APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner appeals the denial of post-conviction relief. He argues his guilty plea to second degree murder was involuntary due to ineffective assistance of trial counsel. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Lavondas Cordell Nelson, pled guilty to one count of reckless endangerment with a weapon and one count of possession of a handgun by a felon in the Rutherford County Circuit Court, and the trial court imposed suspended two year sentences for each count, to be served consecutively, plus four years of probation at the expiration of those terms. The Petitioner filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus and a motion requesting that the trial court appoint an attorney to represent him during the habeas corpus proceeding. The trial court denied his motion and dismissed his petition for writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that: (1) the trial court erred in dismissing his petition for writ of habeas corpus; and (2) the trial court erred by denying his motion for appointment of counsel. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

The Defendant, Travis Anderson, pled guilty to two counts of aggravated burglary, with an agreed sentence of three years on each count to be served concurrently. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court was to determine whether the Defendant merited for alternative sentencing. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied the Defendant’s application for judicial diversion, suspended his sentence for three years, and placed the Defendant on probation for three years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in refusing to grant his application for judicial diversion. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The defendant, Mikel Ulysees Primm, was convicted of speeding, simple possession of cocaine, simple possession of marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia, and criminal impersonation. The trial court imposed a sentence of 30 days for the speeding offense, 11 months and 29 days on each of the three possession offenses, and six months for the criminal impersonation offense. The sentence for criminal impersonation is to be served consecutively to the sentence for simple possession of cocaine. The remaining sentences are to be served concurrently to the sentence for simple possession of cocaine and to each other. In this appeal of right, the defendant argues that the trial court provided erroneous instructions to the jury as to the definition of constructive possession. The judgments are affirmed.

Defendant, Ricky Raymond Bryan, was first tried and convicted of the first degree murder of Charlotte Scott in 1995. At the conclusion of Defendant's first trial, the trial judge, acting in his capacity as thirteenth juror, granted Defendant's motion for a new trial. Defendant's second trial was held in April 1996, and the jury once again found Defendant guilty of first degree murder and sentenced him to life imprisonment. On appeal, this Court remanded for a new trial because the introduction of Defendant's statement of November 15, 1994, violated Defendant's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. At the same time, this Court held that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction. State v. Bryan, 990 S.W.2d 231, 241 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998). Following a third jury trial, Defendant was again convicted of first degree murder and sentenced by the jury to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Defendant now appeals his conviction arguing that the evidence was insufficient to show beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant was the person who killed the victim, Charlotte Scott. Alternatively, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish that Defendant acted with premeditation and deliberation as required at the time of the offense in order to sustain a conviction of first degree murder. Defendant also contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's finding that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel in that it involved torture or serious bodily injury beyond a reasonable doubt. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant was indicted by a Putnam County Grand Jury for one count of first degree murder, one count of especially aggravated robbery and one count of especially aggravated burglary. On September 18, 2000, the State filed a Notice of Intent to Seek Punishment of Imprisonment for Life Without Possibility of Parole. The Grand Jury later returned a Superceding Indictment including charges of First Degree Felony Murder, First Degree Premeditated Murder, Especially Aggravated Robbery and Especially Aggravated Burglary. At trial, the trial court reduced the premeditated first degree murder count to second degree murder for consideration by the jury. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury convicted the defendant of felony murder, second degree murder, especially aggravated robbery and especially aggravated burglary, and immediately sentenced the defendant to life without parole on the first degree felony murder count. The trial court merged the defendant's second degree murder conviction into the first degree felony murder conviction and sentenced the defendant to twenty-five (25) years for the especially aggravated robbery conviction and to twelve (12) years for the especially aggravated burglary conviction. The trial court ran the twenty-five (25) year sentence consecutive to the life without parole sentence and ran the twelve (12) year sentence concurrent to the twenty-five (25) year sentence. The defendant appeals from the trial court based on four issues: (1) Whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury; (2) whether the evidence was sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; (3) whether the Tennessee sentencing scheme for life imprisonment without parole is unconstitutional if the aggravating circumstances, contained in Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-204, are not part of the indictment; and (4) whether the Tennessee sentencing scheme for life imprisonment without parole is unconstitutional. We find these issues do not merit a reversal of this conviction and affirm the trial court.

The defendant, Christopher C. Rigsby, appeals from the Bledsoe County Circuit Court's denial of alternative sentencing following his conviction of aggravated assault. Because the record supports the trial court's ordering the defendant to serve the six-year sentence in the Department of Correction, we affirm.

