APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

In an indictment returned by the Morgan County Grand Jury, defendant, Charles R. Francis, was charged with fourth offense DUI. Count 1 of the indictment alleged that the triggering offense of DUI occurred on December 10, 1998. Count 2 of the indictment alleged that he had previously been convicted of DUI on three separate occasions in Morgan County, Tennessee. The defendant entered a "blind plea" to DUI, fourth offense, and sentencing was submitted to the trial court for a later hearing. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court ruled that defendant was convicted of the Class E felony of DUI, fourth offense, ordered a sentence of two (2) years, with service by split confinement of 150 days in the county jail, and the balance of the sentence to be served in the Community Corrections program. Asserting that he should have been sentenced for commission of a Class A misdemeanor DUI, fourth offense, rather than a Class E felony, defendant has appealed. The original judgment entered by the trial court reflected conviction of a Class A misdemeanor, but the judgment was later amended to reflect conviction of a Class E felony, in accord with the trial court's ruling at the conclusion of the sentencing hearing. We affirm the amended judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Terry A. Rogier, by means of an interlocutory appeal seeks review of the trial court's decision affirming the district attorney general's denial of pre-trial diversion. Rogier was indicted by a Madison County Grand Jury for the offenses of reckless endangerment, a class E felony, and reckless driving, a class B misdemeanor. After review, we find that the prosecutor failed to consider all the relevant factors in denying diversion. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's finding that the prosecutor did not abuse his discretion and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.

Following a bench trial, the defendant was convicted of hindering a secured creditor, a Class E felony. On appeal, the defendant alleges that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. After a careful review of the record, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, William A. Tansil, appeals from his conviction for driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI), third offense, for which he received a sentence of eleven months, twenty-nine days, with all but one hundred fifty days being suspended. He contends that the trial court erred in finding him to be a third-time offender, arguing that the judgment for one of his prior convictions is void on its face. We affirm the trial court.

The issue is how to compute the number of prior offenses available for consideration in determining multiple offender status pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-403(a)(3). We conclude to compute the number of prior convictions available for consideration, the court must first determine whether the defendant has any prior convictions occurring within ten years of the date of the instant conviction. If so, all prior convictions shall be counted occurring within twenty years of the date of the instant conviction provided no period greater than ten years has elapsed between any two preceding prior convictions. An example is contained in the opinion. We reverse the trial court’s order amending the indictment to charge third offense and reinstate the original indictment charging ninth offense driving under the influence.

The defendant entered a best-interest guilty plea in the Cocke County Criminal Court to one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, two counts of aggravated rape, and one count of criminal exposure to HIV. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range I standard offender to six years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction for the criminal exposure to HIV conviction, as a violent offender to 24 years incarceration for the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction, as a violent offender to 24 years incarceration for one of the aggravated rape convictions, and as a multiple rapist to 24 years incarceration for the other aggravated rape conviction. The trial court ordered consecutive service of the sentences for an effective sentence of 78 years incarceration.  On appeal, the defendant takes issue with the length of the sentences and the consecutive service imposed. Based upon our review, we affirm the sentences imposed.

he defendant pled guilty to aggravated assault with an agreed four-year sentence, and the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. The trial court denied the defendant any alternative sentence and ordered that the defendant serve his sentence in the Department of Correction. The defendant appeals the trial court's judgment denying him an alternative sentence. After review, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

The appellant, Robert G. Bean, challenges his conviction in the Williamson County Circuit Court of one count of driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI), third offense. He presents the following issues for our determination: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying the appellant's challenge for cause of prospective juror Thelma Woodard; (2) whether the trial court erred in denying the appellant's motion to suppress the State's use at trial of the videotape of the traffic stop of the appellant's vehicle; (3) whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on adult driving while impaired as a lesser-included offense of driving under the influence; and (4) whether the trial court erred in using the appellant's 1996 conviction of DUI to enhance the appellant's sentence. Following a thorough review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

On April 29, 1999, the petitioner's status on community corrections was revoked and he was resentenced. On May 15, 2000, he filed a pro se post-conviction relief petition. The issue is whether the petition is time-barred by the Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-202. Because the revocation and resentencing became final thirty days after its entry, which was May 29, 1999, as the State concedes, and we agree, the petition was timely filed. We reverse the summary dismissal of the petition and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.