminal Court in this post-conviction case. Our grant of review extends to these issues: (1) whether a "next friend" may file a post-conviction petition on behalf of an incompetent prisoner; (2) if so, may the post-conviction court, sua sponte, order a mental evaluation of the prisoner or conduct other inquiries into the matter to determine whether the "next friend" petition was properly filed on the prisoner's behalf; and (3) whether the court below properly denied the petitioner's motion for recusal. We conclude that we improvidently granted extraordinary review in part, but we otherwise affirm the rulings of the lower court and remand for further proceedings.

A Sumner County jury convicted the Defendant, Michael Joseph Arbuckle, of one count of driving under the influence, one count of driving under the influence, per se, and one count of driving under
the influence, second offense. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court merged the convictions and sentenced the Defendant to eleven months and twenty-nine days, with all but sixty days suspended. In this appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in (1) denying his motion to suppress the results of a blood alcohol test, (2) admitting the blood alcohol test results despite
incomplete evidence of the chain of custody, (3) admitting the blood alcohol test results despite a lack of relevance, and (4) finding that sufficient evidence existed for a reasonable jury to find the Defendant guilty. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant, Dr. Alexander C. Wells, was a professor at Tennessee State University ("TSU"). He was relieved of his teaching duties in 1992 and was asked to remove his property from the office and laboratory space he occupied at TSU. He moved some of his belongings in 1995. His remaining belongings were boxed and moved to the campus warehouse in 1996 because the space had been reassigned. When he retrieved his belongings in 1997, he found several items missing. Appellant then brought a claim in the Tennessee Claims Commission asking the State of Tennessee to return his property or, in the alternative, give him monetary compensation for the lost items. The Commission held that TSU had not been negligent in the care, custody and control of appellant's property. Therefore, the State was not liable for the missing property. We affirm the decision of the Commission.

In this wrongful death action, Plaintiff-Appellant Mary Kindred (Plaintiff), on her own behalf and as next of kin of Marcus Briggs, appeals the trial court’s judgment entered in favor of Defendants-Appellees Board of Education of Memphis City Schools, Willie Anderson, and Raybon Hawkins (Defendants).

In this suit wherein the Plaintiff, Thomas a. Smythe, seeks damages against the Defendant, Donald Cowan, for willfully interfering with contractual relations between Mr. Smythe and Phil Jones, the Trial Court granted summary judgment because in his opinion the Statute of Limitations barred the claim asserted. We affirm.

The defendant appeals from his convictions for facilitation of aggravated robbery, aggravated assault, resisting arrest and criminal impersonation. The only issue raised by the defendant is whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction for aggravated assault. Based on our review of the evidence, we conclude that the co-defendant's conduct amounted to aggravated assault and that the defendant, as a party to the offense, was criminally responsible for that conduct. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The Defendant was convicted by a Bradley County jury of second degree murder. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I standard offender to twenty-five years' incarceration. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant argues (1) that insufficient evidence was presented at trial to support his conviction; (2) that the trial court erred by failing to suppress his statement to police; (3) that the trial court erred by allowing into evidence autopsy photographs of the victim; (4) that the jury considered extraneous facts during deliberation and that the trial court erred in the manner in which it conducted a post-trial voir dire of the jury concerning this matter; and (5) that he was improperly sentenced. Having reviewed the record, we conclude (1) that sufficient evidence was presented to support the Defendant's conviction for second degree murder; (2) that the trial court did not err by allowing the Defendant's statement into evidence; (3) that the trial court did not err by admitting into evidence autopsy photographs of the victim; (4) that the record does not support the Defendant's allegation that jurors in his case were influenced by extraneous information and that the manner in which the trial court conducted a post-trial voir dire of the jurors concerning this matter was not improper; and (5) that the Defendant was properly sentenced. We thus affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Plaintiff, Mike G. Pauley, an inmate at the Madison County Penal Farm (Penal Farm), appeals from an order of the trial court dismissing his pro se complaint against the defendants, 1 Plaintiff filed suit against Madison County, Madison County Penal Farm, David Woolfork, the Madison County Sheriff and Penal Farm Superintendent, Captain Jackson, the Penal Farm’s Head Controller and Acting Warden, Sergeant Jered, the first shift sergeant, Sergeant Evans, the third shift sergeant, Officer Steven Horner, and Officer Cleo King in their official and individual capacities. 2 4which include Madison County, the Penal Farm, and several of the Penal Farm’s personnel.1

The plaintiff’s employer had a generous profit-sharing plan to which the plaintiff was not required to contribute. The trial judge declined to treat this fund as marital property because the “plaintiff didn’t earn it, and the defendant didn’t contribute to it.”

In this action, Plaintiff Eddie Heath (“Heath”) filed a pro se complaint for declaratory judgment to determine whether he provides a taxable service under the Business Tax Act. Heath brought suit against A.C. Gilless (“Gilless”), the Shelby County Sheriff, Jayne S. Creson (“Creson”), the Shelby County Clerk, as well as two employees of the Shelby County Clerk’s Office, Waylon Wininger (“Wininger”) and Pat Hutchinson (“Hutchinson”). The trial court dismissed Heath’s complaint, finding that it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. We affirm.

