APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

In an indictment returned by the Morgan County Grand Jury, defendant, Charles R. Francis, was charged with fourth offense DUI. Count 1 of the indictment alleged that the triggering offense of DUI occurred on December 10, 1998. Count 2 of the indictment alleged that he had previously been convicted of DUI on three separate occasions in Morgan County, Tennessee. The defendant entered a "blind plea" to DUI, fourth offense, and sentencing was submitted to the trial court for a later hearing. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court ruled that defendant was convicted of the Class E felony of DUI, fourth offense, ordered a sentence of two (2) years, with service by split confinement of 150 days in the county jail, and the balance of the sentence to be served in the Community Corrections program. Asserting that he should have been sentenced for commission of a Class A misdemeanor DUI, fourth offense, rather than a Class E felony, defendant has appealed. The original judgment entered by the trial court reflected conviction of a Class A misdemeanor, but the judgment was later amended to reflect conviction of a Class E felony, in accord with the trial court's ruling at the conclusion of the sentencing hearing. We affirm the amended judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Terry A. Rogier, by means of an interlocutory appeal seeks review of the trial court's decision affirming the district attorney general's denial of pre-trial diversion. Rogier was indicted by a Madison County Grand Jury for the offenses of reckless endangerment, a class E felony, and reckless driving, a class B misdemeanor. After review, we find that the prosecutor failed to consider all the relevant factors in denying diversion. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's finding that the prosecutor did not abuse his discretion and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.

The defendant appeals the judgment of the trial court revoking her probation. She raises two issues: (1) whether the evidence supported the trial court's finding that she violated the terms of her probation by committing the offense of accessory after the fact; and (2) whether the trial court had the authority to order her to continue her supervised probation pending this appeal. After a thorough review of the record, we find both issues have merit; therefore, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The State appeals the judgment of the Davidson County Criminal Court suspending the appellee's sentences for aggravated robbery and granting the appellee probation for a term of twenty-four years. Following a review of the record and the State's brief, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this case for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The Appellant, Kelvin A. Taylor, appeals from the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief by the Weakley County Circuit Court. Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, Taylor entered a "best interest" plea to class D felony child abuse, and was sentenced to six years in the Department of Correction as a range II offender. In this collateral attack of his conviction, Taylor presents two issues for our review: (1) whether the general sessions court's revocation of his bond without a hearing and the resulting confinement prior to indictment violated double jeopardy and due process rights; and (2) whether trial counsel was ineffective. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant appeals the judgment entered by the Circuit Court of Blount County revoking his community corrections sentence. The sole issue on appeal is whether the court abused its discretion in ordering the defendant to serve the remainder of his sentence in the penitentiary. After careful review, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

The defendant pled guilty to one count of theft over $1,000.00 and the trial court sentenced her as a Range I standard offender to three years probation. The defendant appeals from the revocation of her probation, contending that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering her to serve the remainder of her sentence in confinement. Because we conclude that the record supports that trial court's decision to revoke the defendant's probation, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.