APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

John McConkey ("Plaintiff") had a vasectomy performed by a state-employed doctor. Plaintiff experienced swelling and pain after the operation, which he claimed caused him to lose time at work and caused problems in his marriage. Plaintiff underwent two subsequent surgeries including the removal of his left testicle. Plaintiff brought this claim against the doctor who performed the vasectomy. Plaintiff had no expert witness at trial. After trial, the Claims Commission ("Commission") entered an order holding, inter alia, that Plaintiff did not carry his burden of proof to establish a res ipsa loquitur case. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

The Polk County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant for three counts of vehicular homicide, four counts of aggravated assault, and twelve counts of failure to stop a school bus at a railroad crossing. The Defendant filed an application for pretrial diversion, and the trial court ordered that a pretrial diversion report be completed. Upon completion of the report, the Assistant District Attorney General denied the application, and the Defendant appealed to the District Attorney General, who also denied the application. The trial court granted a writ of certiorari and, thereafter, affirmed the District Attorney General's decision. The Defendant sought, and was granted, permission to take an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. We granted the Defendant's application for interlocutory review to address the Defendant's contention that the State abused its discretion by denying her application for pretrial diversion. After a thorough consideration of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Marcus Johnson, was convicted by a jury in the Shelby County Criminal Court of felony murder and two counts of especially aggravated robbery. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment for the felony murder conviction and twenty years for each especially aggravated robbery conviction. The trial court ordered the twenty-year sentences to run consecutive to each other, and one twenty-year sentence to run concurrent with the life sentence, and the other to run consecutive with the life sentence. In this appeal as of right, Defendant argues that: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress incriminating statements made by Defendant to the police; (2) the evidence at trial was insufficient to support his convictions beyond a reasonable doubt; and (3) the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury as to the weight to be given to the supplemental jury charge. After a review of the record, we affirm Defendant's conviction for felony murder. We conclude, however, that the constitutional protections against double jeopardy require reversal of one of Defendant's convictions for especially aggravated robbery. Accordingly, we affirm one of Defendant's especially aggravated robbery convictions. We modify the other especially aggravated robbery conviction to aggravated assault and remand for resentencing, for the reasons stated herein.

In action against the State of Tennessee and a state employee, the Commissioner held he had no jurisdiction of the claims. On appeal, we affirm.

In this Estate dispute, the Trial Court dismissed claims of two claimants. We affirm, dismissal of claimant who died on grounds his Estate had no standing to proceed. We reinstate the action of the other claimant on grounds she is not estopped to maintain her action.

The defendant, John Lee Bellamy, pled guilty in the Sullivan County Criminal Court to reckless aggravated assault, a Class D felony; failure to appear, a Class E felony; driving under the influence, second offense, and leaving the scene of an accident, Class A misdemeanors; and driving on a revoked license, second offense, a Class B misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to an effective sentence of four years, eight months, twenty-nine days. The defendant appeals the trial court's ordering him to serve his two-year, nine-month-sentence for the reckless aggravated assault conviction and consecutive one-year sentence for the failure to appear conviction in confinement. He claims that he should have received alternative sentences or, at most, sentences of split confinement. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal questions whether the Trial Court erred in its judgment against the Appellant/Defendant, Water and Light Commission of the Town of Greeneville, Tennessee, for personal injuries sustained by a Greeneville resident as a result of the smoking of sewer lines by the Appellant. We affirm This appeal questions whether the Trial Court erred in its judgment against the Appellant/Defendant, Water and Light Commission of the Town of Greeneville, Tennessee, for personal injuries sustained by a Greeneville resident as a result of the smoking of sewer lines by the Appellant. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.
 

The Defendant, Gary S. Johnson, pled guilty to vehicular homicide, a Class B felony, on August 6, 1996. The trial judge originally sentenced him to twelve years of house arrest and community corrections. The State appealed, and this Court vacated the sentence because the Defendant was not eligible for community corrections. Upon re-sentencing the Defendant was ordered to serve ten years of incarceration. The Defendant did not immediately appeal, but filed a timely Motion for a Modification and/or Reduction of Sentence. Prior to the trial court ruling on the motion, the Defendant filed a Petition for Post Conviction Relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court denied both the Defendant's motion and the Petition for Post Conviction Relief on June 12, 2002. The sole issue for appeal is whether the trial court erred in denying the Defendant's Petition for Post Conviction Relief. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for aggravated sexual battery. He argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because his divorce attorney, who thereafter became his initial trial attorney, failed to attend a polygraph examination and advise petitioner of the protocol, limitations, and requirements necessary to complete the examination. The petitioner further asserts that he was denied effective assistance of counsel by his second trial attorney because this attorney was unprepared to argue a motion to suppress and failed to adequately investigate factual allegations, review juvenile court records, call critical witnesses, pursue leads that would have established a conspiracy by the petitioner's wife to wrongfully prosecute him, and let the petitioner review the brief filed on direct appeal. Based upon our review, we affirm the post-conviction court's denial of the petition.

