APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

We granted review in this workers' compensation case to determine whether "nursing services," as used in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-204(a) (1999), includes care provided by an injured employee's spouse where the spouse is a certified nurse technician. After reviewing the record and applicable authority, we conclude that care provided by a certified nurse technician is compensable under the Workers' Compensation Law irrespective of the relationship between the caregiver and the employee. We further hold that the care here was reasonably necessary and was provided pursuant to what the employee understood to be the physician's orders. Accordingly, we reverse the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel as to this issue and remand to the trial court for a determination of the value of the nursing services rendered by Mrs. Long. We affirm as to the other issues raised by the appellant employee.

Petitioner, Clarence Washington, appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging the legality of his sentence for his conviction of the offense of escape from a penitentiary. After a review of the record, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus.

We granted review in this case to determine the proper standard of review required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 68-211-704(c) (1996). We hold that the de novo review required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 68-211-704(c) requires the trial court to conduct an independent evaluation of all of the evidence before it. We overrule Tucker v. Humphreys County, 944 S.W.2d 613 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996), upon which the Court of Appeals relied, and reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. We remand this case to the chancery court for a review of the county commission's findings using the proper de novo standard as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 68-211-704(c) and this decision.

This is a state appeal from the Cumberland County Criminal Court's suppression of a handgun seized pursuant to a warrantless search of the defendant's vehicle. Because a "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule has not been adopted as a facet of the state constitution, we affirm.

The appellant, Frazier Fashun Perry, was indicted for: (1) possession of cocaine over .5 grams with the intent to sell or deliver; (2) possession of marijuana over one-half ounce with the intent to sell or deliver; and (3) being a drug felon in possession of a handgun. The appellant filed a motion to suppress the items seized as a result of the execution of a “no knock” search warrant. The trial court denied the motion to suppress and the appellant entered a guilty plea to possession of more than .5 grams of cocaine with the intent to resell, a Class B felony. As part of the plea agreement, the appellant reserved a certified question of law to determine whether exigent circumstances existed to justify execution of the “no knock” search warrant in violation of Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure 41(e). The appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. We determine that the trial court did not err in denying the motion to suppress as the State proved that exigent circumstances existed which justified the issuance of a “no knock” search warrant. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Terrance Dupree Woods, appeals the post-conviction court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. Following a review of the record in this matter, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In this dispute, plaintiffs sought declaratory judgment as to use of their lake by defendant, payment of fees and injunctive relief. Defendant counter-claimed for a declaratory judgment as to its use of the lake, disputed any obligation to pay fees to the plaintiff, and sought monetary damages and attorney's fees. The Trial Court held that plaintiffs' owned the lake and the master deed provided for maintenance fee and membership fees, that defendant's members were required to pay. But if the defendants' members did not use the lake they would not be required to pay the fees. On appeal, we hold the Court correctly found that the lake was an amenity and that a lake use fee was required to be paid to plaintiffs pursuant to the master deed and exhibits. But the Court erred in holding that defendant owners could choose not to use the lake and not pay the fees. We otherwise affirm the Court's rulings on the issues raised on appeal.

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of the findings of fact and conclusions of law. The issue in this case is whether the trial court's award of permanent total disability is supported by a preponderance of the evidence. We find no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this action to terminate father's parental rights, the Trial Court refused to appoint counsel for father, despite his claim of indigence. On appeal, we vacate the Judgment and remand for further hearing on the issue of indigency.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee contends the trial court erred (1) when it held that the employee’s phlebitis did not arise out of and in the scope of her employment, (2) in finding that the employee’s torn rotator cuff was not timely reported, and (3) in finding that the employee’s torn rotator cuff did not arise out of and in the scope of her employment.  We affirm the trial court’s finding that the employee’s phlebitis did not arise out of her employment.  However, we reverse the trial court’s findings that the employee’s rotator cuff was not timely reported and did not arise out of and in the course of her employment.

