APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, Frank A. Barnard, was convicted in 1992 of first degree murder, aggravated robbery, and aggravated sexual battery, for which he was sentenced, respectively, to sentences of life, eight years, and ten years, with the latter sentence to be served consecutively to the first two. In a petition for writ of habeas corpus, he claimed that the trial court was without jurisdiction to impose judgment for the murder conviction. The trial court dismissed the petition, and this timely appeal followed. After review, we affirm the dismissal.

A Hardin County jury convicted the Defendant, Stephen Keith Frazier, of vehicular homicide and two counts of driving while under the influence of an intoxicant or drug (“DUI”). The trial court merged the two DUI convictions and sentenced the Defendant to ten years for vehicular homicide, and eleven months and twenty-nine days for the DUI conviction, with both sentences to run concurrently. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions; and (2) the trial court erred in sentencing the Defendant by improperly applying enhancement factor (17) to increase the length of the sentence and in not imposing alternative sentencing. Based upon our review, we affirm the conviction for vehicular homicide and vacate the conviction for DUI, this offense being merged into the conviction for vehicular homicide. Additionally, we affirm the Defendant’s sentence for his vehicular homicide conviction, and we vacate the Defendant’s sentence for his DUI conviction. We therefore remand to the trial court for the entry of a single judgment in accordance with this opinion.

The defendant, Brian French, appeals the revocation of his probation. We dismiss the appeal due to the untimely filing of the notice of appeal.

This case presents an appeal to this court after remand by order of the Tennessee Supreme Court. The Appellant, Robert James Yoreck, III, pled guilty to aggravated assault, a class C felony. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Yoreck, as a Range II multiple offender, to nine years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Yoreck argues that his sentence was excessive. After a review of the record, we affirm the sentence as imposed by the Montgomery County Circuit Court

The plaintiff A.D. Doe for himself and his daughter M.A. Doe sued the Sheriff of Knox County and the County itself for damages when M.A. Doe was allegedly raped by a deputy sheriff. The complaint alleged that the sheriff was liable on his bond and on his oath of office and that Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-8-302 imposed liability on the County because the deputy was acting “by virtue of or under color of the office.” The Circuit Court of Knox County dismissed the complaint against the Sheriff and the County for the failure to state a claim. We affirm.

This case presents an appeal to this court after remand by order of the Tennessee Supreme Court. The Appellant, Mario C. Estrada, appeals the imposition of a sentence of twelve years confinement in the Department of Correction. The sentence arose from a guilty plea entered by Estrada to one count of arson, eight counts of aggravated assault, and one count of possession of a prohibited weapon. In this appeal, Estrada raises the issue of whether the trial court erred by ordering a sentence of total confinement rather than a less restrictive alternative. After review, we find no error. Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.

The Defendant, Thaddeaus Medford, was convicted of three counts involving the delivery and attempted delivery of cocaine. In his first appeal, the Defendant contended, in part, that the State used a peremptory challenge to exclude a potential juror based on race. We remanded the case for the trial court to determine whether the State’s challenge was based upon a racially-neutral reason. On remand, the trial court determined that the State’s challenge was based upon a racially-neutral reason, and the Defendant appeals, contending that this finding by the trial court is in error. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This case presents an appeal to this court after remand by order of the Tennessee Supreme Court. The Appellant, Renne Efren Arellano, appeals from the sentencing decision of the Maury County Circuit Court. In a negotiated plea agreement, Arellano pled guilty to arson, eight counts of aggravated assault, and felony possession of a weapon and received an effective twelve-year sentence as a Range I standard offender. The manner of service was to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied any form of alternative sentencing and imposed total incarceration for the twelve-year sentence. On appeal, Arellano contends that the trial court erred in not sentencing him to any form of alternative incarceration. Finding no error, the sentences of the trial court are affirmed.

The appellant, Felicia Murphy, appeals the sentencing decision of the DeKalb County Circuit Court following revocation of her probation. In December 2001, Murphy pled guilty to misdemeanor reckless endangerment and received a sentence of eleven months and twenty days, which was to be suspended after service of ten days. While on probation Murphy was found to be in violation of her probation, resulting in the extension of her probationary period for an additional six months. On the day before this extended period was to expire a violation warrant was issued, which alleged numerous violations of conditions of her probation. Following a hearing, the trial court revoked her probation and ordered reinstatement of her original sentence. On appeal, she argues that the trial court "acted too harshly" by revoking her sentence and, instead, should have extended her probationary period for one year. Finding no merit to Murphy's claim, the judgment of the trial court revoking her probation and ordering reinstatement of her original eleven-month and twenty-nine-day sentence is affirmed.

This is a will contest case. Patricia Henderson Jolley and Howard E. Henderson, Jr. (collectively "the Contestants") appeal the chancery court's judgment that they do not have standing to contest their father's will. The Contestants contend that the chancery court erred in addressing the issue of their standing and in other ways. They argue that their stepmother, Wanda K. Henderson ("the Executrix"), failed to raise the standing issue and, as a consequence, waived it. They also rely on alleged procedural errors and contend that they do have standing. We affirm.

