APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Melissa Simmons, pled guilty to driving under the influence, first offense, a Class A misdemeanor. As part of the plea agreement, she intended to reserve the right to appeal a certified question of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(i). Because the judgment form failed to comply with the strict requirements of Rule 37(b)(2), defendant did not properly reserve a certified issue for review. As a result, we are without jurisdiction to review the merits of defendant's claim, and accordingly dismiss her appeal.

We granted review in this workers’ compensation case to determine whether the trial court erred in awarding benefits against the defendant employer where the employee was first injured and missed work while employed by a previous employer. After reviewing the record and applicable authority, we conclude that the trial court erred in awarding benefits against the defendant employer because the preponderance of the evidence is that the employee’s gradually-occurring injury became compensable while working for the prior employer and did not progress while working for the defendant employer. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s judgment.

The petitioner, Kevin Troy Greer, appeals the dismissal by the Davidson County Criminal Court of his petition for post-conviction relief and request for a delayed appeal. After review of the record, we affirm.

The petitioner, Michael Robert Moody, filed a "Motion to Correct Errors in Judgment" in which he claimed that the two sentences requiring him to register as a sexual offender are illegal. The trial court dismissed the motion, and the Court of Criminal Appeals denied Moody's request for discretionary review through the common law writ of certiorari. We conclude that the writ of certiorari is not available to review the denial of a motion to correct an illegal sentence and that a habeas corpus action, not a motion, is the proper procedure for collaterally attacking an illegal sentence. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

This appeal involves enforcement of a divorce decree incorporating a marital dissolution agreement and the obligation of a parent to support a child beyond the child's majority in certain circumstances. The trial court determined that the former husband's alimony obligation had terminated upon the payment of the entire amount of alimony in solido created in the order and MDA. The court also held that the father had a continuing obligation to support his adult son because the son was disabled. We affirm both holdings.

The petitioner, Wilbert Rogers, appeals the denial of post conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel by his trial attorney. The petitioner was originally convicted by jury of second degree murder. After careful review, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

This is an unemployment compensation case. The Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development ("the Department") denied the claim of Becky Elliott for unemployment benefits, finding that the plaintiff quit her job without good cause connected to her employment. After exhausting her administrative remedies to no avail, the plaintiff sued James G. Neeley, the Commissioner of the Department, seeking judicial review in the trial court, which court affirmed the Department's denial of benefits. The plaintiff appeals, essentially arguing that the Department's decision is not supported by substantial and material evidence. We affirm.

The Petitioner, Thomas M. Tucker, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus seeking relief from an allegedly void judgment, which the trial court dismissed without a hearing. On appeal, the petitioner contends that the habeas corpus court erred when it dismissed his petition. Finding no error in the judgment of the habeas corpus court, we affirm its dismissal of the petitioner's petition for habeas corpus relief.

A jury convicted the defendant, Edward E. Keathley, of simple possession of a Schedule II controlled substance and of possession of drug paraphernalia, Class A misdemeanors. Following a sentencing hearing, the defendant was fined a total of $900.00 and sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days for each offense. The trial court ordered the defendant to serve the sentences in concurrent split confinement with ninety days in the county jail and the balance of the sentence on probation. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing. Based upon our review, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

This action for specific performance was filed following a foreclosure sale of real property. The foreclosure was prompted by a prior purchaser's default. Rena Mae Blair ("the plaintiff"), the holder of the first deed of trust in default, acting through her daughter and substitute trustee, Linda Caraway, advertised and conducted the foreclosure sale with the assistance of an attorney. At the sale, the property was sold to Rollin C. Brownson and his wife, Mary Ann Brownson ("the defendants") for $77,642.05. There was no writing at the time of the sale memorializing its terms, but Mr. Brownson did provide Ms. Caraway with an earnest money check. Subsequent to the sale, the attorney conducting the sale drafted a deed which purports to set forth the terms of the sale. The defendants refused to go through with the sale when they learned that the property was reputed to be worth only $50,000. In response to the plaintiff's complaint for specific performance, the defendants raised the statute of frauds as an affirmative defense, contending that there was no written memorandum reflecting the terms of the parties' oral agreement. Following a bench trial, the court below granted the plaintiff's request for specific performance. The defendants appeal. We affirm.

The petitioner, Kenneth I. Campbell, was convicted of first degree murder and theft of property and received an effective sentence of life imprisonment. He later sought both direct and post-conviction appeals, both of which were denied by this court. Subsequently, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief based on the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001, which was dismissed.  He appeals that dismissal, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in dismissing the petition without ordering DNA testing on a bullet introduced at the petitioner’s trial. Following our review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s dismissal of the petition.

he Defendant, Richard P. Holt, pled guilty to various drug related felonies in four separate cases, and he was placed on community corrections, and then transferred to supervised probation for a period of eight years. Subsequently, a probation violation warrant was issued because the defendant left the state without permission, and the defendant was indicted and arrested for theft of property valued over $500.00. After a hearing, the trial court revoked the defendant's probation and ordered the defendant to serve the remainder of his sentences in prison. The defendant now appeals, contending that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to revoke the defendant's probation; and (2) the trial court erred in ordering the defendant to serve the remainder of his sentence in prison. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a child custody dispute. The parties were married and had one child. When the child
was approximately three years old, the father filed a petition for divorce and was granted temporary
custody. A year and a half later, the trial court granted the parties a divorce by stipulation, but
reserved the issue of permanent custody. After a hearing, the trial court granted the father primary
residential custody, with the child to reside with the mother three weekends out of the month plus
additional time. The mother now appeals, arguing that the trial court failed to engage in a
comparative fitness analysis and failed to consider evidence that the father had abused the mother during their marriage. After a careful review of the record, we affirm.
 

