APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Pamela K. Ginn ("Plaintiff") purchased a $50,000 life insurance policy on her husband through American Heritage Life Insurance Company ("American Heritage"). When applying for the insurance, Plaintiff told the insurance salesman, Daryle Gross ("Gross"), that her husband was in "basic good health." Plaintiff's husband died a few weeks after the life insurance went into effect. American Heritage denied Plaintiff's demand for the life insurance proceeds, claiming Plaintiff had materially misrepresented her husband's health. Plaintiff sued American Heritage and Gross ("Defendants"). The jury found Defendants breached their contract with Plaintiff. The jury also found that the refusal to pay was done in bad faith, assessing a 25% bad faith penalty. The jury also concluded Defendants had violated the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA") and assessed compensatory damages under the TCPA at $110,000, which was remitted by the Trial Court to $73,855.15. Pursuant to the TCPA, the Trial Court then trebled the damages and awarded attorney fees. When all was said and done, the amount of the judgment awarded to Plaintiff totaled $284,980.60. Both Plaintiff and Defendants appeal various aspect of the Trial Court's Judgment. The Judgment of the Trial Court is reversed in part and affirmed in part, and judgment is entered in favor of Plaintiff in the total amount of $73,415.15.

This case involves the demotion of an Air Crash Chief employed by the City of Memphis Fire Department following the revocation of his security clearance and driving privileges by the Memphis-Shelby County Airport Authority. Following his demotion, the Chief appealed the city’s decision to the City of Memphis Civil Service Commission. The civil service commission reversed the city’s ruling and held that the Chief must be reinstated. The city filed a common law writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court of Shelby County to appeal the finding of the civil service commission. The chancery court reversed, finding that the civil service commission exceeded its authority in reversing the city’s decision and reinstating the Chief. We affirm.
 

Defendant, Jeffery D. Hostetter, pled guilty to one count of furnishing intoxicating alcoholic beverages to a person under twenty-one years of age in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-15-404, a Class A misdemeanor, without a recommendation as to sentencing. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant to eleven months, twenty-nine days, with fifty percent of the sentence to be served in confinement. On appeal, Defendant argues that the period of confinement imposed by the trial court is excessive and inconsistent with sentencing principles, and the trial court improperly applied enhancement factors and failed to apply appropriate mitigating factors. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This case involves a post-divorce custody dispute between the natural father and maternal grandparents and aunt of three children. The issue presented is whether the trial court erred in awarding custody to the grandparents and aunt when it made no finding in its order that an award of custody to the father posed a risk of substantial harm to the children. We hold that the record does not support such a finding of substantial harm, reverse the trial court's award of custody, and, pursuant to the father's constitutional right of privacy to rear and have custody of his children, we award the natural father custody and remand to the trial court to set appropriate visitation and support for the mother.

The Defendant, Leslie Carl Clark, pled guilty to driving on a revoked license, violation of the implied consent law and driving under the influence of an intoxicant. Sentencing was left to the discretion of the trial court. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve eleven months and twenty-nine days for each offense, said sentences to be served concurrently in the local workhouse. It is from this order that the Defendant appeals. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Tennessee Board of Examiners in Psychology received a complaint from the patient of a psychologist alleging the psychologist breached the ethical duty of confidentiality by disclosing information to the patient's sister. During the course of the investigation, the psychologist revealed that he had disclosed confidential information about the same patient to another psychologist romantically involved with the patient. The board filed charges against the psychologist alleging violations of the ethical rules governing confidentiality and documentation of therapy. Following an administrative hearing, the board placed the psychologist's license on probation for two years subject to two conditions: (1) he complete twenty hours of continuing education training and (2) his practice be supervised during the two year probationary period by another psychologist. In addition, the board assessed a $1,000.00 civil penalty against the psychologist. The psychologist appealed the board's decision to the Chancery Court of Davidson County which affirmed the board's decision. The psychologist appealed to this Court. We affirm.

The Appellant, Kenneth M. Holliday, appeals the sentencing decision of the Shelby County Criminal Court. On appeal, Holliday argues that the trial court erred by refusing to grant his request for alternative sentencing. After review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Laconia Lamar Bowers, was convicted by a jury of second degree murder. The conviction was affirmed on direct appeal, see State v. Laconia Lamar Bowers, No. E1999-00170-CCA-R3-CD, 2000 WL 15020 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxville, Jan. 11, 2000), and on appeal to the Supreme Court of Tennessee. See State v. Ely, 48 S.W.3d 710 (Tenn. 2001). The petitioner now seeks post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. For the following reasons, we affirm the post-conviction court's dismissal of the post-conviction petition.