A Hardeman County jury found the defendant, Stephen Lynn Hugueley, guilty of first degree premeditated murder. Following a separate penalty phase, the jury found the presence of four statutory aggravating circumstances and that these aggravators outweighed any mitigating factors.  The jury subsequently imposed a sentence of death. On appeal, the defendant seeks review by this Court of both his conviction for first degree murder and his sentence of death. He presents the following issues for review: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant an individual and sequestered voir dire; (2) whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s objection to the State’s use of peremptory challenges based upon race and gender; (3) whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to excuse a potential juror for cause; (4) whether the indictment failed to charge a capital offense; and (5) whether the trial court failed to apply meaningful standards to ensure constitutionally adequate proportionality review.  Finding no error, we affirm the defendant’s conviction of first degree murder and sentence of death.

The majority concludes that modification of the defendant’s sentence is required in light of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. __, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). I must respectfully dissent.

The Appellant, Anthony Lee Hill, was convicted by a Scott County jury of nine counts of sexual battery and received an effective two-year split confinement sentence with service of six months in the county jail. On appeal, Hill raises two issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support the nine convictions and (2) whether the statutory language of the phrase "can reasonably be construed as being for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification" improperly lessens the State's burden of proof and is, thus, unconstitutional. After review, the judgments of conviction are affirmed.

The defendant appeals the sentence he received after a violation and revocation of his community corrections sentence. On appeal, the defendant contends that the sentence issued was illegal. Following our review, we affirm the sentence imposed by the trial court.

This is an action for breach of contract filed by Plaintiff/Contractor against the State, together with a Counterclaim and a Third-Party Complaint against the surety company for Plaintiff/Contractor. The trial court granted partial summary judgment to Plaintiff as to liability because the State had failed to comply with the requirements of Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56 in answering Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. After much procedural combat, the trial court adhered to its ruling on the Motion for Summary Judgment, dismissed the Third-Party Complaint against the surety and the Counterclaim of the State against Plaintiff, held that Plaintiff had failed to prove any damages against the State, and sustained the Motion of the State for an involuntary dismissal of Plaintiff's entire claim, taxing the costs to Plaintiff. We find that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Plaintiff as to liability without considering documentation and evidence submitted by the State subsequent to the initial non-final order granting partial summary judgment as to liability. It follows that the court also erred in dismissing the Counterclaim and the Third-Party Complaint against the surety. The grant of partial summary judgment as to liability is reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial court for trial on the merits.

While Beatrice Harmon Montgomery ("Plaintiff") and Terry Lane Montgomery ("Defendant") never married, they lived together for many years beginning in 1969. Plaintiff and Defendant had one child, Brian Montgomery. During their relationship, Plaintiff and Defendant accumulated substantial assets and operated several businesses. Plaintiff filed this lawsuit seeking dissolution of her implied business partnership with Defendant. Brian Montgomery intervened claiming he also was a partner in two of the business ventures. The Trial Court concluded that Plaintiff and Defendant were equal partners in all of their business pursuits, and that Brian also was a partner in two of them. It is this ruling that forms the basis for most of the numerous issues raised on appeal. We reverse in part, vacate in part, affirm in part as modified, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

The Defendant, Thomas D. Stanton, was convicted by a jury of one count of aggravated robbery, one count of carjacking, one count of aggravated burglary, one count of theft, one count of Class D felony evading arrest, and one count of misdemeanor evading arrest. The trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment for the robbery offense; twenty-five years for the carjacking, to run consecutively; twelve years for the burglary offense, to run consecutively; five years for the theft, to run concurrently; ten years for the felony evading arrest, to run concurrently; and eleven months, twenty-nine days for the misdemeanor evading arrest, to run concurrently; for an effective sentence of life plus thirty-seven years. In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence does not support his aggravated robbery conviction; that the trial court committed reversible error in failing to charge the jury on certain lesser-included offenses; that the trial court erred in permitting the State to impeach him on the basis of a prior conviction; and that his sentences are excessive. The State also filed a direct appeal, arguing that the Defendant's sentence of life imprisonment for the aggravated robbery conviction is illegal and should be modified to a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. We reverse and remand for a new trial the Defendant's conviction of Class D felony evading arrest. We modify the Defendant's sentence for his aggravated robbery conviction to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. We remand for a correction of the judgment reflecting the Defendant's carjacking conviction. In all other respects, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner appeals the trial court's dismissal of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus, in which he contended that his sentence violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment because he was classified as both a Range II, persistent offender and a Class X offender. We conclude that the petitioner was properly sentenced based upon both the classification of the offense (Class X) and the offender classification (Range II, persistent). As such, we affirm the trial court's dismissal of the habeas petition.