The trial court found the defendant, Tim Mattingly, violated the terms of his ten-year community corrections sentence. It ordered him to serve three years "day for day" in the county jail before serving the remainder of his ten-year sentence on community corrections. In this appeal, the defendant argues the trial court acted without authority in imposing this sentence. We conclude the trial court imposed an illegal sentence and remand for further proceedings.

Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-202(a) requires that the State notify the defendant of its intent to seek enhanced punishment. We accepted this cause in order to decide whether the State complied with this statutory mandate. The trial court ruled that the State's response to the defendant's discovery request met the statutory requirement and therefore, permitted the State to seek enhanced punishment outside of Range I. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. On consideration, we conclude that the State did not meet the notice requirement. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand this case to the trial court for re-sentencing.

The petitioner, Rodrick Johnson, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, asserting that: (1) the post-conviction court erred by failing to make findings and conclusions as to each issue; (2) the jury instructions provided by the trial court lowered the State's burden of proof; (3) the trial court erred in not instructing as to the lesser-included offense of facilitation; and (4) he was denied the effective assistance of counsel on appeal. We affirm the order of the post-conviction court dismissing the petition.

A Carroll County jury convicted the Defendant of manufacturing the controlled substance methamphetamine. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a standard offender to four years and six months of incarceration. The Defendant now appeals, contending the following: (1) that insufficient evidence was presented at trial to support the conviction; and (2) that the jury’s indication on the special verdict form showed its confusion with regard to the trial court’s instructions rendering the  verdict unsustainable or, in the alternative, constituting “plain error.”  Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner appeals the denial of his post-conviction relief petition following his nolo contendere pleas to aggravated burglary, aggravated assault, and evading arrest. He contends his trial counsel did not provide him with effective assistance when he entered into the plea agreement. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Steve Mason, brings the instant appeal of the post-conviction court's denial of his petition for relief. The petitioner stands convicted of first degree murder and attempted first degree murder. In this appeal, he alleges that he is entitled to post-conviction relief on the basis that the facts introduced at trial are insufficient to support his convictions and because he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

The State appeals the trial court's suppression of twenty-five rocks of cocaine seized from the defendant. Because the trial court "did not feel comfortable" in elaborating the reason why the evidence should be suppressed, we remand for the trial court to make findings of fact and conclusions of law.

On May 21, 2001, the appellant, Gary W. Young, pleaded guilty to sale of a controlled substance and possession of a controlled substance within a thousand feet of a school. He received concurrent twenty-one year sentences for each count. As part of the plea agreement the appellant attempted to reserve a certified question of law to be presented on appeal. See Tenn. R. App. P. 37(b)(2)(i). This question concerns the propriety of a search. On June 19, 2001, the appellant also attempted to withdraw his guilty plea pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(f). The trial court denied the motion to withdraw the guilty plea based on this Court's holding in State v. Hall, 983 S.W.2d 710 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998 overruled by State v. Green, 106 S.W.3d 646 2003)). This appeal followed. After a review of the record and the applicable authorities we are of the opinion that the appellant has failed to properly certify an appeal to this Court pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 37(b)(2)(i), and this Court therefore lacks jurisdiction to consider the trial court's denial of the appellant's motion to suppress. However, the appeal of the denied motion to withdraw a guilty plea is properly before this court, and this case must be remanded for consideration of the motion in view of the Tennessee Supreme Court decision in State v. Greene, 106 S.W.3d 646 (Tenn. 2003), which overruled State v. Hall. Finally, the allegation concerning the legality of the appellant's sentences, which has been raised for the first time on appeal, may be presented to the trial court on remand for consideration as a ground to allow withdrawal of the plea

A Robertson County jury convicted the defendant, Dewayne Chambers, of kidnapping and rape. The trial court imposed concurrent sentences of three years for the kidnapping conviction and eight years for the rape conviction to be served in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant contends the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

We granted review in this medical malpractice case to address whether the plaintiff, Carolyn Stovall, established a genuine issue of material fact as to the recognized standard of professional practice in the community in which the defendants, Dr. Lois E. Clarke and Dr. Robert McCain, practiced or in a similar community. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants and later denied the plaintiff's motion to alter or amend the summary judgments. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the grant of summary judgment to Dr. Clarke but affirmed the grant of summary judgment to Dr. McCain. After reviewing the record and the applicable authority, we hold that the Court of Appeals correctly determined that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Dr. Clarke. We further conclude that the trial court erred in denying the plaintiff's motion to alter or amend the grant of summary judgment to Dr. McCain. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

The defendant appeals her sentence of four years for voluntary manslaughter. The defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying her any form of alternative sentencing. We conclude that the trial court did not err in sentencing and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Charles W. Cole, pled guilty on February 4, 2000, to five sexual offenses and, in January 2001, filed a petition for post-conviction relief, asserting that his trial counsel was ineffective. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition, and the petitioner timely appealed. We affirm the dismissal of the petition