APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, a physician, was charged in three separate indictments with a total of twenty sexual offenses involving eleven different victims. The counts charged in the indictments were alleged to have occurred over a time span of six years. The trial court denied the defendant's pre-trial motion to sever the counts for separate trials and granted the State's motion to consolidate all three indictments for a single trial. The defendant was subsequently found guilty of one count of sexual battery by an authority figure, six counts of sexual battery, and three counts of assault. He was acquitted on three counts of rape and three counts of sexual battery. The defendant then presented several issues on appeal, including: (1) that the trial court erred in denying the motion to sever the offenses; and (2) that the defendant was improperly convicted of sexual battery by an authority figure. The Court of Criminal Appeals held, among other things, that the trial court erred in denying the motion to sever. However, the Court found this error to be harmless and therefore affirmed the convictions. The Court of Criminal Appeals also held that the defendant's conviction for sexual battery by an authority figure was proper as a physician fell within the ambit of the applicable statute. For the reasons stated herein, we hold that the failure to sever the counts against the defendant was reversible error, and therefore we reverse the convictions. Further, we hold that a physician is not an authority figure as contemplated under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-527 (2003) and therefore the defendant's conviction under this statute was improper. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed, and the case remanded for new trials.

This matter is before the Court upon the State's motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court by memorandum opinion pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petitioner has appealed the trial court's order summarily dismissing the petition for the writ of habeas corpus. In that petition the petitioner alleges that the indictment charging the petitioner with one count of felony murder and one count of first degree murder is void because the counts therein fail to allege sufficient facts to vest jurisdiction in the trial court. Upon a review of the record in this case we are persuaded that the trial court was correct in summarily dismissing the habeas corpus petition and that this case meets the criteria for affirmance pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This is a child support case involving the allocation of private school tuition. The trial court ordered the father to pay one-half of the minor children’s private school tuition. We affirm.
 

The Petitioner, Adrian Wilkerson, appeals from the dismissal of his petition for the writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that the Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We find the State's motion has merit. Accordingly, the motion is granted and the appeal is affirmed pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The Petitioner, Corey Harrison, appeals from the dismissal of his petition for the writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that the Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We find the State's motion has merit. Accordingly, the motion is granted and the appeal is affirmed pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The Petitioner, Ricky H. Krantz, appeals from the dismissal of his petition for the writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that the Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We find the State's motion has merit. Accordingly, the motion is granted and the appeal is affirmed pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

This action arises out of Appellant's parole hearing proceedings. Subsequent to his original parole hearing, Appellant filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Davidson County Chancery Court. Upon Appellant's motion for summary judgment and Appellee's motion to dismiss, the trial court granted Appellee's motion to dismiss and denied Appellant's motion for summary judgment. For the following reasons, we affirm.

Linda Jane Holt ("Plaintiff") and Billy Dale Holt ("Defendant") were divorced in June of 2002. As part of the divorce judgment, Plaintiff was ordered to sell the marital residence and give $20,000 of the proceeds to Defendant. Defendant filed a petition for contempt in July of 2003, claiming Plaintiff had not sold the house. Plaintiff answered and filed a counter petition claiming Defendant had violated a permanent restraining order contained in the divorce decree by writing letters to her and their daughter. The Trial Court ordered Wife either to sell the house within four months or the Court Clerk would sell it at public auction. The Trial Court also ordered that Defendant be permanently restrained from sending Plaintiff and the parties' daughter letters or other written correspondence. The Trial Court also ordered Defendant to pay Plaintiff's attorney's fees and costs in connection with the petition for contempt and the counter petition. Defendant appeals the award of attorney's fees and costs. We vacate the award of attorney's fees and affirm the award of costs.

