APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

We granted this motion for a full court review of the Special Workers' Compensation Panel decision to determine whether the appellant, Clyde L. Long, proved by a preponderance of the evidence that his injury occurred as a result of a work-related incident as required in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-103(a). After a careful review of the record, we hold that the evidence preponderates against the holding of the trial court and Special Workers' Compensation Panel, and that the appellant's injury did arise out of and within the scope of his employment. The judgment of the trial court and the Special Workers' Compensation Panel is reversed. Because the trial court made no other factual findings, the case is remanded to the trial court with instructions to make factual findings regarding: (1) the compensable medical benefits due to the appellant; (2) the temporary disability benefits to which Mr. Long is entitled, and; (3) the proper permanent disability award to which Mr. Long is entitled. Additionally, in the interest of expediting the payment of Mr. Long's medical expenses and the receipt of disability benefits, we direct the trial court to hold such hearing within sixty days of the date of this Court's order.

A Madison County jury convicted the defendant, Ricky Woods, of aggravated burglary, theft of property valued over $500, and vandalism of property under $500. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range II multiple offender for the convictions for aggravated burglary and theft and imposed concurrent sentences of eight years for aggravated burglary, three years for theft, and eleven months and twenty-nine days for vandalism. On appeal, the defendant contends (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions; and (2) the sentences are excessive. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Ronald Paul, appeals the Robertson County Criminal Court's disposition of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petition alleged ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. The lower court ruled that, because appellate counsel's single issue raised on direct appeal was deemed waived by the appellate court, the petitioner would be entitled to a delayed appeal. The court also dismissed without prejudice the remaining allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, indicating that the petitioner could file a new petition for post-conviction relief after the conclusion of the delayed direct appeal. Because we lack jurisdiction in this appeal, we dismiss the appeal.

The defendant, Tommy William Davis, was convicted of Class D theft of property over $1,000 and was sentenced to a term of six years incarceration, as a Range II offender. On appeal, he argues that the trial court should have granted a judgment of acquittal at the close of the state’s proof, and he challenges the length of his sentence as premised on an invalid enhancement factor. Our review convinces us that the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction and that, although improper enhancement factors were applied, a sentence of six years is appropriate.

The defendant, Donald P. Wilcox, appeals the Sullivan County Criminal Court's denial of his request for probation for his guilty pleas to violating a habitual traffic offender order, a Class E felony; violating the registration law, a Class C misdemeanor; and possession of alprazolam pills, marijuana, and drug paraphernalia, Class A misdemeanors. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

While I concur with the majority that the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction for theft of property over $1,000, I reach that result from a somewhat different approach than that taken in the principal opinion. The majority concludes that the defendant’s presence in and operation of a borrowed vehicle is sufficient proof to support a finding of constructive possession of contraband contained therein. Concededly, this has been the conclusion reached by this Court in a number of its decisions. See, e.g., State v. Gonzalo Moran Garcia, No. M2000-01760-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 146, at *111 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nashville, Feb. 20, 2002); State v. Brown, 915 S.W.2d 3, 7-8 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). However, having re-read the opinion of the Tennessee Supreme Court in State v. Shaw, 37 S.W.3d 900 (Tenn. 2001), I am convinced that mere presence in and operation of a vehicle containing contraband is, without other proof of a power or intention on the part of the defendant to exercise dominion and control over the contraband, insufficient to establish “constructive possession.” Nevertheless, I believe that the record of the instant case provides sufficient other proof that, when coupled with the proof of the defendant’s presence in and operation of the vehicle containing contraband, establishes the constructive possession necessary in this case to sustain a theft conviction.

The defendant, Jerry Wayne Pointer, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced as a violent offender to life imprisonment without parole. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred in denying his motions to suppress evidence seized from his person and his home, in ruling that his prior convictions were admissible for impeachment purposes, in allowing testimony of a prior violent incident between him and the victim, and, additionally, that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support his conviction for first degree premeditated murder. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for first degree felony murder, for which he was sentenced to life imprisonment. He argues that: (1) he received ineffective assistance of counsel; and (2) the post-conviction court erred in finding that his statement taken by law enforcement officers did not violate his constitutional rights. Following our review, we affirm the post-conviction court's denial of the petition.

A Hardin County jury convicted the defendant of two counts of aggravated assault. On appeal, he contends: (1) the trial court erred by refusing to grant a mistrial during jury voir dire; (2) the trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion for new trial based on alleged juror misconduct; and (3) the evidence was not sufficient to support his convictions. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Bobby Earl Ferrell, Jr., appeals as of right the sentences imposed by the Bedford County Circuit Court following the defendant's guilty pleas to aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and theft of property valued between $1,000 and $10,000, a Class D felony. He contends that the trial court should not have ordered him to serve his effective four-year sentence consecutively to a prior Rutherford County sentence. We affirm the sentences imposed by the trial court.

