APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Petitioner Marvin Anthony Matthews appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Petitioner has failed to establish either that this sentence has expired or that his conviction or sentence is void. Accordingly, we grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

This matter is before the Court upon the State’s motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court by opinion pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner is appealing the trial court's denial of habeas corpus relief. A review of the record reveals that the Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Petitioner, Lawrence Montgomery, appeals the trial court's denial of his application for writ of habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. It appears from the record before us that the notice of appeal was not timely filed and this Court cannot conclude that justice requires that this Court waive the timely filing requirement. Accordingly, the State’s motion is granted and the above-captioned appeal is dismissed.

Aunt and niece agreed that aunt would convey her residence to niece in exchange for the promise of niece to look after her in her declining years. The years passed, niece provided care and attention for a period of time, but eventually ceased doing so. Aunt sought to rescind the deed for failure of consideration. The trial judge held that while the proof established a contract, the action was barred by the six-year statute of limitations. Reversed on a finding that the contract was a continuing obligation.

Appellant seeks relief, ostensibly under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02, from final orders establishing paternity and setting child support obligations. Because Appellant failed to timely file his petition to establish fraud and/or misrepresentation and because the equities in this matter do not support the disestablishment of paternity, we affirm.

This matter is before the Court upon the State’s motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner, Rico Raybon, appeals the trial court’s denial of post-conviction relief. The petition was filed outside the applicable statute of limitation and is, therefore, time-barred. Accordingly, we affirm the
dismissal of the trial court.

The petitioner, Kelvin Wade Cloyd, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. He alleges that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel, claims that the state knowingly used false testimony during his trial, and asserts that he was erroneously assessed costs. The judgment is affirmed.

The Petitioner, Joseph L. Coleman, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Because Petitioner has failed to show either that his sentence has expired or that the trial court was without jurisdiction, we grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

The plaintiff in this case was employed as the director of schools for Campbell County, Tennessee, under a contract of employment which was deemed by the defendant Campbell County Board of Education to have terminated after four years. The plaintiff sued the Board for breach of contract asserting that the contract contained a clause which provided that if the Board took no action by April 15 of each year of the contract to either extend or non-renew, the contract was automatically extended one year. The plaintiff contended that, in view of this clause and accompanying non-action by the Board, the contract did not terminate upon the expiration of four years, but rather extended beyond that period of time. The plaintiff alternatively asserted that, pursuant to a prior order of the trial court entered in a matter unrelated to the present case, he was entitled to an annual salary of not less than ten percent below that of the director of schools. The Board filed a motion for summary judgment requesting a ruling that the automatic extension clause of the contract was invalid and that the contract expired according to its terms. The Board's motion also requested that the trial court rule that, upon expiration of the contract, the plaintiff enjoys no rights to salary beyond those of a classroom teacher. The trial court denied the Board's motion with respect to the automatic extension clause, declaring the clause to be valid and enforceable; however, the Board's motion was granted with respect to the matter of the plaintiff's rights to salary granted by the court's prior order. We hold that the automatic extension clause is invalid, but that the plaintiff retains those rights granted him under the prior order of the trial court subject to further review by the trial court. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand.

The Petitioner, Darren Ray Case, appeals from the dismissal of his petition for the writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that the Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We find the State's motion has merit. Accordingly, the motion is granted and the appeal is affirmed pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The Defendant, Chad Allen Conyers, pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter. The trial court deferred entry of a judgment of conviction and placed the Defendant on judicial diversion for fifteen (15) years. The Defendant was subsequently charged with violating the terms of his probation. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant's probation. The trial court subsequently sentenced the Defendant to four years, split confinement. The Defendant now appeals both the revocation of his probation and the manner of service of his sentence. Finding that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking the Defendant's probation, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and order that the Defendant's probation be reinstated.

The issue for jury resolution was whether Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company refused in bad faith to settle a damage suit against Johnson by Moore within his policy limits of $25,000, and exposed him to a final judgment of nearly $200,000.00. Johnson’s defense entirely focused on his asserted non-liability, not withstanding that Moore’s medical expenses exceeded $75,000, and his injuries were serious and permanently disabling, thus reasonably indicating that if Johnson was found to be negligent, the percentage of his fault necessarily would have to be minimal in light of his insurance limits. An unidentified van forced Johnson to crash head-on into Moore, and the jury allocated 50% of Moore’s damages to Johnson and 50% to the van. After this allocation was affirmed on appeal, Johnson sued Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company, claiming that Moore’s claim could have been settled for his policy limits. Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company presents a host of issues, beginning with the refusal of the court to direct a verdict, and continuing with complaints of the trial judge commenting on the evidence and refusing corrective jury instructions. The judgment is reversed for the latter two reasons. 