The defendant was tried and convicted of second degree murder in the Cumberland County Criminal Court in connection with an aggravated assault of a bar patron who died approximately one month later. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a violent offender to 25 years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant takes issue with the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on "diminished capacity" and with the length of the sentence he received. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgment below.

The Appellant, Michael Anthony Pike, appeals as of right his sentences for simple possession of marijuana, possession of marijuana with intent to sell, and possession of drug paraphernalia. He argues on appeal that the trial judge erred by not placing him in community corrections or, in the alternative, by not giving him the minimum statutory sentences. After a careful review of the record on appeal, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Defendant appeals from the dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. We conclude that the State of Tennessee never surrendered jurisdiction over defendant and that defendant's sentence did not expire. We accordingly affirm the judgment from the trial court.

This appeal came on to be heard upon the record from the Circuit Court of Knox County and briefs filed on behalf of the respective parties. Upon consideration thereof, this Court is of the opinion that there is reversible error in the trial court's judgment.

The defendant, Elton Donald Bowers, also known as Rashid Qawwi, was convicted of aggravated robbery and possession of a weapon with the intent to employ in the commission of the robbery. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-402 and Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-307. The trial court ordered the weapons conviction merged with the aggravated robbery, classified the defendant as a career offender, and imposed a thirty-year sentence.

The appellant, Robert Willis Chance, pled guilty to one count of second degree murder and one count of attempted first degree murder. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the sentences were to be served concurrently. The Hardin County Circuit Court imposed a sentence of twenty-three years for each conviction. In his sole issue, the appellant contends that the trial court erred in imposing twenty-three year sentences because of the misapplication of Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210 (1995 Supp.), regarding the presumptive sentence of a class A felony.

We granted this appeal to determine whether the trial court and the Court of CriminalAppeals erred by denying the petitioner’s motion to reopen his post-conviction petition. In hismotion, the petitioner asserted that new evidence establishes that he is mentally retarded and,therefore, ineligible for the death penalty under Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-203, which prohibits theexecutionof the mentally retarded. The petitioner also argued on appeal that the Eighth Amendmentto the United States Constitution and article I, § 16 of the Tennessee Constitution prohibit the execution of mentally retarded individuals.

This is a domestic relations case. The issues are whether the evidence preponderates against (1) an award of alimony in futuro to the appellee, (2) the finding that an alleged loan to the parties was intended as a gift, (3) an award of attorney’s fees.
 

Eldred L. Reid (Plaintiff) sued Jason Petty (Defendant) for “pain and suffering with mental stress” alleged to have resulted from the defendant’s failure to timely respond to Plaintiff’s request for pain medication. Summary judgment was entered in favor of Defendant on the grounds that the trial court lacked jurisdiction and that the defendant was immune pursuant to T.C.A. § 9-8- 307(h).

Plaintiff's actin filed against the State pursuant to the Tennessee Human Rights Act (THRA), Tennessee Code Annotated  § 4-20-191, et seq. , was dismissed by the Trial Judge for failure to state of cause of action.  T.R.C.P. Rule12.02( 6) .

This appeal from the Washington County Chancery Court concerns whether the Trial Court erred in refusing to allow the testimony of an expert witness in accordance with a local rule. The Appellant, Jami Allyson Ross Carter, appeals the decision of the Chancery Court. We vacate the decision of the Trial Court.

Plaintiff, Gary Bernard Sanders, an inmate in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction (TDOC) at the Cold Creek Correctional Facility, appeals from an order of the trial court dismissing his complaint against the defendant, Jimmie L. Jones, a correctional officer at  the facility.¹

In this divorce action, the Plaintiff, Lawrence Woodward Hamilton, filed his petition 2 for divorce on July 20, 1993. The Defendant, Brenda Kay Smith Hamilton, filed a countercomplaint seeking a divorce on the grounds of inappropriate marital conduct. The trial court granted the Defendant’s request for a divorce on the grounds of inappropriate marital conduct. The trial court awarded the parties’ marital residence as well as household furnishings to the Defendant. The Plaintiff was ordered to pay all outstanding marital debts other than the first and second mortgage on the marital residence, all expenses incurred by the Defendant as a result of this action including the Defendant’s attorney fees and $2,200.00 per month in permanent alimony. The trial court awarded the Defendant onehalf of the Plaintiff’s retirement proceeds and ordered the Plaintiff to maintain the Defendant on his health insurance policy for three years. The trial court further ordered the Plaintiff to maintain a $50,000.00 life insurance policy naming the Defendant as the irrevocable beneficiary. The Plaintiff has appealed the judgment of the trial court arguing that the trial court erred in awarding the Defendant permanent alimony and attorney fees. For the reasons stated hereafter, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.