APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

I concur in the majority’s decision finding the evidence sufficient to support the Defendant’s convictions for violating the vehicle registration law, speeding, driving on a suspended license, and felony evading arrest. I respectfully disagree that principles of double jeopardy under Tennessee’s constitution require the merger of the Defendant’s conviction for misdemeanor evading arrest with his felony evading arrest conviction.

This case is about parental relocation and child custody. The parents of a minor child divorced in 2001. Both parents lived in Lexington, Tennessee, and, at the time of the divorce, agreed to joint custody. The child alternated daily between the parents’ homes. In 2002, the mother remarried and moved to Murfreesboro, Tennessee. The mother petitioned the court to designate her as primary residential parent and allow her to move the child with her to Murfreesboro. The father opposed the petition and asked the court to designate him as the primary residential parent. The trial court found that it was in the child’s best interest to move to Murfreesboro with the mother, and designated her as primary residential parent. The father appealed. We affirm, finding that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s decision to designate mother as primary residential parent and permit the child to move with her.

The petitioner, Wilson H. Tucker, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Hardeman County Circuit Court. The trial court summarily dismissed the petition, and the petitioner timely appealed.  Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

I concur in the majority opinion, but I believe one issue deserves further
discussion–sequential offense consideration jury instructions in cases involving a question of second degree murder or voluntary manslaughter. The defendant’s concern is that requiring the jury to acquit on the greater offense before considering the lesser offense can cause a problem when it involves second degree murder and voluntary manslaughter. I agree.

The appellant, Earnest Gwen Humphrey, was convicted by a jury in the White County Criminal Court of second degree murder. The trial court imposed a sentence of twenty-two years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant raises multiple issues for our review, including challenges to the voir dire of the jury, the sufficiency of the evidence, prosecutorial misconduct, and the jury instructions. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner challenges the denial of his post-conviction petition, which asserted various instances of ineffective assistance of counsel. Upon review, we conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the post-conviction court’s findings; therefore, we affirm.

Father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his two minor children, arguing that Petitioner, the children's maternal grandmother, did not show by clear and convincing evidence that Father had abandoned his children. Father also asserts that because there is no transcript or audio recording of the trial court's hearing this court is unable to conduct an adequate appellate review. We agree with Father and find that due to the lack of a transcript or audiotape of the evidence presented at the termination hearing, we are unable to determine whether clear and convincing evidence supported the termination of his parental rights. Consequently, Father has been deprived of an effective review on appeal. We therefore vacate the judgment of the trial court terminating Father's parental rights and remand for further proceedings.

Petitioner, Lloyd Earl Williams, filed his second petition for writ of habeas corpus relief in the Lake County Circuit Court, attacking judgments of conviction entered against him in the Washington County Criminal Court. In 1993, Petitioner was convicted and sentenced in abstentia, following a jury trial, of sale of cocaine, one count of possession of cocaine with intent to sell, and one count of conspiracy to sell cocaine, with an effective sentence of fifty-four (54) years. He was taken into custody in 2001. A petition for post-conviction relief was dismissed for not being filed within the applicable statute of limitations. His first petition for writ of habeas corpus attacked the convictions based upon his being tried and sentenced in abstentia. Dismissal of that petition was affirmed on appeal. See Lloyd Earl Williams v. State, No. W2003-02348-CCA-R3-HC, 2004 WL 948370 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, April 29, 2004), perm. to appeal denied (Tenn. September 2, 2004). In this second petition for habeas corpus relief, Petitioner alleges that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief because the sentences were imposed, both as to length and consecutive service, by a judge and not the jury in violation of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 125 S. Ct. 2531, 159 L. Ed. 2d 403 (2004) and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000). The trial court summarily dismissed the petition without an evidentiary hearing. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is an appeal from the trial court’s reversal of an administrative decision. The plaintiff police officer was involved in a one-car collision while driving a police van. At the time, he was on sick leave and was not authorized to be driving the van. The van contained numerous high-powered police weapons. After the accident, the officer locked the van and left it at the accident scene overnight. The next day, the officer notified the police department about the accident. The officer was later terminated for his conduct arising out of the accident. The officer appealed his termination to the Civil Service Commission, which upheld the termination. The officer then filed the instant lawsuit in the lower court, seeking a review of the Commission’s decision. The trial court reversed  the Commission, holding that no material evidence supported its decision to uphold the termination.  From that decision, the City now appeals. We reverse the decision of the trial court and uphold the Civil Service Commission’s decision to terminate the plaintiff officer, finding material evidence in the record to support the Civil Service Commission’s decision.

Petitioner, C.S.O. Norvell, Jr., filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, attacking his conviction for second degree murder in the Tipton County Circuit Court. The petition was summarily dismissed by the trial court without an evidentiary hearing. Petitioner has appealed, arguing that his conviction is void because he received an illegal sentence. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employee asserts that the trial court erred in finding he was not entitled to reimbursement for medical expenses for unauthorized physicians and in finding he sustained only a 5% permanent partial disability to the whole person as the result of an injury occurring during the course of the appellant's employment with the Davidson Transit Organization. We conclude that the evidence presented supports the findings of the trial judge and, in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(2), affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this extended post-divorce battle over child support, alimony, property division and various other imaginative issues, the trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant. The judgment of the trial court is vacated, and the cause is remanded for trial of specific issues.