The appellant, Jason Allen Needel, pled guilty in the Sumner County Criminal Court to aggravated burglary, theft over $1000, and theft under $500. He received a total effective sentence of fourteen years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the imposition of consecutive sentencing. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-225(e)(3) for reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court, in determining whether death benefits for a widow having no dependent children could be commuted to a lump sum payment, held that commutation of periodic payments is not appropriate in the case of a sole surviving spouse due to limitations placed on death benefits under Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-210(e)(4) and (8). The widow contends the trial court erred in denying lump sum commutation in that Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-229(a) allows lump sum commutation of workers’ compensation and that the Tennessee Supreme Court has previously awarded a lump sum payment of death benefits to a surviving spouse. This Panel, finding that Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 50-6-210 and 50-6-229 should be read in pari materia, concludes that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found that the employee demonstrated a reasonable excuse for failing to give timely notice of his injury to the employer and that the employer was not prejudiced by the delay in notice. The trial court fixed the employee's vocational impairment rating at forty percent. The employer contends that the trial court erred in finding that the employee had a reasonable excuse for failing to give timely notice and that the employer was not prejudiced. The employer also contends that the trial court's award to the employee was excessive in light of the record. We find no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I concur with the majority’s decision affirming the trial court’s denial of Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company’s motion for directed verdict, but I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision reversing the jury’s verdict based on the jury charge and comments to the jury. I would affirm the jury verdict in favor of the Plaintiff, Robert Steven Johnson.

The petitioner, Robert Shawn Clark, appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The single issue presented for review is whether the petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant appeals his conviction for sexual battery, contesting the sufficiency of the evidence and asserting ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Following our review, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction. The issue of ineffective assistance is waived for failure to perfect the record, cite to relevant authority, or reference the record. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court awarded benefits of thirty-six percent permanent partial disability, finding that the employee had given timely notice of a gradual, work-related injury. The employer contends that the trial court erred in the following: (1) finding both a gradual injury and that the notice requirement under Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-201 was satisfied; and (2) finding that the injury was work-related in light of the medical evidence. The employee counters by claiming that the appeal is frivolous. We hold that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed on both issues, and that the appeal is not frivolous.

This is petition to modify custody. The mother and father of the minor child were never
married. In April 2002, when the child was seven years old, the trial court entered a consent order designating the mother as the primary residential parent of the child and giving the father residential time. During the summer of 2002, the parties became embroiled in a dispute over which school and in what grade the minor child should be enrolled for the upcoming school year. Against the father’s wishes, the mother took the child out of the third grade at a public school and enrolled her in the second grade at a private school. The father filed a petition for contempt, and the trial court ordered the mother to return the child to her class at the public school pending a final resolution of the father’s petition. The mother did not do so. The father then sought a change in custody. The trial court granted the father temporary custody pending a final resolution. The father retained temporary primary custody for the remainder of the school year. The trial court then held a hearing on the father’s request to be permanently designated primary residential parent. After a hearing, the trial court restored the mother as primary residential parent, determining that the circumstances did not warrant a change in designation as primary residential parent. The father now appeals. We affirm the trial court’s finding that the father did not show sufficient change in circumstances to remove mother as primary residential parent.
 

The Defendant, Danny Ray Applegate, pled guilty to three counts of the sale of methamphetamine and one count of possession of more than 100 grams of methamphetamine with the intent to sell. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of eleven years in prison. The Defendant appeals, contending: (1) that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence upon him; and (2) the trial court erred when it failed to sentence him to a community corrections sentence. After thoroughly reviewing the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the Defendant’s sentence.

The defendant, Shelborne Mason, was convicted for the sale and/or delivery of .5 grams or more of cocaine, a Class B felony. The trial court imposed a sentence of thirty years. In this appeal, the defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

I agree with both Judge Inman’s and Judge Lee’s Opinions that Tennessee Farmers
Mutual Insurance Company was not entitled to a directed verdict in this case.

The appellant, Terrance D. Nichols, was convicted by a jury in the Shelby County Criminal Court of premeditated first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, the appellant contends that (1) the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury that “reflection” in the context of the instruction on premeditation means “careful consideration,” and (2) the trial court committed plain error by permitting the State to engage in improper and prejudicial argument in its summation to the jury. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the  judgment of the trial court.

Following the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to suppress, the defendant pled guilty to possession with the intent to deliver a Schedule II controlled substance, cocaine, in an amount greater than .5 grams, a Class B felony, in exchange for a sentence of eight years as a standard Range I offender in the Department of Correction. The defendant sought to reserve a certified question of law regarding the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress. The issue before us is whether the trial court erred in its determination that probable cause existed for the defendant to be stopped. After a careful review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.