APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Johnny Moffitt, entered a plea of guilt to second degree murder. The trial court imposed a Range I sentence of 10 years. By agreement, the defendant reserved a certified question of law. See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 37. The issue presented in this appeal is whether the trial court should have dismissed the charge due to the loss or destruction of evidence. The judgment is affirmed.

The Appellant, Elwood Jeffrey Barrigher, appeals the judgment of the Obion County Circuit Court revoking his placement in the Community Corrections program and reinstating his original nine-year sentence in the Department of Correction. Prior to his revocation, Barrigher was serving a nine-year Community Corrections sentence, which stemmed from his 1999 class B felony conviction for delivery of a Schedule II controlled substance. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm the revocation.

The Appellant, Nakia Rumph, appeals from the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. In 2000, Rumph pled guilty to two counts of aggravated sexual battery and was sentenced to eight years imprisonment on each count. On appeal, Rumph challenges the validity of his guilty plea upon grounds of: (1) voluntariness and (2) ineffective assistance of counsel. After review, we affirm the judgment of the Madison County Circuit Court dismissing the petition.

The appellant, Jacky E. Jones, was found guilty by a jury in the Blount County Circuit Court of one count of obtaining a controlled substance by fraud and was sentenced to three years incarceration in the Blount County Jail. The trial court later granted the appellant probation. Months into the service of his probationary sentence, the appellant stopped reporting to his probation officer. Subsequently, the trial court revoked the appellant's probation and sentenced him to serve his original sentence in confinement. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred in failing to sentence him to community corrections after revoking his probation. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant appeals his convictions of rape of a child and incest. We conclude that the State did not improperly bolster the victim's testimony on direct examination. In addition, the defendant was not denied his constitutional right to confront witnesses against him or to an impartial jury when the trial court denied his request to question a non-witness about an alleged statement made out-of-court. Furthermore, the State was not obligated to disclose the contents of a Department of Human Services file requested by the defendant under Brady v. Maryland or Rule 16 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. We must, however, reverse the defendant's conviction of incest and remand for a new trial on Count Two based upon the State's failure to make a proper election for the offense. We, therefore, affirm the rape of a child conviction, reverse the conviction of incest, and remand for a new trial.

The defendant was convicted by a jury of DUI. After stipulating to two prior DUI convictions, he was sentenced for third offense DUI to eleven months and twenty-nine days, to be served in the county jail. We conclude that there is sufficient evidence to establish that the defendant was driving while intoxicated as charged in the indictment. Furthermore, the trial court permissibly ordered the defendant to serve eleven months and twenty-nine days in jail. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant was indicted for first degree murder. After a jury trial, he was convicted of the lesser-included offense of second degree murder and sentenced to twenty-two (22) years as a Range I standard offender. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the second degree murder conviction. Although the defendant put on proof that he was acting in self-defense or that any irrational actions were the result of adequate provocation by the victim, both issues are questions for the jury and were resolved in favor of the State. The defendant failed to make an argument or cite to authority in support of his assertion that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the defendant's right to bear arms. In addition, there is no record of the defendant's request for such an instruction or the trial court's denial of such request. Therefore, the issue is waived. After a de novo review, we conclude that the trial court followed the correct sentencing procedure and applied the correct statutory enhancing and mitigating factors in sentencing the defendant to twenty-two (22) years. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant, Sylvester Ford, was tried by jury and found guilty of one count of rape of a child and one count of aggravated sexual battery. The trial court sentenced the defendant to serve twenty years as a Range I offender. The defendant filed a timely motion for new trial, which the trial court denied. The defendant now brings this appeal, alleging that he should receive a new trial because the trial court committed plain error by failing to require the state to elect which acts the jury should consider to support the defendant's indicted offenses. The defendant subsequently filed a writ of error coram nobis, and the trial court denied the defendant's petition, finding that the petition was untimely filed and did not allege information that would warrant a new trial. After reviewing the record, we find that the defendant's direct appeal claim has merit and warrants a new trial, and, therefore, we need not address the merits of the defendant's coram nobis petition.

I am unable to join with the majority in affirming dismissal of the petition upon grounds that it was time-barred.