APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Helen Broyles ("Plaintiff") sued Emma Woodson and the Estate of H.Y. Woodson, Emma Woodson, Executrix ("Defendants") claiming that her husband and H.Y. Woodson entered into an agreement in 1990 for Plaintiff's husband to purchase a house located in LaFollette, Tennessee for $21,000. Both Plaintiff's husband and H.Y. Woodson had passed away when the complaint was filed. Plaintiff claimed Emma Woodson was not calculating interest properly and had not given Plaintiff proper credit for the house payments that had been made. Plaintiff requested the Trial Court examine the relevant documentation and establish the amount of Plaintiff's equity and the amount still owing. It was admitted by the parties that there was an agreement of some sort between their deceased husbands. However, that agreement was either an oral agreement or, if it had been reduced to writing, the written instrument appeared to be lost or destroyed. The Trial Court granted summary judgment to Defendants after concluding: (1) the Statute of Frauds rendered the agreement unenforceable; (2) the Dead Man's Statute precluded admission into evidence of any proof regarding the terms of the agreement; and (3) Defendants had negated an essential element of Plaintiff's contract claim which required her to establish the essential elements of the alleged contract with reasonable definiteness. Plaintiff appeals, and we affirm as modified.

The defendant, Michael Paul Mondell, was convicted of facilitation of the second degree murder of his father, Francis Mondell. The trial court imposed a 12-year Department of Correction sentence. The defendant appeals and challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the propriety of the sentence. We affirm the conviction but modify the sentence to eight years.

In post-divorce proceedings, Husband/Appellant sought modification of his support obligation to Wife/Appellee. Divorce Referee found no change in circumstances on which to base a modification. The trial court affirmed the Referee’s findings. Husband/Appellant appeals. We affirm.

The Appellant, Michael Woods, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of second degree murder and sentenced to twenty-five years imprisonment. On appeal, Woods raises four issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction; (2) whether the trial court erred by allowing the State to use Woods’ prior criminal convictions for purposes of impeachment when the convictions were more than ten years old; (3) whether the trial court erred by refusing to allow Woods to present proof that two other co-defendants had been convicted of the crime; and (4) whether the sentence is excessive. After review of the record, we find that because Woods’ motion for new trial was not timely filed, issues 2 and 3 are waived. After review of issues 1 and 4, we find no error and affirm the conviction and resulting sentence.

This appeal involves a post-divorce petition for a reduction or termination of alimony. Following a bench trial, the trial court ordered petitioner to continue paying $1,000 per month in alimony in futuro to Wife and granted Wife's request for her attorney's fees and court costs. Wife's counter-petition for an increase in alimony was denied. Both parties appeal. We affirm.

I concur in the results reached and most of the reasoning used in the majority opinion. I disagree, though, with the conclusion that Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. ____, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), does not affect the sentencing. However, I believe the defendant’s history of criminal of convictions justifies the sentence he received.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law.  The trial court found the employee failed to prove his chronic lung problems were related to his occupational exposure. We affirm.

Two cases that pertain to the same child are consolidated on appeal. The child was placed in custody of the Department of Children’s Services at the age of two and one-half years due to filthy conditions at home, lack of supervision, exposure to pornography and drug paraphernalia and parents drug use when both parents were arrested at the family’s home. The Juvenile Court found the child to be dependent and neglected and a victim of aggravated sexual battery. Parents appealed and received de novo trial in Circuit Court which separately concluded the child was dependent, neglected and a victim of severe child abuse and sexual battery. In a separate action, DCS petitioned the Juvenile Court to terminate both parents’ parental rights. DCS investigator interviewed the mother while she was in custody on unrelated charge and after the mother had been appointed counsel. The DCS investigator had not consulted with nor been encouraged by DCS attorneys about questioning the mother. After being released from custody the mother was interviewed by detective. After being advised of her Miranda rights she signed a statement waiving the rights and admitted that she and the father sexually abused the child. The mother had been apprised of her rights against selfincrimination, yet she made a voluntary statement. Thus, she waived her rights against selfincrimination.  Juvenile Court terminated the rights of both parents based on abandonment, persistent conditions, and severe child abuse. Both parents appeal. We affirm.

Defendant, James C. Leveye, entered a plea of nolo contendere to possession of more than 0.5 grams of marijuana with intent to sell, a Class E felony. The trial court imposed the recommended sentence of four years as a Range III persistent offender. As a part of the plea agreement, Defendant reserved a certified question of law under Rule 37(b)(2)(i) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure arguing that the trial court erred in not suppressing the marijuana and drug paraphernalia discovered during a search of Defendant's person. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Aaron T. James, was convicted of especially aggravated kidnapping and the trial court imposed a sentence of sixty years. In this appeal, he asserts (1) that the evidence is insufficient; (2) that the trial court erred by limiting the questioning of a witness; (3) that the trial court erred by refusing to provide a jury instruction on the defense of necessity; (4) that the trial court committed plain error by permitting the state to make improper commentary on the law during closing argument; and (5) that the trial court erred by ordering that the defendant serve the sentence he received in this case consecutively to the sentence for a previous conviction. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This is a dog bite case against an absent landlord. The plaintiff argues that owing to the pervasive publicity about the viciousness of the tenants' dog, the landlord had constructive notice of its propensity to violence and should therefore be held liable. Summary judgment was granted to the landlord . We affirm.

