APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant pled guilty to aggravated robbery and was also found guilty after a bench trial of especially aggravated kidnapping. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to thirty-five years for the Class A felony especially aggravated kidnapping conviction, and to fifteen years for the Class B felony aggravated robbery conviction. The two sentences were ordered to be served consecutively. On appeal, the Defendant argues two issues: 1) his conviction for especially aggravated kidnapping violated his right to due process pursuant to State v. Anthony, 817 S.W.2d 299 (Tenn. 1991), and; 2) the trial court erred in imposing excessive sentences and in running the sentences consecutively. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal involves protracted litigation concerning the zoning of a parcel of land located in Memphis, Tennessee. After a bridge, which provided the only access to the property, washed away, the landowner planned to install and maintain billboards on the subject parcel by helicopter. The landowner initially applied to the Memphis City Council to have the subject parcel re-zoned from agricultural uses to commercial uses. The Memphis City Council rejected the landowner’s application. The landowner filed a petition for review by common law writ of certiorari and an action for declaratory judgment in the circuit court. The circuit court entered an order reversing the decision of the Memphis City Council and remanding the case to the Council for a new hearing.  Upon remand, the Memphis City Council once again rejected the landowner’s application. The landowner filed a petition for contempt in the circuit court alleging the Council violated the court’s order on remand. The trial court found that, while the Memphis City Council violated the court’s order in every respect, it was not in willful contempt of the court’s order because it relied on the erroneous advice of its lawyer in interpreting the order. The trial court then proceeded to remand the case to the Memphis City Council once more for a new hearing. The City filed an appeal. We reverse the decision of the trial court and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This appeal arises from a claim for homeowner's insurance benefits. In 1998, a tornado damaged a home in East Nashville. The owner of the home held an insurance policy that provided coverage for guaranteed replacement cost above the policy limit, once repairs had been completed. After the insurer had paid the owner the actual cash value of the damage, the owner sold the home to the plaintiff for $80,000. Along with the sale, the owner assigned to the plaintiff the rights to any claims or proceeds under the insurance policy. The plaintiff, without making any repairs, began a process of attempting to collect supplemental proceeds under the policy. After the insurer failed to respond to the plaintiff's demand for an appraisal, the plaintiff submitted two sworn statements in proof of loss, claiming a total of $405,072.93 in replacement costs. The insurer rejected the plaintiff's proofs of loss, and this suit followed. Following a jury trial, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff for $405,072.93, in addition to $35,000 in damages for bad faith. Because we find that the judgment entered by the trial court was the product of an inconsistent jury verdict, we vacate and remand.

The petitioner, Kenneth Lee Weston, appeals the trial court's dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petition was properly dismissed as barred by the statute of limitations. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This appeal involves a decision by the Davidson County Circuit Court to grant a petition for a writ of scire facias after expiration of the ten-year statute of limitations. In granting the petition, the trial court first found that the debtor was equitably estopped from asserting the defense of the statute of limitations because of his bad faith and willful misconduct. Next, the trial court found that the judgment creditors timely filed their petition for a writ of scire facias because the ten-year statute of limitations had been tolled by debtor's filing of a Chapter 13 bankruptcy case and also by the entry of the Order for Payment by Installments. The debtor appealed to this Court. The judgment of the trial court is reversed.

This matter is before the Court upon the State's motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court by memorandum opinion pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The appellant has appealed the trial court's order summarily dismissing his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. In that motion, the appellant argued that his guilty plea resulted in a void sentence because it was ordered to run concurrent to a prior unrelated offense that the appellant was out on bond for at the time of the commission of the offenses which resulted in the guilty plea. Upon a review of the record in this case, we are persuaded that the trial court was correct in summarily dismissing the motion and that this case meets the criteria for affirmance pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Petitioner, Larry Bohannon, appeals from the trial court’s dismissal of his petition seeking post-conviction relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petition was filed outside the applicable statute of limitations and is, therefore, time-barred. Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of the trial court.

