APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant appealed his convictions on two counts of facilitation of second degree murder and one count of aggravated arson, as well as the effective 65-year sentence. The defendant's appeal raised the following issues: insufficiency of evidence to support the convictions; error in allowing hearsay testimony under the conspiracy exception; error in allowing cross-examination of the defendant during limited purpose jury-out hearing; error in allowing a medical expert to testify outside his area of expertise; failure to instruct the jury on inadequate crime scene investigation; and error in application of "particularly vulnerable" enhancement factor during the sentencing phase. We conclude that the defendant's issues are without merit and affirm the convictions and sentence as imposed by the trial court.

Following a jury trial, the defendant was found guilty of attempted reckless homicide, aggravated burglary, and aggravated assault. The trial court merged the attempted reckless homicide conviction into the aggravated assault conviction, and the defendant was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender, to ten years for aggravated assault and six years for aggravated burglary, with the sentences to run concurrently. The defendant contends that the trial court improperly merged the attempted reckless homicide conviction into his aggravated assault conviction. Also, the trial court erred in instructing the jury on flight. We conclude, following plain error review, that attempted reckless homicide is not a recognized crime in Tennessee. We reverse and dismiss the defendant's conviction for attempted reckless homicide. Further, we conclude that the jury instruction regarding flight was not error, and the trial court correctly sentenced the defendant as a Range II, multiple offender. We affirm the defendant's convictions and sentences for aggravated burglary and aggravated assault.

The defendant was convicted of aggravated robbery, facilitating aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated burglary. He now appeals these convictions contending that the (1) evidence was not sufficient to support the convictions, (2) trial court erred in refusing to dismiss the charge of aggravated kidnapping or in refusing to merge the charge of aggravated kidnapping with his aggravated robbery charge, (3) trial court erred by denying him his right to effective cross-examination by stating that questions regarding the prior inconsistent statements of the victim would allow the admission of more damaging testimony against the defendant, and (4) trial court erred in sentencing. We hold that the trial court erred in applying enhancement factor four; however, the error was harmless. We affirm the judgments of the trial court in all other respects.

This appeal involves an action to terminate parental rights filed by the prospective adoptive parents of a child. The child’s father asserts that the chancery court erred in terminating his parental rights on the basis that he abandoned his child for the four-month period set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-102(1)(A)(i). To compute the four-month period, the chancery court used the date on which the Court Appointed Special Advocate (“CASA”) filed a petition in juvenile court to terminate the father’s parental rights. CASA’s petition was later dismissed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the chancery court’s termination of parental rights under Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-102(1)(A)(i) and found an additional ground for abandonment as defined by Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-102(1)(A)(iii). Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-102(1)(A)(iii) specifies that parental rights may be terminated if the father “willfully failed to make reasonable payments toward the support of the child’s mother during the four (4) months immediately preceding the birth of the child.” We granted permission to appeal. We hold that the commencement of the four-month period of abandonment under Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-102(1)(A)(i) is properly computed from the date on which the petition to terminate parental rights was filed in chancery court, not from the filing date of the earlier juvenile court petition. We further hold that the Court of Appeals erred in terminating the father’s parental rights based upon Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-102(1)(A)(iii). Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the trial court.

The defendant, Mona Ray Cloud, pled guilty in the Blount County Circuit Court to aggravated burglary, a Class C felony; violating the Motor Vehicle Habitual Offender (MVHO) Act, a Class E felony; and criminal impersonation, a Class A misdemeanor. Pursuant to the plea agreement, she received four-year, one-year, and six-month sentences, respectively, with the one-year and six-month sentences to be served concurrently to each other but consecutively to the four-year sentence for an effective sentence of five years in the Department of Correction (DOC). The manner of service was to be determined by the trial court. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the defendant to serve her sentences in confinement. The defendant appeals, claiming that she should have received alternative sentences. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The appellant, Angelee Prater, was convicted by a jury of aggravated child abuse, a Class A felony and fined $25,000. As a result of the conviction, the trial court sentenced her to twenty-one years and six months incarceration as a Range I, standard offender and classified her release eligibility at 100% as a violent offender. After the trial court denied the appellant's motion for a new trial, she appealed. The appellant argues on appeal that the aggravated child abuse statutes, Tennessee Code Annotated sections 39-15-401 and -402 are unconstitutionally vague as applied to her conduct and that the evidence was not sufficient to support a verdict of guilt. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the statutes in question are constitutional and that the evidence is sufficient to support the verdict of guilt. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The appellant, Barry Inman, was convicted by a jury in the Williamson County Circuit Court of possession of over .5 grams of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver, possession of Alprazolam with the intent to sell or deliver, possession of marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia, and speeding. Additionally, the appellant pled guilty to driving on a revoked license. The trial court sentenced the appellant to a total effective sentence of nine years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court should have granted his motion for judgments of acquittal and that the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to sustain his convictions. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This direct appeal of right for first degree murder for which the defendant received a sentence of life without parole raises five issues of alleged error: (1) sufficiency of evidence; (2) failure to suppress the defendant's statements; (3) improper admission of photographs; (4) improper testimony of experts at the penalty phase of trial; and (5) improper admission of evidence concerning a prior conviction of the defendant. We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the first degree murder conviction. The issue concerning admissibility of the defendant's statement is waived by the defendant's failure to include the suppression hearing in the appellate record. We conclude that the remaining issues were properly decided by the trial court, and we, therefore, affirm the conviction.

The appellant, Paul Edward Pettibone, Jr., pled guilty to the offense of attempted aggravated robbery, a Class C Felony. He was sentenced to four years as a Range I, standard offender. The trial judge ordered the appellant to serve his sentence in incarceration, but asserted that if the appellant successfully completed an addiction treatment program known as Lifeline Therapeutic Community, he could apply to the court to suspend the rest of his sentence.¹ In this appeal as of right, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by failing to grant either an alternative sentence or a term of probation after a period of confinement. After a review of this case, we conclude that the evidence did not support the grant of an alternative sentence or a term of probation after a period of confinement and thus affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Charles Lawuary, appeals from the trial court's order revoking Defendant's community corrections sentence and requiring him to serve the sentence in incarceration. Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking the community corrections sentence. After a review of the record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.