APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The appellant, Melvin E. Beard, was convicted in the Williamson County Circuit Court of one count of the sale and delivery of less than .5 grams of crack cocaine, a class C felony. The trial court sentenced the appellant to ten years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction and imposed a fine of two thousand dollars ($2000). On appeal, the appellant raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence at trial was sufficient to sustain the appellant's conviction; (2) whether the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce the portion of an audio tape recording of the drug transaction that occurred outside the presence of the appellant; (3) whether the trial court erred in refusing to grant the appellant's motion for mistrial; and (4) whether the trial court erred in sentencing the appellant. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Deborah Louise Reese, pled guilty in the Rutherford County Circuit Court to one count of felony murder, one count of especially aggravated robbery, and one count of conspiracy to commit especially aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced the petitioner to a total effective sentence of life imprisonment. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that she received ineffective assistance of counsel and that her guilty pleas were neither voluntarily nor knowingly made. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition. The petitioner now appeals this ruling. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

On September 25, 1998, the petitioner entered best interest pleas to four counts of child rape. For these offenses he received concurrent sixteen year sentences. According to the announced plea the convictions arising out of Pickett and Overton Counties were set to be served at thirty percent while the Putnam County convictions were at one hundred percent with the potential to be reduced to eighty-five percent. Within the statute of limitations the petitioner filed a post-conviction petition alleging that his plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered concerning the consequences thereof. Subsequently, the trial court conducted a hearing and later denied the relief sought in the petition. It is from that denial that the petitioner brings the present appeal continuing to maintain that his plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. After reviewing the record and applicable caselaw, we find that the sentences imposed are illegal and, therefore, reverse and remand the matter.

The Appellant, Edward Drummer, appeals from the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief by the Shelby County Criminal Court. In September, 1997, Drummer pled guilty to one count of aggravated rape and was sentenced to fifteen years confinement in the Department of Correction. In 1998, Drummer filed a petition for post-conviction relief challenging the validity of his guilty plea upon grounds of (1) voluntariness and (2) ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court, finding the claims unsupported, dismissed the petition. On appeal, Drummer contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Sullivan County grand jury issued presentments against the defendant on one count of operating a motor vehicle without a face shield; two counts of speeding; three counts of driving under the influence; three counts of driving on a revoked license; two counts of driving on revoked license after second or subsequent conviction for driving while intoxicated; one count of driving on revoked license after second or subsequent conviction for driving under the influence; one count of driving while intoxicated, fourth offense; and one count of driving under the influence, fourth offense. The charges resulted from three separate cases. The defendant pled to all of the crimes in two different plea hearings and the defendant was sentenced as a career offender to a total of eighteen years, with a minimum jail time of 585 days, and with his last six years to be served on probation. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a career offender and did not apprise the defendant of the possibility that he could be sentenced as a persistent offender, as opposed to a career offender. He moved to withdraw his guilty pleas on this ground. The trial court denied his motion, and he appeals the denial. Furthermore, the defendant waived his right to request probation or alternative sentencing in one case, and the state agreed to allow the defendant to serve probation in one case. In the third case, the defendant requested probation or alternative sentencing. The trial court denied his request, citing his extensive criminal history in support of its denial. The defendant also appeals this denial. After reviewing the record and applicable case law, we find these issues to be without merit and therefore affirm the lower court's denial of defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas and its denial of probation or alternative sentencing.

The defendant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter, a Class C felony, and sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to four years, six months in the county workhouse. In this appeal as of right, he raises the following issues: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction; (2) whether the trial court erred in failing to include "moral certainty" language in its reasonable doubt instruction to the jury; and (3) whether the trial court erred in its application of enhancement factor (10). Based upon a careful review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.