APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is a divorce case involving an Illinois decree. An Illinois court granted a divorce to the husband and awarded the marital residence in Tennessee to the husband. The Tennessee trial court enforced the Illinois court’s award of property, and the wife appeals. Because the Illinois court did not have personal jurisdiction over the wife, we reverse and remand.

This case involves an action to recover on a loan guarantee. The trial court entered a
judgment in favor of the plaintiff bank against the individual guarantor. We affirm.

In this unlawful detainer action, Defendant Michael D. Figlio appeals the trial court’s final judgment which held that Plaintiff/Appellee Prism Partners, L.P., had free and clear 2 title to the subject property, ordered Figlio to vacate the subject property, and dismissed Figlio’s counterclaim for conspiracy. The trial court’s judgment also dismissed Figlio’s thirdparty complaint for fraud and conspiracy against Third-Party Defendant/Appellee Larry Cherry. For the reasons hereinafter stated, we affirm in part and reverse in part the trial court’s judgment, and we remand for further proceedings.

This appeal involves the adequacy of a conservator’s accounting of a disabled person’s estate. After the conservator filed her final accounting in the Probate Court of Davidson County, the personal representative of the disabled person’s estate objected to the accuracy and completeness of the accounting. The probate court conducted a bench trial and approved the conservator’s amended final accounting. On this appeal, the personal representative asserts that the final accounting was irregular and that the conservator has failed to account for all of the disabled person’s funds. We have determined that the conservator’s final accounting cannot be reconciled and, therefore, that the order approving the final accounting must be vacated.

I concur with the court’s conclusion that The Application Group, Inc. is entitled to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02(1) relief under the facts of this case. However, I have prepared this separate opinion to state that I do not concur with the court’s sweeping conclusion that “Rule 60.02(1) relief should be granted when the lawyer realizes his [or her] oversight and takes steps to correct it.” I know of no precedent for the notion that efforts to correct an error, by themselves, are always enough to entitle a lawyer to post-judgment relief. They are only one of the many factors to consider when engaging in the fact-intensive analysis required by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02(1).

This case is before the Court on appeal from the Chancery Court of Davidson
County, Tennessee wherein a Motion for Summary Judgement made by the Defendants
was sustained by the Chancellor.

This case involves an action for rescission of a deed to land allegedly procured through promissory fraud and duress. The trial court dismissed the case on the grounds that it had been brought after the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations. We reverse.

This is an action brought by the Knox County Education Association seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against the Knox County Board of Education and its then-superintendent, Allen Morgan. The trial court found that provisions of a private act granting tenure to principals employed in the Knox County School System were repealed and superseded by the enactment in 1992 of a public act, the Education Improvement Act, and that the private act, to the extent that it conflicts with the general law, violates Article XI, Section 8 of the Tennessee Constitution. The trial court further found that Knox County principals are not members of the bargaining unit represented by the Knox County Education Association as to the subjects of performance, accountability, and contract renewal. The Knox County Education Association appeals, arguing (1) the trial court erred in finding that provisions of the private act were repealed by the Education Improvement Act and (2) the trial court erred in concluding that school principals are not members of the bargaining unit as to the subjects of performance, accountability, and contract renewal. We affirm.

The defendant appeals from his conviction for aggravated assault and his sentence. We conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction for aggravated assault. The imposition of a six (6)-month jail term pursuant to a sentence of five (5) years in split confinement is appropriate. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Roger M. Gardner, appeals the order of the Sullivan County Criminal Court denying his petition for post-conviction relief. A Sullivan County jury found the petitioner guilty of attempted aggravated kidnapping, and the trial court subsequently sentenced him to serve eight years as a Range II multiple offender. The petitioner challenged his conviction on direct appeal, and this Court affirmed his conviction. State v. Roger Morris Gardner, No. 03C01-9712-CR-00524, 1999 WL 486847, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxville July 13, 1999). Subsequently, the petitioner filed for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, judicial misconduct, the trial court's lack of jurisdiction, and denial of statutory rights. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner now brings this appeal alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. For the following reasons, we find that none of these allegations merit relief and therefore affirm the decision of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Steven Lloyd Givens, was convicted of attempted especially aggravated kidnapping in the Criminal Court of Davidson County. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a sentence of twelve years as a Range I offender to be served in the Department of Correction. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in (1) denying the Defendant's motion to suppress the evidence seized during the Defendant's arrest, (2) denying the Defendant's motion to suppress the results of a show-up identification of the Defendant by the victim, (3) denying the Defendant's motion to amend the indictment, and (4) in sentencing the Defendant to the maximum sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Sidney McGlowan, filed for post-conviction relief alleging the ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition. On appeal, the petitioner alleges that the court erred by dismissing his petition without appointment of counsel and without an evidentiary hearing. Following a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Ronald Cox, was found guilty of robbery following a jury trial in the Shelby County Criminal Court. In this appeal, he raises three issues: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support his conviction; (2) whether the trial court erred by denying his request to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of theft; and (3) whether the trial court erred in its answers to questions submitted to the trial court during jury deliberations. Defendant is not entitled to relief on the first and third issues. However, under the recent Tennessee Supreme Court decision in State v. Bowles, 52 S.W.3d 69 (Tenn. 2001), we hold that the trial court committed reversible error by failing to include the lesser-included offense of theft in the charge to the jury. Therefore, we reverse Defendant's conviction and remand the case for a new trial.

The defendant, Lewis A. Forbess, entered pleas of guilt to aggravated rape, theft of property between $10,000.00 and $60,000.00, aggravated burglary, and possession of a weapon in a penal facility. The trial court imposed concurrent sentences as follows:

Offense                                                                       Term                                                          Range
Aggravated Rape                                                     25 years                                          100% Violent Offender
Theft                                                                           15 years                                            Persistent Offender
Aggravated Burglary                                               15 years                                             Persistent Offender
Possession of Contraband in a Penal Facility  10 years                                             Persistent Offender

The sentences were ordered to be served consecutively to an earlier burglary sentence. In this appeal of right, the defendant contends that the sentences are excessive. The judgments are affirmed.

Defendant appeals his conviction of second degree murder following a jury trial. He presents three issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction; (2) whether the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury to disregard certain hearsay testimony; and (3) whether the trial court erred in failing to rule on defendant's objection to a question asked by the prosecuting attorney. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Westminster Realty Company, appeals an order entered by the Davidson County Criminal Court denying its claim to an interest in the proceeds from the sale of property pursuant to forfeiture proceedings. Following a thorough review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Davidson County grand jury indicted the defendant, Galgalo B. Halake, for first-degree murder. The petit jury convicted him of that offense. The defendant filed a motion for new trial and a motion for judgment of acquittal. The trial court denied the defendant's motion for new trial, but granted the defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal by reducing the defendant's conviction to second-degree murder. Subsequently, the trial court sentenced the defendant to serve twenty-two years of incarceration. The state appeals the trial court's reduction of the conviction to second-degree murder. The defendant appeals his conviction, challenging the admission of certain testimony, the trial court's failure to charge the jury with the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter, the sufficiency of the evidence, and the propriety of his sentence. We find that there is sufficient evidence to support a jury finding of guilt of first degree murder. However, because the trial court erred in allowing lay opinion testimony concerning blood spatters, we reverse the decision of the lower court and remand this case for a new trial.