APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Appellant, Ricky Hill Krantz, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief by the Davidson County Criminal Court. Krantz is currently incarcerated as a result of his jury convictions for first degree felony murder and aggravated assault. On appeal, Krantz raises the single issue of whether he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. After review of the issue, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

On March 23, 1998, The petitioner pled guilty to six (6) counts of attempt to commit incest and six (6) counts of attempt to commit rape. He was sentenced to six (6) years for each count, all to be served concurrently to each other. On March 20, 2002, he filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. He based his petition on two grounds of relief, attorney misrepresentation and DNA analysis under Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-403. The trial court dismissed the petition as time-barred on the attorney misrepresentation issue and as not meeting the statutory requirements on the DNA issue. The petitioner appeals the trial court's decision. We affirm the trial court.

I agree with the majority opinion in all respects with one exception. The majority opinion concludes the failure of the trial court to charge the lesser-included offense of facilitation of felony murder as to Defendant Bond was not harmless error. I respectfully disagree with this conclusion.

This case involves Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant committed legal malpractice while representing
Plaintiff in certain bankruptcy proceedings. The Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment,
alleging that the applicable statute of limitations bars the malpractice action, as does the doctrine of res judicata. The trial court granted Defendant’s motion, and Plaintiff filed the instant appeal. For
the following reasons, we affirm the ruling of the lower court.

The Defendant, Donald W. Brymer, Jr., appeals from the Williamson County Circuit Court's revocation of his probation that he received for his guilty plea to one count of statutory rape. The Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his probation and sentencing him to confinement. We affirm the trial court's judgment.

I agree on both counts. The “loan agreements” are poorly drafted, and they do not reflect
sound business judgment on Mr. Caldwell’s part. So what? When competent parties have bargained in good faith and have entered into a written contract, it is not the courts’ prerogative to rewrite the contract or to relieve either party from the burdensome effects of their agreement. Vargo v. Lincoln Brass Works, Inc., 115 S.W.3d 487, 492 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003). Whether considered by themselves or in conjunction with the parties’ separate “consulting agreements,” the fact of the matter is that Mr. Caldwell’s “loan agreements” are precisely that – loan agreements. I would affirm the trial court.

The Petitioner, Roger Lynn Perry, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Because Petitioner has failed to allege a ground for relief which would render the judgment void, we grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

This is an appeal by the petitioner from the denial of his post-conviction relief petition. The petitioner was originally convicted of especially aggravated robbery and sentenced to 60 years at 100% service. After careful review, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

Appellant Dennis Ray Jones was convicted in the Henry County Circuit Court of manufacturing methamphetamine and was sentenced to three years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Appellant Pamela Kay Barker was convicted of criminal responsibility for facilitating the manufacturing of methamphetamine and was sentenced to two years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellants raise numerous issues, including the trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, the sufficiency of the evidence, and sentencing. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for a correction of Appellant Barker’s judgment of conviction.

Defendant, Michael David Totty, was indicted on one count of burglary of a building other than a habitation, a Class D felony, and one count of theft of property over $1,000 but less than $10,000, a Class D felony. The jury found Defendant guilty of the lesser-included offense of facilitation of a burglary other than a habitation on count one and guilty on count two, theft of property. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range III persistent offender to ten years on the theft conviction and six years on Defendant’s conviction of facilitation of a burglary. The trial court ordered Defendant’s sentences to run concurrently for an effective sentence of ten years. Defendant does not appeal his sentence. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court’s denial of his motion for a continuance prevented Defendant from securing a material witness for trial and denied his counsel an adequate opportunity to evaluate Defendant’s competency to stand trial. Defendant also argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

I concur in affirming defendant Jones’s conviction of manufacturing methamphetamine but respectfully dissent from affirming Barker’s conviction of facilitation of the same offense.

The Homeowners' Association of a residential subdivision organized as a planned unit development assessed maintenance fees against the owner of twenty-two unimproved lots in the subdivision. The owner of those lots filed a suit to obtain a declaration that it was not liable for those fees, alleging that the developer had waived all assessments on vacant lots. The trial court found that the Association was entitled to rescind the waiver, granted summary judgment to the Association, and ordered the lot owners to pay the fees, as well as significant late charges and attorney fees, for a total of over $45,000. We reverse the judgment because there is no evidence in the record that the Board of Directors of the Homeowners' Association ever officially rescinded the waiver, and there is thus a material question of fact as to whether its assessments were valid.

