APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The pro se appellant appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for the writ of habeas corpus. Finding that summary dismissal was appropriate under the circumstances of this case, we affirm the judgment of the lower court.

Issue: Whether the issuance of a capias tolls the expiration of a probationary sentence. Upon this record, we conclude it does not. We reverse the revocation of the defendant's probation, concluding his probationary sentence had expired.

The defendant, Mark Anthony Bales, pled guilty to attempted second degree murder. After accepting his plea, the trial court sentenced the defendant to serve eleven years as a Range I standard offender. The defendant now appeals his sentence arguing that the trial court erred (1) by finding that when the defendant committed the instant crime, he treated the victim with exceptional cruelty; (2) by giving insufficient weight to two applicable mitigating factors, the defendant's excellent social history and his lack of a criminal record; and (3) by sentencing the defendant to a term of years that made him ineligible for consideration for an alternative sentence. After a thorough review of the record, we find that none of the defendant's allegations merit relief and accordingly affirm his sentence.

Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, Defendant, Terrance W. Price, pled guilty to fifteen counts of money laundering, a Class B felony, and one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering, a Class C felony. He pled guilty reserving the right to appeal a certified question of law pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(i) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. The certified question of law on appeal is whether Tennessee Code Annotated sections 39-14-901, - 903, Money Laundering Act of 1996, violates Article XI, Section 8 or Article I, Section 8 of the Tennessee Constitution by exempting from its application violation of gambling laws, found in Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-501 et seq. After a careful review, we conclude that the statutes do not violate the Tennessee Constitution, and therefore affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Melvin E. Beard, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In his appeal, Petitioner alleges that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with the negotiation and entry of Petitioner's best interest plea to the charge of sale and delivery of cocaine, that his best interest plea was involuntary, and that the factual basis presented by the State was insufficient to support his plea. After a careful review of the record in this matter, we conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court's findings of fact. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 23, we accepted certification of questions of law from the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee. We are asked by the federal district court to construe Rule 9, section 25 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Tennessee. Specifically, we are asked to determine whether Richard Roe, a layperson (i.e., a non-attorney), may be charged with contempt for disclosing that he filed a complaint with the Tennessee Board of Professional Responsibility against an attorney in violation of the confidentiality provision embodied in Rule 9, section 25, and if so, by whom and before what tribunal? For the reasons given herein, we answer that the confidentiality requirement of Rule 9, section 25 applies to non-lawyers and lawyers alike. The appropriate sanction for a violation of Rule 9, section 25 is an action of contempt. Contempt proceedings may be initiated by the attorney against whom the complaint has been filed, the complainant, the Board of Professional Responsibility, or this Court. Finally, we hold that such a petition for contempt should be filed in this Court, whereupon assignment shall issue to a special master to conduct an evidentiary hearing. The record and findings of fact of the special master shall then be sent to this Court whereupon a determination of guilt and punishment, if any, will follow.

The defendant, Kenneth Jordan, entered pleas of guilt to aggravated burglary and aggravated assault. The trial court imposed Range I sentences of six years for each offense to be served concurrently. At the conclusion of a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a sentence of one year with split confinement. The defendant was given the choice of serving one year with work release and the balance on probation, or participating in a Lifeline Therapeutic Community Program with the opportunity to apply for early release. In this appeal of right, the defendant argues that the trial court failed to adequately consider the statutory guidelines and should have granted probation. The judgments of conviction are affirmed and the effective sentence is modified to require 90 days in jail with work release followed by supervised probation.

The appellant, Dennis Pylant, was found guilty in the Cheatham County Circuit Court of felony murder committed in the perpetration of aggravated child abuse. The appellant received a sentence of life imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant raises several issues for our consideration, namely the sufficiency of the evidence, evidentiary issues, and a complaint regarding the jury instructions. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, John Wayne Gray, appeals the Franklin County Circuit Court's denial of post-conviction relief from his conviction for the sale of a Schedule II controlled substance. On appeal, the petitioner claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Following a review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, in which he alleged he received ineffective assistance of counsel at his community corrections revocation and resentencing. The post-conviction court found post-conviction relief was unavailable to one challenging a community corrections revocation proceeding. We conclude that although the post-conviction process may not be used to collaterally attack a probation revocation, it is available to attack a community corrections revocation/resentencing. Thus, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