This case involves the attachment of a mobile home and its subsequent transport to a storage facility. The Appellee sued out an attachment on the Appellants’ mobile home to secure payment of past rent due on a tenancy at Appellee’s trailer park. Appellee had the mobile home transported after it was attached and Appellants sued Appellee for damages to the mobile home. The Shelby County General Sessions Court found in favor of Appellants, and Appellee appealed to the Circuit Court. The Circuit Court found in favor of Appellee, and Appellants now appeal to this Court. For the following reasons, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.
 

We granted this appeal to determine whether a third-party beneficiary who seeks to enforce a contract between a hospital and an insurance carrier may be bound by an arbitration provision in the contract. The trial court denied the hospital’s motion to compel arbitration, finding that the thirdparty beneficiary was not a party to the contract between the hospital and the insurance carrier. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the arbitration provision could be enforced against the third- party beneficiary in this case. After reviewing the record and authority, we conclude that an arbitration provision in a contract is enforceable against a third-party beneficiary who has filed a cause of action seeking to enforce the contract.

A Shelby County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Robert L. Stevenson, of burglary of a building, a Class D felony, and the trial court sentenced him as a career offender to twelve years in the Department of Correction. The defendant appeals, claiming (1) that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and (2) that the trial court erred by allowing the state to impeach him with prior convictions. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Michael R. Lewis, appeals the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, he claims that ineffectiveness of trial counsel resulted in an invalid, 2001 jury conviction of reckless aggravated assault and that post-conviction relief from the conviction is warranted. Because the record supports the post-conviction court’s findings and conclusion, we affirm.

The trial court granted Mother's petition for conservatorship of the parties' disabled son; enforced MDA provision requiring Father to pay child support beyond child attaining age of majority; increased Father's child support obligation; and ordered Father to continue to maintain life and disability insurance. We affirm.

We granted review in this workers’ compensation appeal to determine whether an employee who was less than age 60 on the date of injury, but who reached maximum medical improvement and permanent total disability status after age 60, is entitled to a minimum of 260 weeks of benefits under Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-207(4)(A)(i) (Supp. 2003). The Chancellor determined that because the employee was less than 60 years of age when the injury occurred, he was entitled to permanent total disability benefits for only 232 weeks until he was eligible for full benefits under the Social Security Act. The employee’s appeal was transferred to the full Supreme Court prior to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel hearing argument and issuing its decision. After reviewing the record and applicable authority, we conclude that the Chancellor properly construed the statute in awarding the employee 232 weeks of permanent total disability benefits pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-207(4)(A)(i). We therefore affirm the Chancellor’s judgment.

The Defendant, Dennis James Varner, entered a conditional plea of guilty to driving under the influence following the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence attendant upon his stop at a roadblock. The Defendant reserved for this Court's ruling a certified question of law regarding the constitutionality of his stop by law enforcement officers. Upon our review of the record and pertinent legal authority, we have determined that the trial court erred in denying the Defendant's motion to suppress. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's judgment and dismiss the charges against the Defendant arising out of his stop at a roadblock conducted in contravention of Tennessee's constitution.

The petitioner appeals from his denial of post-conviction relief. He alleges ineffective counsel and error by the post-conviction judge. After careful review, we conclude that the petitioner failed to prove ineffective counsel. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of relief.

The Trial Court held defendant’s purchase money security interest in cattle had priority over
plaintiffs’ prior security interest. On appeal, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Christopher A. Davis, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner failed to file his petition within the applicable statute of limitations, failed to assert a claim that is cognizable in a petition for writ of error coram nobis, and the statute of limitations should not be tolled. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The petitioner, Steven Gass, was convicted by a jury in the Rutherford County Circuit Court of rape of a child, aggravated sexual battery, and attempted rape of a child. The petitioner received a total effective sentence of thirty-two years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, citing several instances of ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner timely appealed. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Carl E. Leggett, Sr., was indicted by the Franklin County Grand Jury for possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver. Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted of facilitation of possession with intent to sell over .5 grams of cocaine. The Defendant was sentenced as a Range II multiple offender to serve nine years in confinement and ordered to pay a $70,000 fine. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. The Defendant also challenges his sentence. After a careful review of the record, we reverse the judgment of the trial court on sufficiency grounds and dismiss the charges against the Defendant.

Conservator brought action to recover assets for the Estate of Carolyn Brown which had been given to defendant by Brown. The Chancellor invoked the constructive trust doctrine and ordered assets returned to the Estate. On appeal, we affirm.
 

I concur with the portion of the majority opinion which would affirm the trial court’s judgment regarding sentencing. However, I respectfully dissent from that portion of the opinion which holds that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the conviction of facilitation of possession with intent to sell over .5 grams of cocaine.