APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, Monroe Brown, appeals the trial court's order denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The state has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petition fails to establish either a void judgment or an expired sentence. Accordingly, the state's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Jason C. Polston, of reckless aggravated assault.  The trial court sentenced the Defendant to two years in the workhouse, suspended except for 60 days to serve on weekends, a $500.00 fine, and 200 hours of community service. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) insufficient evidence exists to support his conviction; (2) the trial court erred by failing to suppress the Defendant’s statement made in a telephone conversation with a police officer because the State did not disclose the statement prior to trial; (3) the trial court erred by instructing the jury on flight; (4) the trial court erred by failing to charge the defenses of necessity and duress; (5) the trial court erred bydenying the Defendant’s application for judicial diversion; and (6) the trial court erred by ordering the Defendant to serve sixty days in jail. We conclude that the trial court erred by failing to suppress the Defendant’s telephone conversation with a police officer because the State did not disclose the statement to the Defendant prior to trial in violation of Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 16. Therefore, we reverse the Defendant’s conviction and remand for a new trial.

This is a child custody dispute. The mother and father entered into a permanent parenting plan naming the mother the primary residential parent of their daughter. Under the plan, the father had supervised visitation because the mother was concerned about sexual abuse by the father. The father later sought to modify the parenting plan to allow for unsupervised visitation. The mother then filed a notice that she intended to move to Florida with the daughter, which the father opposed. The trial court granted the father's petition for unsupervised visitation and denied the mother's request to relocate to Florida with the child. The mother and daughter then left for a scheduled trip to Florida, with the understanding that they would return for the father's scheduled visitation. The mother remained in Florida with the daughter for six weeks, asserting that she, the mother, was too ill to travel. The father was granted an emergency change of custody. The father then retrieved the daughter through a private investigator, coordinating with Florida officials. Upon return to Tennessee, the trial court found the mother in criminal contempt for interfering with the father's visitation and for moving to Florida. The father was named the primary residential parent and the mother was granted supervised visitation. The mother was also required to pay the father for the cost of the private investigator. The mother appeals the denial of her request to move to Florida with the child, the award of unsupervised visitation to the father, the finding of contempt, the change of custody, the requirement that her visitation be supervised, and the requirement that she pay the private investigator's fee. We affirm.

Mother appeals termination of her parental rights. The juvenile court found that Mother was in substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, that she failed to remedy the persistent conditions that prevented her child's return, and that termination was in the child's best interest. We affirm. The record contains numerous extraneous documents that do not pertain to the petition to terminate parental rights or the issues raised on appeal. The parties and the clerk have a responsibility to abridge the record. Tenn. R. App. P. 8A(c). Failure to abridge the record may result in a reduction of the juvenile court clerk's fee for the cost of preparing and transmitting the record. Tenn. R. App. P. 40(g).

This litigation arises out of a two-vehicle collision in Hawkins County. Teresa A. Martin ("the plaintiff") and her husband sued the driver of the other vehicle, Johnny L. Drinnon ("the defendant"), seeking damages and charging him with common law and statutory acts of negligence. The defendant answered and filed a counterclaim. The jury returned a verdict, finding the parties equally at fault. Judgment was entered on the jury's verdict and the trial court denied the plaintiff's motion for a new trial. The plaintiff appeals, raising, in effect, three issues. We vacate the trial court's judgment and remand for further proceedings.

The petitioner, James Clark, appeals the trial court's dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence. Because the petitioner has no appeal as of right under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(b), the appeal is dismissed.

The defendant entered a guilty plea to driving under the influence. The trial court imposed a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days to be served forty-eight hours of confinement followed by probation. As a part of the guilty plea, the defendant reserved for appeal the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress. See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 37(b)(2)(i). The judgment is affirmed.

Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her two children. The circuit court found that Mother was in substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, that she failed to remedy the persistent conditions that prevented her child's return, and that termination was in the child's best interest. We affirm. The record contains numerous extraneous documents that do not pertain to the petition to terminate parental rights or the issues raised on appeal. The parties and the clerk have a responsibility to abridge the record. Tenn. R. App. P. 8A(c). Failure to abridge the record may result in a reduction of the circuit court clerk's fee for the cost of preparing and transmitting the record.

The pro se petitioner, James P. Hyde, appeals from the trial court's order denying the petitioner's motion to reopen his post-conviction petition. The states moves the court to affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20 of this court's rules. The motion was properly denied for lack of merit. Accordingly, the state's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This is an unemployment compensation case in which Appellant was denied benefits by the Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development. At all administrative levels it was determined that Appellant was discharged for “misconduct connected with such claimant’s work” and that he was, therefore, disqualified from receiving benefits under Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-7-303. This ruling was then affirmed by the lower court. Appellant then timely filed this appeal challenging the ruling of the lower court. For the following reasons, we affirm and remand for further proceedings.

Mother and husband divorced. In her complaint for divorce, mother stated that her son was born of their marriage. Husband paid son’s child support. Upon reaching the age of majority, son filed a paternity action against alleged father. Son relied upon mother’s affidavit as proof of requisite sexual contact. The alleged father filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim arguing mother was judicially estopped from making the statements contained in her affidavit in light of her statements made in her divorce complaint. The juvenile court granted the motion to dismiss. For the following reasons, we reverse the decision of the trial court and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This is a child custody case in which both Gerald Ottinger (father) and Kimberly Ottinger (mother) filed petitions for primary residential custody of their daughter, Marlah Whitley Ottinger. The trial court granted joint legal custody to the parties and awarded primary residential custody to the father. The mother appeals, asserting that the court should have awarded her primary residential custody. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this divorce action, the Trial Judge granted the parties a divorce, and allocated the marital and separate assets.

