APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Derrick Sawyers, appeals from the trial court’s dismissal of his petition seeking habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The State’s motion is granted. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant, Marshaun Luden, appeals from the trial court's order revoking his probation and reinstating his original sentence of five years as a Range I, standard offender in the Department of Correction. The defendant does not contest the revocation of his probation. Rather, he argues that the trial court erred by failing to consider any additional alternative sentencing options. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Steven G. Hughes, petitioned the Johnson County Criminal Court for habeas corpus relief from his Cocke County convictions of aggravated robbery. The court dismissed the petition, and the petitioner appealed. The state has moved this court to affirm the convictions pursuant to Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20. We sustain the court's motion and affirm the order of dismissal.

Shelby County employee appealed denial of review by the County’s Civil Service Merit Board following elimination of her position. The Shelby County Circuit Court affirmed the denial of a review by the Board because employee’s position was eliminated due to loss of funding as opposed to disciplinary action against her. Employee appeals. We affirm.

After having been indicted for the offense of first degree murder, Petitioner, David Joe Douglas Blair, pled guilty to the lesser included offense of second degree murder on June 6, 1999, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, and received a sentence of twenty-five years in the Department of Correction. On January 5, 2001, Petitioner filed a "Motion for Appointment of Counsel" pertaining to this matter and referenced a statute pertaining to the right to petition for post-conviction relief. The trial court appointed counsel and an amended petition for post-conviction relief was filed. The State answered, and in its answer alleged that the petition should be summarily dismissed because it was filed outside of the applicable statute of limitations. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the petition. Petitioner appealed, and filed his brief. The State has filed a motion for this court to affirm the dismissal pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. Finding merit in the motion, we grant same and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Curtis Tate, was convicted by a jury in the Shelby County Criminal Court of second degree murder. Following a hearing, the trial court sentenced the appellant to twenty years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant contends that (1) “[p]lain error exists in the record in that the two material and crucial witnesses were not called at trial”; (2) the trial court’s instructions to the jury were incomplete and misleading; (3) the trial court erred by instructing the jury on flight; (4) the evidence was insufficient to sustain the appellant’s conviction; and (5) the sentence imposed by the trial court was excessive. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Chico Lopez Chigano, appeals from the trial court's order dismissing his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The state has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petition fails to establish a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the state's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Petitioner, James A. Vaughn, was convicted of one count of first degree murder, three counts of attempted first degree murder, and one count of reckless endangerment, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of life plus twenty-two years. This Court affirmed the Petitioner's convictions and sentences on appeal. The Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court dismissed after a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred because he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Hamilton County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Vincent Marcel Williams, of aggravated child abuse, a Class A felony, and reckless homicide, a Class D felony. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to concurrent sentences of twenty-five years for the aggravated child abuse conviction and four years for the reckless homicide conviction. The defendant appeals, claiming that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966); (3) his right to a fair trial was violated when a police officer testified at trial concerning a polygraph test and the defendant's prior convictions; (4) the burden of proof was improperly shifted from the state to the defendant by the prosecutor's statements during closing argument; and (5) the trial court erred by refusing to apply or give sufficient weight to mitigating factors and by improperly applying enhancement factors in light of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. __, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). We affirm the defendant's convictions and sentences.

The Defendant pled guilty to aggravated robbery and was also found guilty after a bench trial of especially aggravated kidnapping. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to thirty-five years for the Class A felony especially aggravated kidnapping conviction, and to fifteen years for the Class B felony aggravated robbery conviction. The two sentences were ordered to be served consecutively. On appeal, the Defendant argues two issues: 1) his conviction for especially aggravated kidnapping violated his right to due process pursuant to State v. Anthony, 817 S.W.2d 299 (Tenn. 1991), and; 2) the trial court erred in imposing excessive sentences and in running the sentences consecutively. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Santita Makeva Sutton, pled guilty in the Bedford County Circuit Court to two counts of sale of one-half gram or more of cocaine, a Class B felony, possession with intent to sell one-half gram or more of cocaine, a Class B felony, possession of a weapon by a convicted felon, a Class E felony, and simple possession of a schedule VI controlled substance, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced her to eight years for each Class B felony conviction, one year for the Class E felony conviction, and eleven months and twenty-nine days for the Class A misdemeanor conviction. The court ordered two of the three Class B felony convictions, the Class E felony conviction, and the Class A misdemeanor conviction to run concurrently with each other but consecutively to the other Class B felony conviction for an effective total sentence of sixteen years in the Department of Correction. The defendant appeals, claiming the trial court erred in denying her alternative sentencing under state law and the rule announced in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. __, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). We affirm the trial court.

The petitioner, Jackie F. Curry, petitioned the Johnson County Criminal Court for habeas corpus relief from his three 2000 Knox County convictions of aggravated rape. The court dismissed the petition, and the petitioner appealed. The state has moved this court to affirm the convictions pursuant to Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20. We sustain the court's motion and affirm the order of dismissal.

