APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

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Tenn. R. App. P. 3; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed.

DAVID G. HAYES, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JERRY L.  SMITH and JOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS, JJ., joined.
 

The defendant, Eric Alonzo Smith, was convicted of driving on a revoked license, aggravated robbery, and evading arrest. The trial court imposed concurrent sentences of 6 months, 8.5 years, and 11 months, 29 days, respectively. In this appeal of right, the defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction for aggravated robbery. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The defendant, Toby P. Leonard, entered pleas of guilt to aggravated assault and civil rights intimidation. As a part of the plea agreement, the defendant received Range I, consecutive sentences of six and two years, respectively, for an effective sentence of eight years. The trial court denied probation. In this appeal of right, the defendant argues that he should have been granted an alternative sentence. The judgment is affirmed.

Through a 2001 Tipton County Circuit Court post-conviction petition, Austin Eugene Lineback challenges his 2001 convictions in that court of statutory rape and especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor. The convictions resulted from his guilty pleas, which the petitioner now
alleges are involuntary and unknowing due to ineffective assistance of counsel. Following an evidentiary hearing, the lower court denied post-conviction relief, and the petitioner now appeals.  Upon our review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and the applicable law, we affirm.

The defendant, Paul Anthony Wright, pled guilty in the Obion County Circuit Court to manufacturing methamphetamine, a Class C felony, and was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to three years, with ninety days to be served in the county jail and the remainder in a community corrections program. As a condition of his guilty plea, the defendant sought to reserve as a certified question of law whether the trial court erred in finding there was probable cause to issue a search warrant for his property. On appeal, the defendant argues that he properly certified the question for appeal whether the trial court erred in concluding that the search warrant sufficiently established probable cause for the search of his premises. We agree with the defendant that the certified question is properly before this court and agree with the State that the trial court properly determined that the search warrant was adequate. Accordingly, we affirm the order of the trial court.

Aggrieved that his Shelby County jury conviction of aggravated robbery is not supported by sufficient evidence, Abron A. Coleman, the defendant, appeals. Because we conclude that the evidence is sufficient, we affirm the conviction.

Royden Russell and Judy Russell ("Plaintiffs") entered into a contract with Malvin L. Bray and Diedre Bray ("Sellers") to purchase a house. The sales contract required Plaintiffs to obtain an inspection by a professional home inspector. Plaintiffs hired Randall L. Douthat and Holly Douthat d/b/a The HomeTeam Inspection Service ("Defendants") to perform the home inspection. Royden Russell signed a form contract ("Contract") presented by Defendants. The Contract contained an exculpatory clause limiting Defendants' liability to the lesser of the cost of repair or the amount of the inspection fee. After moving into the house, Plaintiffs discovered structural problems. Plaintiffs sued Sellers, the realtors involved in the sale of the house, and Defendants. Plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment concerning the exculpatory clause contained in the Contract. Defendants responded by filing a Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment concerning, in part, the exculpatory clause. The Trial Court held the exculpatory clause was not against public policy and was enforceable. The Trial Court also granted Plaintiffs permission to file an interlocutory appeal. Plaintiffs applied to this Court and were granted an interlocutory appeal on the limited issue of whether the Trial Court erred in holding the exculpatory clause was not against public policy. We reverse.

The majority concludes that reversal is necessitated based upon (1) failure to instruct the jury on facilitation and (2) error in admitting into evidence the defendant's prior felony drug conviction for purposes of impeachment. Because I am unable to join on either point, I must respectfully dissent.

The Defendant, Percy Wade Cockrill, pled guilty to six counts of robbery. After a hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I offender to four years each on three of the robberies, and to five years each on the remaining three robberies. The trial court further ordered the five-year sentences to run consecutively to each other, for an effective sentence of fifteen years to be served in the Department of Correction. The Defendant now challenges the length of each term as well as the imposition of consecutive sentences. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant was found guilty by a jury of reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, vandalism up to five hundred dollars ($500), and public intoxication. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range I standard offender to a term of two years for reckless endangerment, eleven months and twenty-nine days for vandalism, and thirty days for public intoxication. These sentences were to run concurrently and were to be served in confinement in the county jail. The trial court rejected alternative sentencing. The defendant contends his sentence is excessive. Because the defendant failed to include the trial transcript, we are unable to conduct an adequate appellate review. Therefore, we presume the trial court correctly sentenced the defendant and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant appeals his conviction for DUI - second offense and his sentence of sixty days. The defendant contends the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction, more specifically that he was not impaired while driving or on a public road. The defendant also argues that his sentence of sixty days is excessive. We conclude the evidence is sufficient to sustain his conviction. The defendant failed to include the sentencing hearing transcript, thus barring this Court from reviewing his argument concerning sentencing. We affirm the judgment from the trial court as modified.

The appellant, Robert L. Trocsch, was convicted in the Roane County Criminal Court of one count of burglary and two counts of theft. He received a total effective sentence of eight years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant contests the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions and alleges that the trial court improperly performed its function as thirteenth juror. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Myra S. Bikrev appeals from her Williamson County convictions of felony theft of property, coercion of a witness, and aggravated perjury. These convictions were imposed following findings of guilt at a jury trial, and Bikrev is presently serving an effective eight-year sentence involving both jail confinement and probation. She challenges the sufficiency of the evidence as well as the propriety of the sentences she received. Her appellate arguments are not meritorious, and we affirm.

The petitioner, Chico Lopez Chigano, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for postconviction relief. In this appeal, he asserts that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed

Richard Albany Goode, convicted upon his guilty plea of statutory rape, appeals from the Blount County Circuit Court's imposition of a two-year incarcerative sentence. He claims he should have received an alternative sentence. Because the appellate record does not contain evidence relied upon by the parties and the court at the sentencing hearing, we hold that the defendant has waived our review of his appellate issue. We therefore affirm the sentence imposed by the trial court.

A Rhea County grand jury indicted the defendant on multiple sexual offense charges. At the conclusion of a trial, the defendant was acquitted of numerous offenses but found guilty of two counts of aggravated sexual battery (as lesser included offenses of aggravated rape). For each of these convictions, the trial court sentenced the defendant to twelve years as a standard offender. The court then set these sentences to run concurrently. After unsuccessfully pursuing a new trial motion, the defendant brings this appeal, raising five issues. He avers 1) that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict; 2) that the prosecutor committed reversible error by soliciting "unrelated crimes" evidence from a State witness; 3) that the prosecution committed reversible error by comments made in its closing argument; 4) that the trial court erred in failing to declare a not guilty verdict as to all counts after the jury indicated that this was its verdict; and 5) that the trial court erred in excessively sentencing the defendant. After reviewing the record and relevant authorities, we find it necessary to remand the defendant's aggravated sexual battery conviction under trial count two for resentencing consistent with this opinion. However, we find that none of the other issues merit reversal and, therefore, affirm the defendant's convictions and his aggravated assault sentence under count four of the indictment.

I respectfully dissent. For those reasons expressed in State v. Vernon Dewayne Waller, No. M2001-02414-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, Aug. 23, 2002), perm. to appeal granted, (Tenn. 2002), I find no error in the admission of the defendant's prior felony drug convictions for purposes of impeachment.

The petitioner appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his first degree murder conviction. He claims he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel (1) failed to adequately challenge suppression of the petitioner's confession and (2) failed to have the petitioner testify at trial. We affirm the trial court's denial of post-conviction relief.