APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

On July 21, 2003, the Grand Jury for Bedford County returned an indictment against the defendant charging him with one count of aggravated rape. After a jury trial, the defendant was convicted as charged on October 1, 2003 and sentenced on October 27, 2003, to twenty-two (22) years in the Department of Correction. The defendant now appeals this conviction. He argues that (1) the trial court erred in denying the Defendant's motion for a new trial where there is evidence that a juror failed to disclose to the trial court after voir dire that she had had a conversation with the Defendant's brother and knows the brother personally; and (2) that the State violated Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957), and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by failing to disclose evidence of the victim's pretrial statement which contained exculpatory information. We conclude that these issues are without merit and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

We granted review in this case to determine whether convenience store employees owe a duty of reasonable care to persons on the roadways when the employees sell gasoline to an obviously intoxicated driver and/or assist the driver in pumping the gasoline into his vehicle. We answer in the affirmative. The plaintiffs in this case were injured when their vehicle was struck by another vehicle driven by an intoxicated driver. The intoxicated driver had purchased gasoline at the defendant convenience store shortly before the accident. The plaintiffs filed suit alleging the defendant was liable for their injuries based on theories of negligence, negligence per se, and negligent entrustment in furnishing the driver with gasoline. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on all claims. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the negligence per se and negligent entrustment claims, but reversed the grant of summary judgment on the negligence claim. The intermediate court held that the defendant's employees were under a duty to act with due care when undertaking the affirmative acts of selling the gasoline to the visibly intoxicated driver and then helping the driver pump the gasoline into his vehicle. After a careful review of the record and relevant authority, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

The Petitioner, Reginald Almo, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Because the petition fails to grant a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief, we grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

This matter is before the Court upon the motion of appointed counsel seeking permission to withdraw from further representation of the Appellant in the above-captioned appeal pursuant to Rule 22, Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. Counsel claims that there are no
meritorious issues available for appellate review. Counsel has complied with the procedural requirements of Rule 22, Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner, Kelvin Hooks, has failed to submit a responsive brief pursuant to Rule 22(E), Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. After careful review of the motion, the accompanying Anders brief, and the appellate record, including the transcripts of the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, we agree with counsel’s assertion that the appeal has no merit and is, accordingly, frivolous within the meaning of Rule 22, Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. Counsel’s motion to withdraw is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals.

The Petitioner, Michael Bell, appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief.  The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The State’s motion is granted. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The appellant, Joseph Larue Davis, pled guilty in the Cocke County Circuit Court to aggravated burglary and theft of property over $1,000. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the appellant received concurrent four-year sentences with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the appellant to serve his sentences in confinement. On appeal, the appellant claims the trial court improperly enhanced his sentences and erred by refusing to grant his request for alternative sentencing. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Jeremy S. Crosby, appeals from the trial court's dismissal of his petition seeking habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The State's motion is granted. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Petitioner, Lewis A. Grimes, appeals the lower court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petition was filed outside the applicable statute of limitation and is, therefore, time-barred. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal.

A Montgomery County jury convicted the defendant, William L. Miller, of possession with intent to sell over 0.5 grams of cocaine, simple possession of marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia, evading arrest, assault, resisting arrest, and driving on a revoked driver's license. The trial court ordered the defendant to serve an effective sentence of eight years, with six days in the county jail and the remainder to be served in Community Corrections. On appeal, the defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for possession with intent to sell over 0.5 grams of cocaine and assault. After reviewing the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Terry Edward Jones pleaded guilty to solicitation of first degree murder, for which he received an eight-year incarcerative sentence. Aggrieved of the trial court's failure to grant his request for alternative sentencing, he brings the instant appeal challenging his manner of service. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Debra Ann Williams ("Mother") and George Jay Williams, IV ("Father") were divorced in 1998. Mother was designated the custodial parent of the parties' two minor children. In 2003, Father filed a Petition for Modification and Contempt seeking, in part, a change in custody or visitation, and relief from the requirement that Father carry life insurance or, in the alternative, that Mother also be required to maintain life insurance. Mother filed a counter claim requesting, in part, increased child support and the right to claim the tax exemption for both children. After a trial, the Trial Court entered an order holding, inter alia, "that there has been no change in circumstances which would justify the modification of the final judgment" as requested by Father and dismissing Father's petition for modification. The Trial Court, however, increased child support in accordance with the guidelines and held that for purposes of calculating child support under the guidelines, Father was not entitled to a reduction in his annual earnings for state income taxes he may pay. Father appeals raising issues regarding custody, visitation, life insurance, child support, and attorney's fees. We reverse as to the award to Mother of the tax exemption for one child, and affirm as to all other issues.

The Trial Court awarded fees to the Guardian Ad Litem who asked the Trial Court to award him fees and costs for collecting the initial award. The Trial Court refused. On appeal, we affirm.