This opinion adjudicates John Robert Tory, Jr.'s appeal from the Knox County Criminal Court's denial of his 1994 petition for post-conviction relief. He filed the petition to challenge his 1992 jury convictions of first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery. Following a hearing in which counsel argued but no evidence was presented, the post-conviction court rejected the petitioner's claims that his especially aggravated robbery conviction violated double jeopardy principles, that the trial court erred in not instructing the jury as to second degree murder as a lesser included offense of first degree felony murder, and that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to demand an instruction on second degree murder as a lesser included offense. Because the record and the applicable law support the denial of post-conviction relief, we affirm.

The appellant, Paul Dennis Reid, Jr., was found guilty by a jury of two counts of premeditated murder, two counts of felony murder, two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, and one count of especially aggravated robbery. The felony murder convictions were merged into the premeditated murder convictions. Thereafter, the jury sentenced the appellant to death based upon the existence of three aggravating circumstances: the appellant had previously been convicted of one or more felonies, other than the present charge, the statutory elements of which involve the use of violence to the person; the murders were committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution of defendant or another; and the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel in that it involved torture or serious physical abuse beyond that necessary to produce death. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a violent offender to twenty-five years imprisonment for especially aggravated robbery and especially aggravated kidnapping, to run consecutively to his sentences for first degree murder and to a prior out-of-state sentence. On appeal, appellant presents forty-five issues. After an extensive review of the record and the applicable law, we find that none of these issues warrants a reversal of this case. Therefore, the judgments of the trial court are AFFIRMED.

We have this case on direct appeal, pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 1.3, from the judgment of the circuit court approving the order of a hearing committee of the Board of Professional Responsibility that suspended Charles F. Galbreath, the appellant, from the practice of law for a thirty-day period. The circuit court essentially adopted the findings of fact and conclusions of law entered by the hearing committee. Galbreath does not contest those factual findings but argues that the sanction imposed is excessive. Upon review of the record and applicable authority, we conclude that the thirty-day suspension is appropriate. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

This lawsuit emanates from a 1989 sale of land, which included a portion of land to which the seller did not have title. Two subsequent assignees of the original buyer filed a cause of action against the seller, seeking rescission or reformation of the 1989 transaction and alternate relief. The trial court awarded plaintiffs’ damages and declined to award equitable relief. We affirm.

The appellant, Danny Johnson, was convicted by a Sequatchie County jury of two counts of rape of a child, Class A felonies, and one count of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the appellant to an effective sentence of twenty-one years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges (1) the selection process of the venire from which grand and petit jurors were selected; (2) the trial court's failure to allow into evidence as an excited utterance the statement of Thomas Zervos regarding prior abuse of the victim; and (3) the sufficiency of the evidence. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Convicted by a jury of assault and aggravated stalking, the defendant, Howard Duty, Jr., appeals. In addition to claiming that his convictions are not supported by sufficient evidence, he claims it was error for the trial court to enhance a charge of misdemeanor stalking to the felony of felony stalking. The lower court imposed the felony stalking conviction based upon a previous conviction of stalking that was adjudicated after the commission of the offense in the present case. Based upon our review, we conclude that sufficient evidence supports the stalking conviction; however, the aggravation of the stalking offense to a felony was improper. Thus, the lower court's actions are reversed in part and affirmed in part.

Defendant Jarvis Williams was convicted of seven counts of especially aggravated kidnapping and four counts of aggravated robbery. He was sentenced to an effective term of 360 years in the Department of Correction for these offenses. In this direct appeal, he challenges the length of his sentence. Co-defendant John Williams was convicted of five counts of especially aggravated kidnapping and three counts of aggravated robbery. He was sentenced to an effective term of 161 years in the Department of Correction for these offenses. In this direct appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and the length of his sentence. We affirm the judgments of the trial court in all respects.

The petitioner, Jesse Cleo Minor, entered a best-interest plea to one count of attempted rape of a child. He is currently serving an eight-year sentence. See State v. Jesse Cleo Minor, No. M1998-00424-CCA-R3-CD, 1999 WL 1179143 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, Dec. 15, 1999). The post-conviction petition at issue herein was filed by the petitioner's daughter Leann Morrison as next friend. The petition alleges that the petitioner is in poor health and suffers from irreversible dementia that seriously affects his cognitive abilities. The petitioner attacks his conviction based upon the following four allegations: (1) he was incompetent and unable to understand the prior proceedings and therefore incapable of entering a voluntary guilty plea; (2) the State failed to disclose material exculpatory evidence; (3) false and/or materially misleading statements were offered to the trial court; and (4) trial counsel was ineffective. We affirm the trial court's dismissal of the post-conviction petition.

The appellant, Delsie Lucille Sartain, was convicted by a jury for the reckless aggravated assault of a five-month-old baby, which resulted in permanent injuries. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a sentence of three years and two months incarceration as a range I standard offender. Sartain appeals the sentencing decision, arguing that the trial court erred by ordering a sentence of total confinement rather than the less restrictive alternative of probation. After review, we find no error and affirm the judgment of the Bedford County Circuit Court.