The petitioner appeals after being denied post-conviction relief. She pled guilty to one count of aggravated burglary and ten counts of forgery. Pursuant to her plea agreement, she received an effective sentence of twenty years as a Range III offender. Her post-conviction relief petition alleged she received ineffective assistance of counsel and that she did not enter her plea knowingly and voluntarily. We conclude the evidence does not preponderate against the post-conviction court's findings. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Chancery Court of Sumner County declared the parties divorced, divided the marital property, and awarded the wife rehabilitative alimony. On appeal the wife argues that since her conservator executed her counterclaim for divorce, the court had no jurisdiction to award her a divorce. She also contests the amount and duration of the alimony awarded to her. We affirm the divorce, but we reverse the award for rehabilitative alimony and modify the award to alimony in futuro. We remand for a hearing as to the amount.

The Circuit Court of Davidson County granted summary judgment to the owner of a building in a slip and fall case. We concur with the trial court in its conclusion that the defendant did not owe the plaintiff a duty to make its premises safer and that the plaintiff's own negligence was more than 50 percent of the cause of the accident. We affirm.

This appeal arises out of a condemnation proceeding brought by Rutherford County against the appellees. The appellant, claiming an interest through her deceased husband in the property to be condemned, filed a motion to intervene in the proceeding. The trial court denied the appellant's motion to intervene and dismissed her cross-claim for declaratory judgment, finding that she held no interest in the property under the provisions of the granting instrument. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the granting instrument conveyed a contingent remainder to each member of the class. As such, the conveyance to the appellant's husband lapsed when he predeceased the life tenant, leaving appellant without an interest in the property. We granted review, and we now hold that each class member held a vested, transmissible interest in the property prior to the death of the life tenant and that the appellant holds no interest in the property. We remand this cause to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Byron M. Edwards appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief attacking his jury conviction for aggravated robbery and for which he was sentenced to 30 years. He argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with a plea offer by the state that he rejected. Following our review, we affirm the post-conviction court's denial of the petition.

Defendant, Phillip Howard White, Jr., was indicted on one count of felony murder and one count of attempted especially aggravated robbery. Following a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of second degree murder and not guilty of attempted especially aggravated robbery. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant to serve twenty-five years. In his appeal, Defendant alleges that (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction; (2) the trial court erred in not instructing the jury to refrain from sleeping; (3) the trial court erred in not granting Defendant's request for a continuance because of Defendant's physical appearance at trial; and (4) the trial court erred in sentencing Defendant to twenty-five years. After a careful review of the record in this matter, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal arises pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 9. The appellant, Darrell Wayne Taylor, seeks interlocutory review of the question of whether a trial court in a post-conviction proceeding involving a capital case is authorized following an ex parte grant of fees for expert services pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 40-14-207(b), to issue ex parte orders directing the transportation of evidence in state custody to a defense expert for independent forensic tests. After careful consideration of the applicable law, we hold that there is no right on the part of an accused in a criminal case, capital or otherwise, to obtain permission ex parte for independent forensic testing of physical evidence in the custody of the State. However, following an adversarial hearing where both the prosecution and the defense may be heard, the trial judge may grant a defense request for independent testing of such physical evidence under such conditions as the trial court may in its discretion deem appropriate to protect the interests of both parties. Accordingly the judgment of the trial court staying the ex parte order to transport physical evidence for independent testing is affirmed and the case is remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

In this appeal, the appellant challenges the constitutionality of the Tennessee Department of Human Services Child Support Guidelines ("the Guidelines"). The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's determination that chapter 1240-2-4-.03(4) of the Guidelines violates the equal protection provisions of the federal and state constitutions. We granted permission to appeal. After careful consideration, we conclude that: (1) chapter 1240-2-4-.03(4) of the Guidelines, which prohibits consideration of non-court-ordered child support in calculating child support, and chapter 1240-2-4-.03(2) of the Guidelines, which requires consideration only of the obligor's income in calculating child support, do not violate the equal protection and due process provisions of either the United States or Tennessee Constitutions; and (2) the promulgation of the Guidelines does not constitute an impermissible delegation of rulemaking authority by the General Assembly to the Department of Human Services. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the cause for proceedings consistent with this opinion.