The Petitioner, Jeffrey M. Hodges, appeals from the dismissal of his petition for the writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that the Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We find the State's motion has merit. Accordingly, the motion is granted and the appeal is affirmed pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Eight full-time Memphis police officers, all of them former officers with the Memphis Police Reserve, sued for declaratory judgment finding that time they served in the Memphis Police Reserve should be credited toward the thirty years of service required in order to receive an automatic promotion to the rank of Captain under Section 67 of the Memphis Charter. Plaintiffs argued that designation of reserve officers as “part-time employees” in Article III, Section 28-56 of the Memphis Code, entitles them to receive such service credit. The Shelby County Chancery Court denied their request for declaratory judgment. Plaintiffs appeal. We affirm.
 

The Petitioner, Michael Keith Kennedy, appeals from the dismissal of his petition for the writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that the Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We find the State's motion has merit. Accordingly, the motion is granted and the appeal is affirmed pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The Petitioner, Antonio Lyons, appeals from the trial court's dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. The trial court found the petition to be untimely filed. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We find the State's motion has merit. Accordingly, the motion is granted and the appeal is affirmed pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The Petitioner, Reginald K. Watkins, appeals from the dismissal of his petition for the writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that the Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We find the State's motion has merit. Accordingly, the motion is granted and the appeal is affirmed pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

In 1991, the Petitioner, Kenneth R. Lewis, pled guilty to second degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range I offender to twenty-five years in prison. The Petitioner did not perfect a direct appeal. In 2003, the Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus relief, which the habeas court summarily dismissed. The Petitioner appeals the order dismissing his petition, contending that: (1) his plea and sentence were illegal; and (2) the habeas court erred when it dismissed his petition without holding an evidentiary hearing. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the habeas court's judgment.

A Marshall County jury convicted the Petitioner, Jonathan D. Tears, of multiple drug-related offenses, and the trial court sentenced him to twelve years. The Petitioner did not appeal his convictions or sentence, but filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief on the grounds that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. Following a hearing on the post-conviction petition, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because: (1) both his trial and appellate counsel failed to properly advise him about the law regarding his right to file a motion for new trial; (2) trial and appellate counsel failed to inform the Petitioner of his right to appointed counsel for appeal; and (3) trial and appellate counsel failed to fully advise him of his right to appeal the sentence imposed by the trial court. After thoroughly reviewing the record and the applicable law, we conclude that there exists reversible error in the trial court's judgment.

The defendant, William E. Ross, pled guilty in the Hardin County Circuit Court to possession of less than one-half gram of cocaine with intent to sell, a Class C felony; possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor; two counts of driving on a suspended license, second offense, a Class A misdemeanor; and resisting arrest, a Class B misdemeanor. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to concurrent sentences of eight years for the felonious possession of cocaine conviction; eleven months, twenty-nine days for each Class A misdemeanor conviction; and six months for the resisting arrest conviction. The trial court was to determine the manner of service of the sentences. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered that the defendant serve his sentences in confinement. The defendant appeals, claiming that he should have received alternative sentences. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Brian Shane Caldwell, was convicted by a jury of first degree felony murder and first degree burglary. He was sentenced to concurrent terms of life imprisonment and ten years, respectively. The Defendant's convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal. See State v. Brian Shane Caldwell, No. 1176, 1988 WL 94393 (Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxville, Sept. 13, 1988). The Defendant subsequently filed for post-conviction relief alleging, inter alia, that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied relief; this appeal followed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Rawshard J. Smith, pled guilty to possessing less than .5 grams of cocaine. He was sentenced as a standard Range I offender to three years on intensive probation. Following a revocation hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant's probation and ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. The Defendant now appeals. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Andrew Thomas, was convicted of felony murder. In imposing a death sentence, the jury found that evidence of one aggravating circumstance, i.e., the defendant was previously convicted of one or more felonies whose statutory elements involved the use of violence to the person, outweighed the evidence of mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction and the death sentence, and the case was automatically docketed in this Court. We entered an order identifying three issues for oral argument and now hold as follows: (1) the trial court did not err in excusing a prospective juror for cause; (2) the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on lesser included offenses of felony murder but the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; and (3) the death sentence was not arbitrary, excessive, or disproportionate. We also agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals’ conclusions with respect to the remaining issues, the relevant portions of which are included in the appendix to this opinion. Accordingly, the Court of Criminal Appeals’ judgment is affirmed.