The Appellant, Wilmore Hatfield, was indicted for attempted first degree murder, aggravated assault, felony possession of a weapon, and driving under the influence (DUI). Following a jury trial, Hatfield was found guilty of felony reckless endangerment, as a lesser-included offense of aggravated assault, and DUI. He was sentenced to concurrent sentences of two years for the felony reckless endangerment conviction and eleven months, twenty-nine days for the DUI conviction. On appeal, Hatfield raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether felony reckless endangerment is a lesser-included offense of aggravated assault as charged in the indictment; (2) whether the trial court's DUI instruction was proper; (3) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the verdicts; and (4) whether his sentences were excessive. We hold that felony reckless endangerment is not a lesser-included offense of aggravated assault committed by intentionally or knowingly causing bodily injury to another by use or display of a deadly weapon. Therefore, the felony reckless endangerment conviction must be reversed and remanded for a new trial on the lesser charge of misdemeanor assault. Regarding Hatfield's DUI conviction, we conclude that the trial court properly charged the jury and the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict. However, we find that the trial court erred by ordering Hatfield to serve his entire eleven-month and twenty-nine-day sentence in the county jail. Accordingly, his DUI conviction is affirmed; however, his sentence is modified to reflect a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days, with all time suspended except forty-eight hours to be served in the county jail.

The Appellant, Renne Efren Arellano, was indicted by a Maury County grand jury for one count of aggravated arson, a class A felony, eight counts of attempted first degree murder, class A felonies, and one count of felony possession of a weapon, a class E felony. A negotiated plea agreement allowed the Appellant to plead to one count of arson, eight counts of aggravated assault, and one count of felony possession of a weapon in exchange for an effective twelve-year sentence. The manner of service of the twelve-year sentence was to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered that the twelve-year sentence be served in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Arellano contends that the trial court erred in not sentencing him to any form of alternative incarceration. However, plain error dictates that the convictions be vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings because aggravated assault is not a lesser included offense of attempted first degree murder.

The Appellant, Billy Joe Porterfield, was convicted by a Montgomery County jury of aggravated burglary, especially aggravated kidnaping, especially aggravated robbery, attempted first degree murder, and two counts of aggravated rape, all arising from a single criminal episode. As a result of these convictions, Porterfield received an effective sentence of one-hundred-fifteen years imprisonment. On appeal, Porterfield argues: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, and (2) the trial court erred in its application of enhancement factors in determining the appropriate sentences. Finding no merit to these issues, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant, Jesse Wayne Baker, pled guilty to introduction of a controlled substance into a penal institution, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced the defendant to four years to be served consecutively with a previous sentence. On appeal, the defendant argues that his sentence is excessive and the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing and in imposing consecutive sentencing. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The State appeals the ruling of the Cocke County Circuit Court modifying the sentence of the Appellee, Bradley Ryan Webb, pursuant to Rule 35, Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. Under the terms of a plea agreement, Webb received an effective six-year Department of Correction (DOC) sentence, which stemmed from six theft convictions in Cocke and Jefferson counties. The plea agreement provided that the six-year DOC sentence would be served concurrently with a federal sentence Webb was serving. Following a timely filed Rule 35 motion, the trial court modified Webb's DOC sentences to "time served" and ordered removal of the state detainer warrant lodged against Webb. The trial court found that modification was necessary to effectuate the intent of the plea agreement. The State argues that the trial court's ruling was improper because Webb's sentences were imposed as a result of an "agreed plea," and any post-sentencing developments complained of by Webb were not unforeseen. After review, we conclude that Webb's sentence was improperly modified. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and this case is remanded for reinstatement of the judgments of conviction as originally entered.

The defendant entered "open" guilty pleas to eight counts of aggravated robbery and two counts of attempted aggravated robbery. The trial court imposed an effective forty-year sentence. On appeal, the defendant argues: (1) his sentences are excessive; and (2) the trial court erred in imposing partial consecutive sentencing. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Terry Wayne Luna, was convicted by a jury of aggravated sexual battery. He was sentenced to twenty years in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in overruling his motion for a mistrial because the Defendant was unduly prejudiced by a non-responsive answer to a question asked by defense counsel on cross-examination. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Darrell Lamar Fritts, filed in the Davidson County Criminal Court a petition for habeas corpus relief, alleging that the plea bargain process employed by the State of Tennessee is unconstitutional per se, thus rendering two of his convictions, which resulted from guilty pleas, void. The trial court denied the petition and the petitioner timely appealed. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.