APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The appellant, Danny Johnson, was convicted by a Sequatchie County jury of two counts of rape of a child, Class A felonies, and one count of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the appellant to an effective sentence of twenty-one years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges (1) the selection process of the venire from which grand and petit jurors were selected; (2) the trial court's failure to allow into evidence as an excited utterance the statement of Thomas Zervos regarding prior abuse of the victim; and (3) the sufficiency of the evidence. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Convicted by a jury of assault and aggravated stalking, the defendant, Howard Duty, Jr., appeals. In addition to claiming that his convictions are not supported by sufficient evidence, he claims it was error for the trial court to enhance a charge of misdemeanor stalking to the felony of felony stalking. The lower court imposed the felony stalking conviction based upon a previous conviction of stalking that was adjudicated after the commission of the offense in the present case. Based upon our review, we conclude that sufficient evidence supports the stalking conviction; however, the aggravation of the stalking offense to a felony was improper. Thus, the lower court's actions are reversed in part and affirmed in part.

Defendant Jarvis Williams was convicted of seven counts of especially aggravated kidnapping and four counts of aggravated robbery. He was sentenced to an effective term of 360 years in the Department of Correction for these offenses. In this direct appeal, he challenges the length of his sentence. Co-defendant John Williams was convicted of five counts of especially aggravated kidnapping and three counts of aggravated robbery. He was sentenced to an effective term of 161 years in the Department of Correction for these offenses. In this direct appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and the length of his sentence. We affirm the judgments of the trial court in all respects.

The petitioner, Jesse Cleo Minor, entered a best-interest plea to one count of attempted rape of a child. He is currently serving an eight-year sentence. See State v. Jesse Cleo Minor, No. M1998-00424-CCA-R3-CD, 1999 WL 1179143 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, Dec. 15, 1999). The post-conviction petition at issue herein was filed by the petitioner's daughter Leann Morrison as next friend. The petition alleges that the petitioner is in poor health and suffers from irreversible dementia that seriously affects his cognitive abilities. The petitioner attacks his conviction based upon the following four allegations: (1) he was incompetent and unable to understand the prior proceedings and therefore incapable of entering a voluntary guilty plea; (2) the State failed to disclose material exculpatory evidence; (3) false and/or materially misleading statements were offered to the trial court; and (4) trial counsel was ineffective. We affirm the trial court's dismissal of the post-conviction petition.

The appellant, Delsie Lucille Sartain, was convicted by a jury for the reckless aggravated assault of a five-month-old baby, which resulted in permanent injuries. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a sentence of three years and two months incarceration as a range I standard offender. Sartain appeals the sentencing decision, arguing that the trial court erred by ordering a sentence of total confinement rather than the less restrictive alternative of probation. After review, we find no error and affirm the judgment of the Bedford County Circuit Court.

A Hamilton County Grand Jury indicted the defendant, Gene Shelton Rucker, Jr., for felony murder and aggravated arson in connection with a fire that took the life of an individual who resided in the apartment structure that was burned. Following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of the lesser-included offense of criminally negligent homicide and aggravated arson, as charged. The defendant now appeals his convictions and sentence. Specifically, the defendant argues (1) that the trial court erred by instructing the jury on criminal responsibility for the conduct of another; (2) that setting fire to personal property is a lesser-included offense of aggravated arson and should have been included in the charge to the jury; (3) that the instruction on the knowing mens rea element of aggravated arson was incorrect; (4) that the state violated the defendant's due process rights by advancing impermissibly inconsistent positions relative to the defendant and an indicted co-defendant; (5) that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; and (6) that his sentence should not have been enhanced on the basis of prior convictions that were not proven by certified copies of the underlying judgments. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the defendant's convictions and sentence.

The defendant, Sharon J. Breeden, appeals the revocation of her probation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Taurys K. Walls, appeals from the trial court's dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. Petitioner argues that his confession was coerced in violation of the United States and Tennessee constitutions. Additionally, petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on direct appeal. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Petitioner, Jason M. Weiskopf, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment. This Court affirmed Petitioner’s conviction. State v. Jason M. Weiskopf, No. W2000-02308-CCA-RM-CD, 2000 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 787 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Jackson, October 11, 2000). Petitioner timely filed a petition for post-conviction relief. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied post-conviction relief. In this appeal, Petitioner raises one issue for our review: whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present evidence of Petitioner’s diminished capacity. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, David Jennings, pled guilty to burglary, a Class D felony; theft over $1,000, a Class D felony; vandalism, a Class D felony; simple possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor; and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to an effective sentence of three years, fined a total of $400, and ordered to pay restitution. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Michael C. Adams, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for second degree murder and four counts of aggravated assault. He argues that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed to properly advise him of his right to testify and failed to properly communicate a plea offer and recommended that he proceed to trial. Following our review, we affirm the post-conviction court's denial of the petition.

The defendant appeals the trial court's revocation of his community corrections placement. Because the record supports the trial court's ordering the defendant to serve the balance of his original sentences, we affirm.

A jury convicted the defendant, Grady Paul Daverson, of driving under the influence, fourth or subsequent offense. In this appeal, the defendant argues his arrest was illegal; therefore, the trial court erred by not suppressing the evidence against him. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

We granted permission to appeal to determine the applicable statute of limitations in this action against a laboratory that analyzes blood for purposes of providing evidence in paternity cases. The trial court ruled that the case was "governed by the applicable one year statute of limitations" in Tennessee Code Annotated sections 28-3-104 and 29-26-116, which refer to injuries to the person and medical malpractice claims, and dismissed the action because the suit was filed outside the one-year limitation. The intermediate court applied the three-year statute of limitations applicable to suits for recovery of monetary damages for injuries to personal property and, thereby, reversed the trial court's ruling. We conclude that this action sounds in negligence rather than medical malpractice. Further, we conclude that the economic loss sustained by the plaintiff is an injury to property rather than to the person. Thus, we hold that the three-year statute of limitations for injury to personal property applies. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The Defendant, Joy Nelson, appeals from the trial court’s denial of her motion to correct an illegal sentence. The Defendant pled guilty to second degree murder, a Class A felony. She was classified as a Range I offender. She agreed to a sentence of forty years, which is outside the range of a Range I offender, Class A felony. We find that the sentence is proper because the Defendant knowingly and voluntarily agreed to it.