Pursuant to Rule 9, Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, both the defendant and the State were granted appeals from an interlocutory order of the trial court granting in part, and denying in part, Defendant's motion to exclude Rule 404(b), Tennessee Rules of Evidence, testimony. After a careful review of the evidence, we affirm in part and reverse in part the trial court's order.

The defendant was convicted of DUI, second offense. He contends that 1) the evidence was insufficient, 2) the trial court erred in instructing the jury on reasonable doubt, 3) the trial court erred in instructing the jury as to the inference from refusal to submit to a chemical test, and 4) the trial court erred in failing to grant the motion to strike the enhancement count. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

I concur in the results reached in the majority opinion. However, I question whether a “reasonable certainty” equates to a “moral certainty” relative to the definition of reasonable doubt in Tennessee. Also, I believe that trial courts in this state should not be using varying definitions of reasonable doubt.

Defendant, Cecil Moss, appeals from the trial court's order revoking his probation and reinstating his original sentence to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Defendant argues that the trial court erred by failing to consider any alternative sentencing options other than incarceration. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant was convicted of robbery under a theory of criminal responsibility for the conduct of another. The defendant contends the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction. We conclude a reasonable jury could have inferred the defendant's intent to assist in the robbery based upon his contemporaneous assault on the victim. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Robert E. Allen, pled guilty to aggravated assault, three counts of domestic assault, vandalism, evading arrest, public intoxication and reckless burning. The trial court sentenced him to five years in prison for the aggravated assault and eleven months and twenty-nine days on each of the other charges, with the sentences to run concurrently. The Petitioner did not perfect an appeal of his sentence, but petitioned for post-conviction relief on the grounds that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. Following a hearing on the post-conviction petition, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he was denied effective assistance of counsel for the following reasons: (1) trial counsel failed to properly advise him as to the potential sentences for all the charges covered in the plea agreement; and (2) trial counsel failed to advise him of his right to appeal the sentence imposed by the trial court. Finding no error, we affirm the post-conviction court's dismissal of the petition.

A Fayette County jury convicted the Defendant, Christopher Jerome Taylor, of possession of more than 0.5 grams of cocaine with intent to deliver, possession of more than 0.5 ounces of marijuana with intent to deliver, and felony possession of a handgun. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed concurrent sentences of eighteen years for cocaine possession, three years for marijuana possession, and three years for felony possession of a handgun. On appeal, the Defendant contends: (1) that insufficient evidence exists in the record to support his convictions; and (2) that his sentence is excessive. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

This appeal arises out of a complaint filed by the Appellant, Samuel Timothy Collins, against the
Appellee, NBC Bank, for damages he allegedly incurred as a consequence of his erroneous arrest and incarceration by the Knox County Sheriff’s Department. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

This appeal arises from the trial court’s award of summary judgment to the Defendant in a medical malpractice action. The trial court awarded summary judgment based on the statute of limitations. We affirm.
 

I concur in the result reached by the majority. I do so because I believe the record before us
reflects undisputed material facts that negate an essential element of the plaintiff’s cause of action, i.e., the element of “proximate causation” of the appellant’s damages. I do agree with the appellant that there remains a genuine issue of material fact for the trier of fact as to the element of “cause in fact.” I believe a jury could reasonably find that there is a “cause and effect relationship between the defendant’s tortious conduct and the plaintiff’s injury or loss.” White v. Lawrence, 975 S.W. 2d 525, 529 (Tenn. 1998). As the Supreme Court has pointed out, “cause in fact” addresses the “‘but for’ consequences of an act.” Id. However, in my judgment, the conduct of the Sheriff’s Office, once the deputies arrived at the bank and thereafter took the appellant into custody, conclusively militates against a finding of proximate causation tying the bank’s conduct to the appellant’s damages.

This matter is before the Court upon the State’s motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court by opinion pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner is appealing the trial court's denial of habeas corpus relief. The Petitioner fails to assert a ground of relief entitling him to habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.