After a bench trial, the Defendant, Jose Luis Quintero, was convicted of the first degree murders of Meceia Nelson and Darius Boleyjack. The Defendant waived a sentencing hearing and agreed to a sentence of two concurrent terms of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that 1) the evidence is not sufficient to support his convictions; 2) the Defendant's statement to the police should have been suppressed; and 3) the trial court erred in allowing a witness to testify about statements made to her by one of the victims. Finding no errors entitling the Defendant to a reversal, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This matter is before the Court upon the State’s motion to affirm the judgement of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner, Carlos Rice, appeals the trial court’s denial of post-conviction relief. The petition was filed outside the applicable statute of limitation and is, therefore, time-barred. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found that the employee had suffered a compensable injury to his left knee and awarded permanent partial disability benefits of forty percent for the left lower extremity, but
denied recovery for the employee’s back injury. The employee contends that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s conclusion that his back injury was not compensable. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse the holding of the trial court and remand for a determination of permanent partial disability benefits.

The Trial Court enforced a mediated Settlement Agreement, reduced to writing and signed by the parties, over the wife's objection. On appeal, we affirm.

The Appellant, Edward Chumney, appeals the revocation of his probation by the Madison County Circuit Court. On appeal, Chumney argues that the trial court was without authority to revoke his probation because the violation warrants were issued after his sentence of probation had expired.  After review, we agree that three of his sentences had expired; however, his two sentences for aggravated burglary had not. Accordingly, we affirm revocation of his two sentences for aggravated burglary and reverse and vacate revocation of his sentences for misdemeanor theft, class E felony theft, and class D felony theft. The case is remanded for correction of the records below to reflect this holding and for other proceedings consistent with this opinion.

First Source Furniture Group and Travelers Insurance Company have appealed the decisions of the trial court in favor of Randy Lee Hayes. First, the trial court awarded Mr. Hayes 25% permanent partial disability to his left arm due to a new injury. Second, the trial court, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(a)(2), reconsidered Mr. Hayes’ prior award and increased it by 7% to the body as a whole. We affirm the decisions of the trial court while correcting an admitted error regarding Mr. Hayes’ workers’ compensation benefit rate for the arm injury.

In the 1940's, Tyler Seal received a life estate interest in a parcel of land with the remainder going to his heirs at law upon his death. In 1968, Tyler Seal conveyed his interest in the property to his brother, Clint Seal, via a deed which purported to convey a fee simple interest. This deed was not recorded until 1991. Tyler Seal passed away in March of 1996. Clint Seal deeded the property in fee simple to his son and daughter-in-law, Tony and Patricia Seal, the following year. This lawsuit was filed by various persons claiming an interest in the land because they were remaindermen pursuant to the will which originally conveyed the life estate to Tyler Seal. Suit was brought against Clint Seal as well as Tony and Patricia Seal ("Defendants"). Defendants claimed they were the rightful record owners of the property or, alternatively, that they were entitled to ownership of the property based on adverse possession. The Trial Court concluded Defendants were entitled to ownership of the property because they had adversely possessed the property for the requisite number of years and further that Plaintiffs' seven year statute of limitations to file suit had expired. We reverse.

The defendant, Santita Makeva Sutton, pled guilty in the Bedford County Circuit Court to two counts of sale of one-half gram or more of cocaine, a Class B felony, possession with intent to sell one-half gram or more of cocaine, a Class B felony, possession of a weapon by a convicted felon, a Class E felony, and simple possession of a schedule VI controlled substance, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced her to eight years for each Class B felony conviction, one year for the Class E felony conviction, and eleven months and twenty-nine days for the Class A misdemeanor conviction. The court ordered two of the three Class B felony convictions, the Class E felony conviction, and the Class A misdemeanor conviction to run concurrently with each other but consecutively to the other Class B felony conviction for an effective total sentence of sixteen years in the Department of Correction. The defendant appeals, claiming the trial court erred in denying her alternative sentencing under state law and the rule announced in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. __, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). We affirm the trial court.