The defendant appeals the trial court's revocation of her probation based upon a new law violation, to wit: introduction of contraband into a penal facility. Specifically, she contends that: (1) no proof was presented that Soma is a controlled substance or legend drug; (2) the trial court improperly took judicial notice that Soma is a controlled substance; (3) no proof was presented of unlawful intent; and (4) the revocation order does not properly state the evidence relied upon and reason for revoking probation. Upon our review, we conclude that there was substantial evidence to support the finding of a new law violation; we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Paul Dennis Reid, Jr., was convicted of two counts of premeditated first degree murder, two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, and one count of especially aggravated robbery. In imposing a death sentence for each count of first degree murder, the jury found three aggravating circumstances, i.e., that the defendant was previously convicted of one or more felonies whose statutory elements involved the use of violence to the person, that the murders were especially heinous, atrocious or cruel in that they involved torture or serious physical abuse beyond that necessary to produce death, and that the murders were committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution of the defendant or another, had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(2), (5), (6) (2003). In addition, the jury found that the evidence of aggravating circumstances outweighed evidence of mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(c) (2003). The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the convictions and the death sentences.

After the case was docketed in this Court, we entered an order identifying numerous issues for oral argument. We now hold as follows: 1) the trial court did not err in finding that the defendant was competent to stand trial; 2) the trial court did not err in excluding evidence during the competency hearing; 3) the trial court did not err in refusing to hold a new competency hearing on the basis that a court-appointed expert was biased; 4) the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s convictions; 5) the trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss on the basis that the aggravating circumstances were not stated in the indictment; 6) the trial court did not err in allowing the prosecution to amend the indictment; 7) the trial court did not commit reversible error in limiting extrinsic evidence of inconsistent statements; 8) the evidence was sufficient to support the aggravating circumstances found by the jury; 9) the death sentences were not arbitrary or disproportionate as imposed in this case; 10) the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s finding that evidence of aggravating circumstances outweighed evidence of mitigating circumstances; 11)the capital sentencing statutes are not unconstitutional on the basis that they allow evidence to be admitted in violation of due process and confrontation under the United States Constitution; 12) the trial court did not err in admitting photographs of the victims at the crime scene during sentencing; 13) the trial court did not commit reversible error in failing to charge the jury on the “catch-all” statutory provision as to mitigating circumstances; and 14) the trial court did not err in denying a new trial based on prosecutorial misconduct during sentencing. We also agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals’ conclusions with respect to the remaining issues, the relevant portions of which are included in the appendix to this opinion. Accordingly, the Court of Criminal Appeals’ judgment is affirmed.

The Appellant, Antonio Dewayne Bledsoe, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief by the Davidson County Criminal Court. On appeal, Bledsoe contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel and, as a result, his nolo contendere plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The defendant challenges the District Attorney General's denial of pretrial diversion pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 9. Specifically, he avers that the District Attorney General abused his discretion and failed to consider all relevant factors. Upon careful consideration, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for the District Attorney General's further consideration of all applicable factors, discussion of the evidence supporting those factors, and an explanation of the weight accorded to each.

The defendant, Jeffery Hayes, entered an open guilty plea to one count of the sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine, a Class C felony, two counts of the sale of more than .5 grams of cocaine, Class B felonies, and one count of possession with intent to sell more than .5 grams of cocaine, a Class B felony. He was sentenced to an effective sentence of ten years as a Range I standard offender. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in imposing an excessive sentence and denying alternative sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Christopher Robertson, appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner has failed to file a timely notice of appeal document. This Court finds that justice does not require waiver.  Accordingly, the above-captioned appeal is dismissed.

In Tennessee, a determination of child support is statutory. Jones v. Jones, 870 S.W.2d 281 (Tenn. 1994).¹ Accordingly, I would approach resolution of this appeal by resort to the applicable statutes.

The petitioner, Kelvin Lee Howard, appeals from the post-conviction court’s denial of post-conviction relief. On appeal, he contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel which caused him to enter unknowing and involuntaryguilty pleas. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying post-conviction relief.

The defendant, Jonathan Harris, was convicted by jury of attempted second degree murder, a Class B felony; voluntary manslaughter, a Class C felony; and theft of property valued between $10,000 and $60,000, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range I, standard offender to twelve years for the attempted second degree murder conviction, six years for the voluntary manslaughter conviction, and five years for the theft of property conviction. The trial court ordered the sentences to run consecutively for an effective sentence of twenty-three years. On appeal, the defendant argues: (1) the trial court erred in not suppressing the defendant’s statements and journal; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (3) and the trial court erred in imposing an excessive sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, James Eugene Yates, appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The State’s motion is granted. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The petitioner, Howard Duty, Jr., appeals from the post-conviction court's denial of post-conviction relief. On appeal, he contends that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received the effective assistance of counsel. Following our review, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

Alfonzo Silvestre Arze (“Father”) and MaryAnne Bracken Arze (“Mother”) were divorced in 2000.  The divorce was based upon stipulated grounds of irreconcilable differences, and the parties submitted a marital dissolution agreement (“MDA”) to the Trial Court for approval. The terms of the MDA were agreed upon through mediation. At the time of the divorce, Father was employed as a physician with gross earnings of approximately $150,000. Mother was unemployed. Due to the significant disparity in income, Father agreed to pay Mother $2,000 in child support even though he was not obligated legally to do so since he was the primary residential parent for the parties’ four children. When the oldest child turned eighteen, Father reduced his child support payments by twenty-five percent, $500. After Mother challenged Father’s unilateral reduction in child support,  the Trial Court entered an order which required Father to pay child support in an amount consistent with the Child Support Guidelines (“Guidelines”). We conclude that because Father was not legally obligated under the Guidelines to pay any child support, the payment of $2,000 was purely a contractual obligation which was not governed by the Guidelines. We also conclude that Father was within his contractual rights when he reduced the child support payments by $500 when the oldest child became emancipated.