The defendant, Gustavo Chavez, pled guilty to one count of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. After conducting a sentencing hearing, the trial court classified him as a Range I offender and imposed a ten year sentence at 100% service in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant challenges the length of the sentence imposed by the trial court. After reviewing the record and the applicable law, we affirm the defendant’s conviction. However, in light of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. ----, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), we modify the defendant’s sentence to an effective sentence of eight years at 100% service. We, therefore, remand the case for entry of a judgment that is consistent with this opinion.

This case involves a claim for personal injuries sustained in an automobile accident. The accident occurred when the vehicle in which the plaintiff was a guest passenger was forced off the road by an unidentified motorist. The plaintiff asserted a claim for uninsured motorist benefits under the provisions of an insurance policy issued to her former husband and his company. The issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for the defendant insurance company after concluding the undisputed facts revealed that, under the circumstances of this case, the plaintiff was not insured under the policy. The Court of Appeals affirmed the grant of summary judgment. Upon appeal to this Court, we conclude that the undisputed facts in the record do not support the trial court's grant of summary judgment for the insurance company. After thoroughly reviewing the record, we conclude that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the plaintiff was insured under the automobile insurance policy at the time of the accident and therefore entitled to uninsured motorist coverage. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The defendant, Ronald Allen, was convicted of rape of a child. The trial court imposed a sentence of twenty-five years. In this appeal, he asserts (1) that the evidence is insufficient; (2) that the trial court erred by permitting the state to ask leading questions of the minor victim; (3) that the sentence is excessive under the terms of the 1989 Sentencing Act; and (4) that the sentence must be modified under the terms of Blakely v. Washington, 524 U.S. ___, 124 S. Ct. 2351 (2004). The sentence is modified to twenty-three years. Otherwise, the judgment is affirmed.

Appellants, who were represented in a lawsuit by Appellees, appeal the dismissal of their attorney malpractice suit against Appellees on the ground, among other things, that the Appellants did not file suit within the one-year statute of limitations for attorney malpractice actions. Finding no error, we affirm.

Petitioner, Willie E. Kyles, Jr., filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, as amended after the appointment of counsel, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial.  Specifically, Petitioner contends that his trial counsel (1) failed to adequately investigate the facts surrounding Petitioner’s case or interview potential witnesses; (2) failed to file a motion to suppress; and (3) failed to challenge the chain of custody of the State’s evidence introduced at trial.  After review of the record in this matter, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Petitioner’s petition for post-conviction relief.

The defendant was convicted of theft under $500 and evading arrest, and was sentenced to two consecutive sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days at 75% release eligibility. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, the failure to admit the testimony of a defense witness, and the length and consecutive nature of his sentences. Upon thorough review, we affirm the judgments and the sentences.

The appellants, Christopher L. Williams, Corey A. Adams, and Ortega Wiltz, appeal as of right from their convictions in the Davidson County Criminal Court. Following a jury trial, Appellant Williams was convicted of three counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, Appellant Adams was convicted of three counts of facilitation of especially aggravated kidnapping, and Appellant Wiltz was convicted of two counts of facilitation of especially aggravated kidnapping. Thereafter, the trial court sentenced Appellant Williams to a total effective sentence of seventy-five years incarceration. Appellant Adams was sentenced to a total effective sentence of thirty-six years incarceration, and Appellant Wiltz was sentenced to a total effective sentence of forty years incarceration. On appeal, the appellants challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain their convictions and the sentences imposed by the trial court. Appellant Adams also challenges the trial court's ruling that certain prior convictions were admissible for the purpose of impeaching a defense witness. Based upon our review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.