Appellant/Homeowner appeals from the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellee/Homebuilder. Appellant/Homeowner sued Appellee/Homebuilder on theories of faulty installation and construction of Appellant/Homeowner’s roof and under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The trial court found that Appellant/Homeowner’s claims were time barred under both T.C.A. §28-3-202 and T.C.A. §47-18-110. We affirm.

The Defendant, Jeffrey A. Utley, appeals from the dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The trial court found that the petition did not set forth grounds which would entitle the Defendant to habeas corpus relief. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

This case involves a lengthy and protracted attempt by the Department of Children's Services and numerous other social services agencies to assist the biological parents of five children with creating an acceptable environment for the children. After five years and repeated efforts, the Department of Children's Services filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of mother and father alleging the grounds of abandonment by failure to provide support, abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, failure to substantially comply with the permanency plans, and persistent conditions. The department also alleged that termination of the parental rights was in the best interest of the children. Following a hearing on the petition, the juvenile court entered an order terminating the parental rights of the natural parents. The mother of four of the children and the father of all five children filed an appeal to this Court. After reviewing the entire record, we affirm.

The City of Memphis promulgated an On-the-Job Injury Program to handle claims filed by city employees seeking benefits for on-the-job injuries. Thirteen firefighters and one police officer filed applications for benefits with the city. When the city denied the applications, the employees filed appeals to the On-the-Job Injury Appeals Panel which affirmed the city’s denial of benefits. Each employee appealed the panel’s determination to the Chancery Court of Shelby County by filing a Petition for Writ of Certiorari seeking review under a statutory writ of certiorari or, in the alternative, a common law writ of certiorari. The chancellor reversed the panel’s decision and held that, pursuant to section 27-9-114 of the Tennessee Code, proceedings before the panel are subject to the contested case procedures set forth in the Tennessee Uniform Administrative Procedures Act. In addition, the chancellor held that, pursuant to section 27-9-114 of the Tennessee Code, judicial review of the panel’s decision is neither by common law or statutory writ, but review must be conducted in accordance with section 4-5-322 of the Tennessee Code. The city appealed the chancery court’s ruling to this Court arguing that the chancellor erred in applying section 27-9-114 of the Tennessee Code to the panel. We reverse the chancery court’s ruling.
 

This appeal involves the termination of the parental rights of Mother and Father to their children. After a hearing, the Lauderdale County Juvenile Court terminated Mother’s parental rights over W.N. and C.N. on the grounds of abandonment for failure to support and severe child abuse. Further, the trial court found that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the best interest of the children. Mother now seeks review by this Court, and we affirm.
 

The Petitioner, Miko T. Burl, was convicted of aggravated assault, aggravated burglary, and especially aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of twenty-five years. On direct appeal, this Court vacated the Petitioner’s aggravated assault conviction, but affirmed all of the Petitioner’s other convictions. The Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging, among other things, ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the Petitioner’s petition. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred because the Petitioner’s trial counsel was ineffective.  Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The appellant, Harry Jamieson, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of one count of aggravated robbery and two counts of aggravated assault. Following a hearing, the trial court sentenced the appellant to an effective sentence of nine years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The appellant now appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and the sentence imposed by the  ial court. In light of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Blakely v. Washington, __ U.S. __, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), we modify the appellant’s sentence for aggravated robbery to eight years and the sentences for aggravated assault to three years each, for an effective sentence of eight years incarceration. We otherwise affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is a child custody case. Father/Appellant appeals from the trial court's Order, which denied Father/Appellant's Petition to change custody from the minor children’s Mother to Father. Finding that there is not a material change in circumstances to warrant a change of custody, we affirm.
 

The Defendant, Romelus Caraway, was indicted for felony Escape. A Shelby County Jury convicted the Defendant of the indicted offense, and the trial court sentenced the Defendant to six years, after it determined the Defendant was a career offender. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied him a new trial because: (1) the indictment against the Defendant was fatally defective and the trial court allowed the State to use this defective indictment to prove essential elements of the offense for which he was charged; and (2) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This appeal stems from an action filed by the State of Tennessee, in its own behalf and for the use and benefit of Hamilton County and certain municipalities ("the state"), against property owners (collectively "the defendants") who had not paid their 1998 real estate taxes. Following the entry of a default judgment as to certain property, a delinquent tax sale was conducted at which Carlton Ditto and Positive Impact, Inc. ("the purchasers") bought a parcel of land. The purchase, however, was subsequently voided because the Hamilton County Property Assessor ("the Property Assessor") inadvertently reflected someone other than the true owner on its property rolls. As a consequence of this mistake, the true owner of the property was never made a party to the delinquent tax suit. The purchasers sought compensation for interest on the bid amount and the cost of recording the decree of sale. The purchasers also sought damages for the state's negligence. The trial court awarded interest on the bid amount and the cost of recording the decree, but refused to award damages for negligence. The state appeals. We affirm.