Appellant, James Thomas Jefferson, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, Appellant argues the trial court should have granted his petition for post-conviction relief because (1) his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a jury instruction as to lost or destroyed evidence, and (2) his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the chain of custody. Because we find these issues to be without merit, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

The petitioner appeals the denial of her petition for post-conviction relief from her first degree murder conviction, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that she received the effective assistance of trial counsel. She also contends she was denied the effective assistance of post-conviction counsel. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the post-conviction petition.

This appeal arises out of an action for divorce. The trial court awarded the wife a divorce from the husband on the ground of inappropriate marital conduct and denied the husband’s counterclaim for divorce. After classifying and valuing various items of property in the marital estate, the trial court divided the marital property between the husband and wife. Further, the trial court awarded the wife transitional alimony in the amount of $6,000.00 per month for three years and then $3,000.00 per month for the next three years. Finally, the lower court ordered each party to pay his or her own attorney’s fees. For the following reasons, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Defendant, Richard Simon, filed a "Petition for Declaratory Judgment and/or Equitable Relief" and a pro se "Petition Seeking Nunc Pro Tunc Order" requesting the trial court to modify or correct his sentence to grant him retroactive sentence reduction credits. The trial court concluded that it was without jurisdiction to modify Defendant's sentence, and dismissed his petitions. Because there is no right of appeal from the trial court's dismissal of Defendant's motions, we dismiss the appeal.

The defendant, Fernando Deandra Vaughn, appeals the revocation of his probation, arguing that the trial court erred by not waiting for the disposition of the drug charges against him before revoking his probation on the basis of those charges. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The plaintiffs in this medical malpractice action filed their complaint approximately three weeks after the three-year medical malpractice statute of repose, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-116(a)(3) (1980), had expired. The defendants moved to dismiss the action as time-barred. In response, the plaintiffs argued that their action should not be time-barred because the primary plaintiff was mentally incompetent during most of the repose period. Specifically, the plaintiffs contended that due process requires tolling of the statute of repose during the period of a plaintiff’s mental incompetency. In support of their contention, the plaintiffs relied on Seals v. State, 23 S.W.3d 272 (Tenn. 2000), and other precedents which provide for tolling of the Post-Conviction Procedure Act statute of limitations, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-102(a) (2003), on the basis of a petitioner’s mental incompetency. The lower courts granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. We affirm. We hold that due process does not require tolling of the medical malpractice statute of repose during the period of a plaintiff’s mental incompetency. The legislature has the constitutional power to place reasonable temporal limitations on rights of action in tort. By contrast, a post-conviction petition, despite its procedurally civil nature, is available only to a person who is in custody following a criminal conviction and sentence; such a petition thus implicates life and liberty interests in a way that materially differentiates it from civil actions. Therefore, the precedents which require tolling for mental incompetence in the context of post-conviction petitions are inapposite to questions of tolling statutes of repose in civil tort actions.

The petitioner appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for aggravated robbery, aggravated assault, and second degree murder, raising two claims: (1) that he was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel; and (2) that his guilty pleas were not knowing and voluntary. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant was convicted by a Warren County jury of facilitation of first degree felony murder, facilitation of especially aggravated robbery, and criminally negligent homicide, which the trial court merged into the facilitation of felony murder conviction. The defendant was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to twenty-five years on the facilitation of felony murder conviction and twelve years on the facilitation of especially aggravated robbery conviction, to be served consecutively, for an effective sentence of thirty-seven years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant raises the following issues: whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain her convictions and whether the court erred by not instructing the jury as to accessory after the fact and in imposing consecutive sentences. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for entry of corrected judgments to reflect the correct offense date.

In this appeal, a roofing contractor seeks to reverse the trial court's finding that it breached express and implied warranties and violated the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The contractor argues that its agreement was simply to perform insurance repair work and that the trial court erred in admitting parol evidence to expand the parties' agreement. There is sufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that appellant violated its warranty. We affirm that finding, but reverse the trial court's finding that the contractor violated the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) (2003) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court determined that the plaintiff-employee suffered a 60% vocational disability to her right upper extremity and a 30% vocational disability to her left. From these determinations, the trial court awarded a 45% disability to both hands. The defendant-employer asserts that the trial court award was excessive under the facts and applicable law. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the judgment of the trial court

The Defendant, Earl David Crawford, appeals from the trial court's dismissal of his petition seeking habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief, pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The State's motion is granted. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The appellant, James Kenneth Carroll, was convicted in the Roane County Criminal Court of driving under the influence (DUI), child endangerment, and a violation of the implied consent law. The trial court imposed consecutive sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days in the Roane County Jail for the DUI and child endangerment convictions. For his violation of the implied consent law, the appellant's license was suspended for one year. On appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court's actions as thirteenth juror. Upon our review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Cecil Moss, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus seeking relief from an allegedly void judgment, which the trial court summarily dismissed. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the habeas corpus court erred by not holding an evidentiary hearing and that it erred when it dismissed his petition. Finding no error in the judgment of the habeas corpus court, we affirm its dismissal of the Petitioner's petition for habeas corpus relief.

The Petitioner, Michael Blackburn, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, and aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to life plus twenty years. This Court affirmed the convictions and sentences on appeal. The Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court dismissed after a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred because he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the post-conviction court's judgment.