The appellant pled guilty to aggravated assault. At sentencing, the trial court imposed a three-year sentence to be served on probation. In this appeal, the appellant argues the trial court erred by denying judicial diversion. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Elmer Fritts, appeals from the trial court's order dismissing his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The state has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petition fails to establish a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the state's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The petitioner, Carl Ed Leming, pled guilty in the Hamilton County Circuit Court to two counts of aggravated rape. He received consecutive sentences of forty years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction, with release eligibility after serving thirty percent of his sentence. Subsequently, the petitioner filed in the Bledsoe County Circuit Court a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that his sentence was illegal because he received statutorily impermissible release eligibility. The court dismissed the petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and the petitioner now appeals. Upon our review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a breach of contract case in which the controlling issue involves the commencement and conclusion of the term of an employment contract and, more specifically, when Plaintiff's guaranteed term of employment ended. The trial court determined that Defendant had breached the contract by terminating Plaintiff prior to the end of his employment term and awarded damages, together with contract authorized attorney fees and expenses. We affirm the judgment of the Chancellor.

The petitioner, Joseph B. Thompson, appeals from the Sullivan County Criminal Court's dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, in which he challenged his 2001 jury conviction of misdemeanor theft on the grounds that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel and that the trial court committed certain errors. The state has moved this court to affirm the order of dismissal pursuant to Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20. We sustain the motion and affirm the order.

This is a child support case. The appellant is the father of eight children who are the subject of this dispute. The State filed a petition in the Juvenile Court alleging that the children were dependent and neglected due to the drug use of the mother and father. The mother and father stipulated to these charges and the children were placed in the care of relatives. The State later filed a petition to establish paternity and set support, seeking adjudication of numerous issues, including child support. The trial court ruled on the issue of child support, but did not rule on the other issues. Without seeking permission for interlocutory appeal, the father appealed the ruling on child support. We dismiss the appeal, finding that the order from which the father appeals is not a final order and is thus not properly before this Court.

The employee in this workers' compensation case suffered a spontaneous and large right-lung pneumothorax while at work. The pneumothorax required two corrective surgeries and resulted in treatment with narcotics for chronic pain. After a careful review of the record, we conclude that the injury sustained was an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of her employment. We further hold that the evidence supports the trial court's finding that the employee was totally and permanently disabled. We affirm the trial court's judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The petitioner, Robert R. McCray, petitioned the Sullivan County Criminal Court for a writ of habeas corpus to gain release from that court's 18-month sentence imposed for a conviction of selling a counterfeit controlled substance. The court denied the petition, and the petitioner appealed. The state has moved this court to affirm the order via memorandum opinion pursuant to Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20. We sustain the state's motion and affirm the order pursuant to Rule 20.

The Appellant, Edward Chumney, appeals the revocation of his probation by the Madison County Circuit Court. On appeal, Chumney argues that the trial court was without authority to revoke his probation because the violation warrants were issued after his sentence of probation had expired.  After review, we agree that three of his sentences had expired; however, his two sentences for aggravated burglary had not. Accordingly, we affirm revocation of his two sentences for aggravated burglary and reverse and vacate revocation of his sentences for misdemeanor theft, class E felony theft, and class D felony theft. The case is remanded for correction of the records below to reflect this holding and for other proceedings consistent with this opinion.

First Source Furniture Group and Travelers Insurance Company have appealed the decisions of the trial court in favor of Randy Lee Hayes. First, the trial court awarded Mr. Hayes 25% permanent partial disability to his left arm due to a new injury. Second, the trial court, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(a)(2), reconsidered Mr. Hayes’ prior award and increased it by 7% to the body as a whole. We affirm the decisions of the trial court while correcting an admitted error regarding Mr. Hayes’ workers’ compensation benefit rate for the arm injury.

In the 1940's, Tyler Seal received a life estate interest in a parcel of land with the remainder going to his heirs at law upon his death. In 1968, Tyler Seal conveyed his interest in the property to his brother, Clint Seal, via a deed which purported to convey a fee simple interest. This deed was not recorded until 1991. Tyler Seal passed away in March of 1996. Clint Seal deeded the property in fee simple to his son and daughter-in-law, Tony and Patricia Seal, the following year. This lawsuit was filed by various persons claiming an interest in the land because they were remaindermen pursuant to the will which originally conveyed the life estate to Tyler Seal. Suit was brought against Clint Seal as well as Tony and Patricia Seal ("Defendants"). Defendants claimed they were the rightful record owners of the property or, alternatively, that they were entitled to ownership of the property based on adverse possession. The Trial Court concluded Defendants were entitled to ownership of the property because they had adversely possessed the property for the requisite number of years and further that Plaintiffs' seven year statute of limitations to file suit had expired. We reverse.

This is a Title IV child support case. Father/Appellee was subject to a court order requiring him to make monthly child support payments. Mother allegedly requested to end Father’s child support obligation and Title IV-D services due to a private agreement between the parties whereby Father paid some child support directly to Mother. The State/Appellant, on behalf of Mother, filed a contempt petition against Father seeking payment of child support and arrears. Following a hearing, the trial court dismissed the support orders and forgave any arrears. The trial court also denied the State’s Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment. The State appeals based upon T.C.A. § 36-5-101(a)(5) because no petition or motion to modify child support was filed and based upon T.C.A. § 71-3-124 because the State asserts it is entitled to reimbursement from the arrears for public benefits paid to Mother. We reverse and remand.

The petitioner appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he should have been appointed post-conviction counsel to assist him with his petition. We conclude that the petitioner alleges a colorable claim for relief under the less stringent standards afforded to a pro se petitioner and that the petitioner’s request for counsel should have been granted.  Accordingly, we reverse the dismissal of the petition and remand the case to the post-conviction court for the appointment of counsel.