This appeal stems from an action filed by the State of Tennessee, in its own behalf and for the use and benefit of Hamilton County and certain municipalities ("the state"), against property owners (collectively "the defendants") who had not paid their 1998 real estate taxes. Following the entry of a default judgment as to certain property, a delinquent tax sale was conducted at which Carlton Ditto and Positive Impact, Inc. ("the purchasers") bought a parcel of land. The purchase, however, was subsequently voided because the Hamilton County Property Assessor ("the Property Assessor") inadvertently reflected someone other than the true owner on its property rolls. As a consequence of this mistake, the true owner of the property was never made a party to the delinquent tax suit. The purchasers sought compensation for interest on the bid amount and the cost of recording the decree of sale. The purchasers also sought damages for the state's negligence. The trial court awarded interest on the bid amount and the cost of recording the decree, but refused to award damages for negligence. The state appeals. We affirm.

This appeal involves the court's authority to order a parent to pay support for an adult disabled child. The parties were married with two severely disabled adult sons. In 1995, while the parties were still married, the probate court established them as co-conservators for their sons. In June 2001, the mother filed a petition for divorce in circuit court. Neither party informed the divorce court of the conservatorships that had been established for their sons. The circuit court entered a final decree of divorce which incorporated a parenting plan, submitted by the father, which provided for joint custody of the sons. The divorce decree required the mother to pay child support to the father. The divorce decree was not appealed. The mother later filed a motion requesting that the decree requiring her to pay child support be vacated pursuant to Rule 60.02(3), asserting that the divorce court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to require her to pay support for the adult sons. Rather than rule on the mother's motion, the divorce court transferred the case to the probate court, which had before it the conservatorship actions. The father then filed a motion in the probate court asking it to confirm the divorce decree entered by the divorce court. The probate court, in the same order, denied the mother's motion to vacate and granted the father's motion to confirm the decree adopting the parenting plan, determining that the divorce decree entered by the divorce court was valid. The mother now appeals that order. We reverse, concluding that the divorce court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to order the parent to pay support for the adult disabled children, but finding that the probate court is permitted to consider requiring the parents to pay support in the context of the conservatorship proceedings.

This is a zoning case. The appellant landowner owns a tract of land that it sought to resume using as a sanitary landfill. The appellees are the newly-incorporated town in which the landfill is located and the town’s zoning board. In 1996, the landowner and the county in which the town and landfill are located resolved a dispute in which the landfill was deemed a legally permitted nonconforming use under the county zoning ordinance. In 2002, the landowner sought a building permit from the town planning commission. The town planning commission refused to grant the permit until the landowner obtained a determination from the town zoning board that the landfill was a legally permitted non-conforming use under the town’s newly-enacted zoning ordinances. The town zoning board determined that the landfill was not a legally permitted nonconforming use under the town zoning ordinances because the landowner had discontinued its nonconforming use of the landfill for longer than one year. Consequently, no permit was issued. The landowner unsuccessfully appealed the ruling to the town zoning appeals board. The landowner then appealed the decision of the zoning appeals board to the trial court. The trial court affirmed the ruling of the zoning appeals board. We affirm, finding that the use of the property as a landfill had been discontinued for more than one year and thus the landfill did not fall within the nonconforming use exception to the town’s zoning ordinance.

This case involves the construction of a will. The will established a trust for the benefit of the decedent's children that provided income for eleven years. At the end of the eleven year term, the trust was to be terminated and the trust assets distributed to the beneficiaries. During the eleven-year term, one of the decedent's children died, leaving no spouse, children or surviving parent. The beneficiary under the deceased child's will sued, seeking that child's share of the trust assets. At issue was whether the trust assets vested in the beneficiaries when the testator died or when the trust terminated. The probate court held that the decedent intended for the trust corpus not to vest in the beneficiaries until the trust terminated, and that the beneficiary under the child's will would not receive her share of the trust assets. We affirm, finding that the language of the will indicates that the testator intended for the corpus of the trust to vest when the trust terminated.

Lisa Karen Stowers Hoffer, formerly Smith ("Mother"), filed a petition against her former husband, Mark Edward Smith ("Father"), seeking to modify the provisions of the parties' judgment of divorce, which judgment required Father to pay $1,200 per month in child support. The trial court, finding that, in the most recent three years, Father had had an average annual income of $117,238, held that there had been a substantial and material change in circumstances justifying an order requiring Father to pay child support of $2,803 per month. Father appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in its calculation of his income. We affirm in part and vacate in part.