The petitioner, Jackie F. Curry, petitioned the Johnson County Criminal Court for habeas corpus relief from his three 2000 Knox County convictions of aggravated rape. The court dismissed the petition, and the petitioner appealed. The state has moved this court to affirm the convictions pursuant to Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20. We sustain the court's motion and affirm the order of dismissal.

The appellant pled guilty to aggravated assault. At sentencing, the trial court imposed a three-year sentence to be served on probation. In this appeal, the appellant argues the trial court erred by denying judicial diversion. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Elmer Fritts, appeals from the trial court's order dismissing his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The state has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petition fails to establish a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the state's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The petitioner, Carl Ed Leming, pled guilty in the Hamilton County Circuit Court to two counts of aggravated rape. He received consecutive sentences of forty years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction, with release eligibility after serving thirty percent of his sentence. Subsequently, the petitioner filed in the Bledsoe County Circuit Court a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that his sentence was illegal because he received statutorily impermissible release eligibility. The court dismissed the petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and the petitioner now appeals. Upon our review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a breach of contract case in which the controlling issue involves the commencement and conclusion of the term of an employment contract and, more specifically, when Plaintiff's guaranteed term of employment ended. The trial court determined that Defendant had breached the contract by terminating Plaintiff prior to the end of his employment term and awarded damages, together with contract authorized attorney fees and expenses. We affirm the judgment of the Chancellor.

The petitioner, Joseph B. Thompson, appeals from the Sullivan County Criminal Court's dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, in which he challenged his 2001 jury conviction of misdemeanor theft on the grounds that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel and that the trial court committed certain errors. The state has moved this court to affirm the order of dismissal pursuant to Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20. We sustain the motion and affirm the order.

This is a child support case. The appellant is the father of eight children who are the subject of this dispute. The State filed a petition in the Juvenile Court alleging that the children were dependent and neglected due to the drug use of the mother and father. The mother and father stipulated to these charges and the children were placed in the care of relatives. The State later filed a petition to establish paternity and set support, seeking adjudication of numerous issues, including child support. The trial court ruled on the issue of child support, but did not rule on the other issues. Without seeking permission for interlocutory appeal, the father appealed the ruling on child support. We dismiss the appeal, finding that the order from which the father appeals is not a final order and is thus not properly before this Court.

The employee in this workers' compensation case suffered a spontaneous and large right-lung pneumothorax while at work. The pneumothorax required two corrective surgeries and resulted in treatment with narcotics for chronic pain. After a careful review of the record, we conclude that the injury sustained was an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of her employment. We further hold that the evidence supports the trial court's finding that the employee was totally and permanently disabled. We affirm the trial court's judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The petitioner, Robert R. McCray, petitioned the Sullivan County Criminal Court for a writ of habeas corpus to gain release from that court's 18-month sentence imposed for a conviction of selling a counterfeit controlled substance. The court denied the petition, and the petitioner appealed. The state has moved this court to affirm the order via memorandum opinion pursuant to Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20. We sustain the state's motion and affirm the order pursuant to Rule 20.

This is a Title IV child support case. Father/Appellee was subject to a court order requiring him to make monthly child support payments. Mother allegedly requested to end Father’s child support obligation and Title IV-D services due to a private agreement between the parties whereby Father paid some child support directly to Mother. The State/Appellant, on behalf of Mother, filed a contempt petition against Father seeking payment of child support and arrears. Following a hearing, the trial court dismissed the support orders and forgave any arrears. The trial court also denied the State’s Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment. The State appeals based upon T.C.A. § 36-5-101(a)(5) because no petition or motion to modify child support was filed and based upon T.C.A. § 71-3-124 because the State asserts it is entitled to reimbursement from the arrears for public benefits paid to Mother. We reverse and remand.