In 1981, a Davidson County jury convicted the Petitioner, Jesse Haddox, of second-degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him to life in prison. In 2002, the Petitioner filed a post-conviction petition requesting DNA testing pursuant to the Post Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001. The trial court denied the Petitioner's post-conviction petition, concluding that the results of any tests of the remaining DNA evidence would not exonerate the Petitioner. The Petitioner now appeals, contending that the trial court erred by denying his post-conviction petition. After thoroughly reviewing the record and the applicable law, we conclude that there exists reversible error in the trial court's judgment.

This is a direct appeal as of right from two jury verdict drug convictions of the sale of less than 0.5 grams of cocaine. The trial court sentenced the Defendant, Terrell Thomas, to concurrent terms of six years for each offense. On appeal, the Defendant argues two issues: (1) the State failed to provide exculpatory information to the defense in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 65 (1963); and, (2) the trial court erred in not granting the Defendant's motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The State appeals from an order of the Hamilton County Criminal Court suppressing evidence from a motorist stop on public housing authority property. Following the stop at the street entrance into the public housing development, the officer observed two quart containers of beer in the vehicle driven by Defendant, Jerry W. Hayes. A check of Hayes' driver's license revealed that the license had been suspended. Hayes was indicted for driving on a suspended license and being a minor in possession of alcohol. The stated purpose of the housing authority's checkpoint was to ensure the safety of its residents by excluding trespassers and others without legitimate purposes seeking entry into the housing development. The trial court found the stop constituted an unreasonable seizure and was thus unconstitutional. Pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, the State seeks review of this ruling. After review, we conclude that the stop was reasonable; therefore, no Fourth Amendment violation resulted. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's suppression of the evidence and remand for further proceedings.

The Appellant, James Dubose, has filed a petition to rehear in this case. The opinion of this Court, affirming the judgment of the trial court, was filed October 15, 2004. Upon review of the petition to rehear, we conclude that it should be denied.

The Defendant, Wade James Odum, appeals from the trial court's dismissal of his petition for error coram nobis relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The parents in this child support proceeding have three children – twins conceived during their marriage and one child conceived after their divorce. Because of pre-2003 jurisdictional restraints, proceedings to set child support were simultaneously pending in both the Circuit Court for Davidson County and the Juvenile Court for Davidson County. The juvenile court awarded the mother a $23,273.50 judgment for retroactive child support for the youngest child and based the father’s prospective child support obligation on his ability to earn $40,000 per year. The circuit court, without considering the juvenile court’s order, calculated the father’s child support for the twins based on $25,761, the imputed annual income in the Child Support Guidelines, and then increased the amount because of extraordinary medical expenses of one of the twins. The mother has appealed the circuit court’s decision to base the father’s child support for their two older children on $25,761 per year rather than on $40,000 per year. The father has appealed both judgments. He asserts that the juvenile court erred by basing his child support for the parties’ youngest child on a $40,000 annual income and by failing to grant him requested credits against his retroactive child support. He also complains that the circuit court erred by increasing his child support because of the medical expenses of one of the twins and the combined effect of the two judgments which require him to pay This is not expressly stated in the order but it is stated in the parenting plan. 1 -2- 53% of his net income in child support, rather than 41% as provided in the Child Support Guidelines. We have determined that the juvenile court’s judgment for retroactive child support should be vacated because the father is entitled to credit for his voluntary child support payments. We have also determined that the father’s child support obligation for all three children should be based on $40,000 per year and that the combined amount of child support obligation should be 41% of his net income, with an upward adjustment for the extraordinary medical expenses of one of the twins. Finally, based on the 2003 statutes affecting the jurisdiction of the juvenile and circuit courts, we have determined that the proceeding in the juvenile court should be transferred to the circuit court and that all future matters regarding these children should be adjudicated in the circuit court.