The Defendant, Karen Renee Howell, pled guilty to three counts of first degree felony murder, one count of attempted first degree murder, two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, two counts of aggravated kidnapping, and one count of theft over $1,000. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to three consecutive terms of life without the possibility of parole for the murders, a consecutive term of twenty-five years for the attempted murder, and a concurrent effective term of twenty-five years for the remaining convictions. The Defendant's convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal. See State v. Howell, 34 S.W.3d 484 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000). The Defendant subsequently filed for post-conviction relief, alleging that her guilty pleas and sentencing were marred by the ineffective assistance of counsel, and that her guilty pleas were not entered voluntarily, intelligently and knowingly. After a hearing, the trial court denied relief. This direct appeal followed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Randall Edwin Cobb, appeals pro se from the order of the Obion County Circuit Court dismissing his petition for habeas corpus relief for failure to state a claim. The petitioner pled guilty in June 2000 to one count for possession of cocaine, a Schedule II controlled substance, with the intent to sell within 1000 feet of a school zone, a Class B felony, and on two counts for sale of a controlled substance within 1000 feet of a school zone, each a Class B felony. In this appeal, he challenges: (1) whether the trial court properly dismissed his habeas corpus petition; (2) whether the petition stated a claim for relief; (3) whether the judgments are void; and (4) whether the indictments were defective. After reviewing the matter, we affirm the decision of the trial court, but remand for entry of corrected judgments.

The Defendant, Andre Mayfield, filed for a writ of habeas corpus, seeking to invalidate several convictions he obtained in 1989. The State responded by filing a motion to dismiss. The trial court granted the State's motion and this appeal followed. We affirm the trial court's judgment.

The Petitioner Steven L. Anderson appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Petitioner has failed to allege any ground that would render the judgment of conviction void. Accordingly, we grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

This appeal questions the apportionment of attorney fees and costs. The plaintiff suffered a compensable on-the-job injury and by the negligence of a third party. He recovered workers' compensation benefits, and settled his tort action thereafter. The employer's subrogation rights were stipulated, but the parties could not agree upon a proportional allocation of fees.

Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Supreme Court of Tennessee, this Court accepted certification of the following two questions from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee, at Greeneville: (1) In an action instituted against an employer for workers' compensation benefits and in which the employer files an answer or amended answer naming a third party as having caused all or a part of the plaintiff's injuries, does Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-1-119 extend the limitation period and allow the filing of an amended complaint against the third party named by the employer and/or other persons named as tortfeasors(s) by the third party in its answer? In the event the first question is answered in the affirmative, then the second question is posed: (2) In Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-1-119(a), does the term "applicable statute of limitations" appearing in the phrase "or named in an amended complaint filed within the applicable statute of limitations" refer to the one year limitation period for personal injury only or to the limitation period as extended by the ninety-day "window" provided by Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-1-119(a)? As to the first question, we answer in the negative. We hold that because Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-1-119 applies only to cases in which comparative fault is or becomes an issue, and because workers' compensation benefits are awarded without regard to fault, section 20-1-119 may not be invoked as authority to amend a complaint in a workers' compensation action to include a claim against a third party tortfeasor that would otherwise be time-barred. Because our answer to this first question renders the second question moot, we do not address it at this time.

The defendant, John Allan Lezotte, entered pleas of guilt to driving under the influence and child endangerment, reserving the right to appeal a certified question of law. See Tenn. R. App. P. 3(b); Tenn. R. Crim. P. 37(b)(2). The single issue presented for review is whether the trial court erred by denying the defendant's motion to suppress. The judgments are affirmed.

This case arises from the trial court’s grant of Appellee’s Tenn. R. Civ. P.  12.02 Motion to Dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Under the Tennessee long-arm statute and the relevant case law, we find that the criteria for personal jurisdiction over Appellant are met. Consequently, we reverse and remand.

The petitioner, Marquez Winters, was found guilty by a jury in the Shelby County Criminal Court of attempted first degree murder and aggravated kidnapping. He received a total effective sentence of thirty-seven years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming that he received the ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner now appeals that ruling. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The juvenile court and custodial party in a dependency and neglect proceeding were granted a Rule 10 application for extraordinary appeal from the chancery court’s order staying and restraining proceedings of dependency and neglect in the juvenile court. We reverse the order of the chancery court.

The petitioner challenges the trial court’s denial of a delayed appeal by which to present his petition for writ of error coram nobis. Upon review of the record, we conclude that the petitioner’s due process right to appeal was not violated simply because he failed to take action to secure representation. The record reflects that the petitioner was not declared indigent and that the onus in obtaining representation rested with him. His coram nobis petition was outside the applicable statute of limitations and was properly dismissed. We affirm.

This case involves a surviving spouse’s attempt to set aside a financial transaction made by the decedent approximately one year prior to the decedent’s death. The trial court voided the transfer and awarded the proceeds to the surviving spouse, determining that the transfer was fraudulent and intended to defeat the interest of the surviving spouse. For the reasons stated herein, we reverse.