APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Jamie Dewayne Reed, filed for post-conviction relief. The trial court summarily denied relief on the basis that the petition was time-barred. The Defendant now appeals. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant appeals the revocation of his probation contending that the trial court abused its discretion. We hold that the record contains substantial evidence to support the trial court's conclusion that a violation had occurred, and there was no abuse of discretion. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments.

The Defendant, Chett Allen Walker, was indicted for first degree premeditated murder, setting fire to personal property, and abuse of a corpse. Prior to trial, the Defendant expressed his intent to plead guilty to setting fire to personal property and abuse of a corpse, which he did. However, the trial court submitted those charges to the jury, along with the charge of first degree murder, to which the Defendant pled not guilty. Following the jury trial, the Defendant was convicted of all three charges. In this direct appeal, the Defendant raises six issues: (1) whether the trial court erred by denying the Defendant's motion to suppress his confession; (2) whether the trial court erred by allowing the charges of setting fire to personal property and abuse of a corpse to be determined by the jury after the Defendant expressed his desire to plead guilty to those charges; (3) whether the trial court erred by allowing the jury to view certain photographs and the car that the Defendant burned; (4) whether the trial court erred by allowing the prosecutor to display a photograph of the remains of the victim to the jury during his closing argument; (5) whether the trial court erred by denying the Defendant's motion with respect to the jury instructions; and (6) whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support the Defendant's conviction for first degree premeditated murder. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Pamela J. Moses, pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to aggravated assault and numerous misdemeanors. The plea agreement encompassed the length of the sentences, but left the manner of service for the trial court's determination. The trial court denied an alternative sentence and ordered the Defendant to serve her terms in confinement. The Defendant subsequently filed for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel in conjunction with her plea. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief and this appeal followed. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal arises from the Father's post-divorce petition to set child support and to terminate previously ordered alimony in futuro. From an adverse decision of the trial court denying child support and termination of the alimony obligation, Father appeals. We affirm the portions of the trial court's ruling regarding alimony and reverse the award of attorney's fees and denial of support.

The Putnam County trial court revoked the probation of the defendant, James Cravens, and ordered him to serve his original sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days in confinement. On appeal, the defendant contends: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court's probation revocation order; (2) his sentence is excessive; and (3) the trial court erred in placing certain conditions on his bond pending appeal. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant was convicted of two counts of aggravated child abuse. The trial court imposed a
nine-year sentence for each conviction and ordered concurrent service of these sentences. The
defendant appealed, raising numerous issues, but the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the
convictions and sentences. We granted the defendant’s application for permission to appeal and,
after thoroughly reviewing the record, conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in
consolidating the two indictments for trial. Furthermore, we have concluded that the erroneous
consolidation of the indictments, in conjunction with the erroneous admission of evidence of
other crimes, wrongs, or acts, affirmatively appears to have affected the verdict of the jury.
Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court and Court of Criminal Appeals are reversed, and
these cases are remanded for new trials at which evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts
committed by the defendant against the victim or others shall not be admitted unless relevant to a
material issue. Tenn. R. App. P. 11; Reversed and Remanded for New Trials
 

The majority has concluded that the trial court committed reversible error by consolidating
the offenses of March 1, 1998 and April 9, 1998, and by admitting evidence of prior abuse
committed by the defendant, Anderson Toliver. In my view, however, the trial court did not abuse
its discretion by consolidating the two offenses and the admission of prior acts of abuse did not affect the jury’s verdict. Accordingly, I dissent and would affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Action to collect rent owed by surety was dismissed by the Trial Court. On appeal, we affirm.

Although I concur in the analysis and holding of the majority, I write to address an issue of concern: whether in today’s society a parent’s right to corporally chastise a refractory child survives, and, if so, how does one reconcile that right with the child abuse statutes as currently written and interpreted. It is my intention by this concurring opinion to raise the level of discussion and to provide, perhaps, a measure of guidance for the trial court on remand.

Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging that the indictments against him were fatally defective and that this Court's reduction of one of his convictions for aggravated rape to rape violated the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. The trial court dismissed the petition without an evidentiary hearing. Following a review of the record in this matter, we affirm the order of the trial court's dismissing the petition for writ of habeas corpus.

The appellant, Patrick J. Gray, pled guilty in the Cumberland County Criminal Court to vehicular homicide and was placed on judicial diversion. During his probationary period, the appellant violated the terms of his probation. Accordingly, the trial court revoked the appellant's probation and ordered him to serve a six-year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant complains that the trial court erred in its rulings during the probation revocation hearing. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A jury convicted the Defendant, Carl Watson, of rape, and the trial court imposed a ten-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the State’s bill of particulars was inadequate; (3) the trial court erred in failing to grant him a continuance or a mistrial due to the State’s failure to comply with discovery; (4) the trial court erred in excluding evidence of the victim’s alleged gang affiliation and initiation as a possible source of her hymenal tear; and (5) the trial court erred in not recusing itself following an ex parte communication with jurors after trial. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Maury County jury convicted the Petitioner of aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the conviction, and the Tennessee Supreme Court denied the Defendant's application for permission to appeal. The Petitioner then sought post-conviction relief, alleging that he was denied due process and effective assistance of counsel. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition, and this appeal ensued. We affirm the dismissal of the petition.

The defendant, Vidal L. Strickland, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony; attempted aggravated robbery, a Class C felony; and felony possession of a weapon, a Class E felony. He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender by the trial court to ten years for the aggravated robbery conviction, four years for the attempted aggravated robbery conviction, and two years for the felony possession of a weapon conviction, with the robbery sentences ordered to be served consecutively, for an effective sentence of fourteen years in the Department of Correction. Following the denial of his motion for a new trial, the defendant filed a timely appeal to this court, arguing: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his robbery convictions; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the results of the victims' pretrial identifications; (3) the trial court erred in ordering consecutive sentencing; and (4) the trial court erred in granting the State's motion in limine to suppress the defendant's statements to law enforcement officers. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.