Robert T. Irvin sued the defendants for refusal to continue to accept his donation of plasma to The Plasma Center. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court entered an order stating that the complaint failed to state a cause of action and, that if Mr. Irvin’s cause of action lies in medical malpractice, he failed to meet his requisite burden in responding to the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The motion for summary judgment was granted and Mr. Irvin appeals.

This extraordinary appeal involves a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 35.01 request for a physical examination of an opposing party. Following a vehicular collision in Wilson County, one of the drivers and her passenger filed suit in the Circuit Court for Wilson County seeking damages from the driver and owners of the other vehicle. Issues involving the extent and permanency of the plaintiff driver's injuries caused by this collision arose after the plaintiff driver was injured in another accident, and the defendants requested permission for their medical expert to examine the plaintiff driver. The trial court denied the request, and the defendants filed a Tenn. R. App. P. 10 application with this court. We have determined that, under the facts of this case, the trial court's denial of the defendants' Tenn. R. Civ. P. 35.01 motion departs from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings of this sort. Therefore, we grant the Tenn. R. App. P. 10 application and reverse the order denying the Tenn. R. Civ. P. 35.01 motion.

Melvin Thomas Hartman, Jr., appeals a divorce judgment rendered by the Circuit Court for Hamilton County, On apeal he insists that the Trial Court erred in its award of certain jewelry to his wife, Paua Ruth Sheffied Hartment, as separate property which was in fact marital preperty. Mr. Hartman also insists that the Trial Court made an inequitable division of the marital estate since the Trial Court refused to consider the tax consequences of awarding Mr. Hartman certain retirement funds in exchange for Ms. Hartman receiving the equity in their home and other real property. Mr. Hartman filed a motion for reference to a Special Master due to the "complex valuation and categorization issues. "

This appeal involves an action for breach of an employment agreement. Defendants, Carol Cordell Coletta and Coletta & Company, Inc., appeal from the judgment of the chancery court which entered judgment in the amount of $31,800.00 in favor of the plaintiff, Clyde Norman Brewer, Jr.

This is a habeas corpus appeal. A jury convicted the petitioner of seven counts of rape of a child, one count of incest, and three counts of aggravated sexual battery. He received an effective sentence of twenty-two years incarceration. In April 2003, the petitioner submitted a pro se petition for habeas corpus relief, alleging the sentences for child rape committed in 1992 are illegal because the record is unclear as to whether these offenses were committed before or after July 1, 1992, the effective date of the child rape statute. The trial court dismissed the petition, and the petitioner appeals the dismissal. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Anthony Carrier, pled guilty to aggravated burglary, felony theft, and misdemeanor vandalism. Pursuant to his plea agreement, he received an effective sentence of three years, with the manner of service of the sentences to be determined by the trial court. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve his sentences in confinement. It is from this order that the Defendant appeals. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Lamar Advertising of Tennessee (Lamar) appeals from an order of the Chancerty Court of Knox County that upheld the validity of a provision of the kNoxville City Code, Article V, Section 10-N (Ordinance) that assesses a license fee per annum for the inspection of all existing ground and portable signs within the City of Knoxville. Lamar owns and maintains 350 outdoor advertising sturctures within the City of Knoxville and has challenged the validity of the ordinance.

The petitioner, James C. Murray, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief relating to his convictions for premeditated first degree murder and conspiracy to commit first degree murder. On appeal, the petitioner contends: (1) he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial; and (2) the post-conviction court erred in refusing to admit Leonard Rowe's testimony. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This case is before us pursuant to the grant of two Rule 9 Interlocutory Appeals, one to Plaintiff Rhonda Lee Smith and the other to Larry Wallace, in his offical capacity as Director of the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the juvenile court of Knox County wherein the court terminted the parental rights of the appellant (defendant). For reasons hereinafter stated, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal presents a multifaceted challenge to the constitutionality of Tennessee’s abortion statutes. After a physician and a clinic in Knoxville were charged with violating these statutes, two other clinics in Memphis and Nashville, joined by three physicians, filed suit in the Circuit Court for Davidson County seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under the Constitution of Tennessee. The trial court struck down the residency requirement, the waiting period, and the requirement that physicians inform their patients that an abortion is a major surgical procedure. After making its own substantive revisions in the statutory text, the trial court upheld the mandatory hospitalization requirement, the remaining informed consent requirements, and the newly enacted parental consent requirement. We have determined that the trial court erred by revising the text of several provisions. We have also determined that the emergency medical exception enacted by the General Assembly is unconstitutionally narrow, that the combined effect of the waiting period and the physician-only counseling requirement places an undue burden on women’s procreational choice, and that the remaining challenged provisions as construed herein pass constitutional muster.
 

This is a suit by David T. Bailey and E. Lynn Wagner in their own right and derivatively for the use and benefit of Southeastern Healthcare Services, L.P., a Limited Partnership in which they were partners, against Tom Holbert, as general partner, Moore's Pharmacy, Inc., D/B/A Marcum's Healthcare Services, and Carl Marcum and Gina Marcum Pinney, as Officers and Directors and/or Employees and Agents of and for Moore's Pharmacy, Inc., and Tom HOlbert, Carl Marcum and gina Marcum Pinney, Individually. The suit stems from the purchase by Southeastern Healthcare Services of a unit dosage pharmacy business from Moore's Pharmacy, Inc., for the sum of $275,000. The complaint alleged a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation and breach of warranty.