Petitioner/Appellant is an inmate in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction.  This appeal arises from the Appellant’s filing of the underlying pro se petition for common-law writ of certiorari, seeking review of the Warden’s decision to move him from one housing unit to another.  The trial court dismissed Inmate’s case based upon its determination that the Warden’s decision was administrative, as opposed to judicial, in nature and that, as such, the common-law writ of certiorari was not the proper vehicle for review. Inmate appeals. We affirm.

Defendant, Marlon Avery Bussell, was indicted for first degree felony murder in count one, and for attempted especially aggravated robbery in count two. Following a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of the lesser included offense of criminally negligent homicide, a Class E felony, in count one, and of the lesser included offense of attempted robbery, a Class D felony, in count two. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to two years for his criminally negligent homicide conviction and four years for his attempted robbery conviction, and ordered the sentences to be served concurrently. The trial court denied Defendant's request that he be granted alternative sentencing, and ordered Defendant to serve his sentences in confinement. On appeal, Defendant challenges the length of his sentences and the trial court's denial of alternative sentencing. He does not challenge the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Following a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This case involves a divorce and the validity of a postnuptial agreement. Mr. and Ms. Stutz were married more than twenty years. During most of the marriage, they wanted to have children but were unsuccessful. When a child became available for adoption, Ms. Stutz was elated and aggressive in her actions to secure the adoption of the child, but Mr. Stutz was opposed to the adoption of the child. Over the course of several weeks, Ms. Stutz attempted to change Mr. Stutz's mind regarding the adoption. Finally, she suggested that in exchange for his consent to the adoption, they would enter into an agreement dividing the marital estate and in the event Mr. Stutz was unhappy being a father they would divorce and follow the agreement previously determined. The result was a lengthy postnuptial agreement, which among other things, divided the marital estate giving most of the marital property to Mr. Stutz. Within a few years of the signing of the postnuptial agreement and the adoption, Ms. Stutz filed for divorce. The trial court upheld the validity of the postnuptial agreement with the exception of a section which attempted to waive and/or significantly limit Mr. Stutz's child support obligation. The trial court also granted a divorce to the parties upon Mr. Stutz's motion without conducting an evidentiary hearing. Ms. Stutz appeals. We hold that the postnuptial agreement is invalid as it is contrary to public policy. We further hold that the trial court erred in granting a divorce to the parties in the absence of a stipulation to or proof of grounds for divorce. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's decision and remand this case for a trial on the division of the marital estate, alimony, divorce, and any remaining issues.

The State has appealed to this Court pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure from an interlocutory order of the trial court suppressing evidence resulting from a search and seizure. The question presented for our review is whether the defendant had standing to contest the search of an outbuilding located on property near his premises. Upon review of the record, we affirm the trial court's findings that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the outbuilding but not in the area surrounding the outbuilding.

The trial court dismissed an action against the county arising from a deputy sheriff's allegedly negligent failure to arrest a man who had just assaulted his former girlfriend, the mother of his child. The man later murdered his young son. The mother of the child appealed. Because the public duty doctrine provided a shield from liability, and the complaint did not allege facts sufficient to establish the special duty exception, we affirm the trial court.

The Defendant, Larry Walcott, was convicted by a jury of aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to five and one-half years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant raises four issues: 1) whether the trial court erred in refusing to recuse itself; 2) whether the trial court erred in refusing to sequester the jury; 3) whether the evidence is sufficient to support his conviction; and 4) whether the trial court erred in ordering the Defendant to serve his sentence in confinement. Finding no reversible error in the issues raised by the Defendant, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this post-divorce action, Robert William Fuller, Jr. ("Father") filed a petition seeking, among other things, a modification of the custody arrangement with respect to the parties' minor son, Ryan; an enforcement of parenting time with both Ryan and his daughter, Caitlyn; and a finding of contempt against his former wife, Lynn Gail Harrison, formerly Fuller ("Mother"). Mother filed a counterclaim, seeking an increase in child support. Following a hearing, the trial court essentially denied Father's petition. It left Mother as the primary residential parent of both children. In addition, the trial court ordered that Father's visitation with Caitlyn would be at the sole discretion of a named counselor. The trial court did not find Mother in contempt. Father appeals. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and modify in part.

As a result of the shooting death of his wife, the Anderson County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant, Jonathan Ray Taylor, for second degree murder and reckless homicide. A plea agreement was reached in which the second degree murder count would be dismissed and the Defendant would plead guilty to reckless homicide and receive a two year sentence. The trial court rejected this plea agreement. The State then attempted to nolle prosequi the second degree murder charge, and the trial court refused to allow the nolle prosequi. We granted the Defendant's application for interlocutory appeal to address whether the trial court erred: (1) when it rejected the proposed plea agreement; (2) when it denied the State's request to enter a nolle prosequi on the charge of second degree murder; and (3) when it refused to recuse itself. Finding that there exists no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Larry Vaughn, alias Demertruis Moore, appeals the revocation of his community corrections sentence by the Hamilton County Criminal Court. He argues that the record does not contain sufficient evidence to support the revocation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Arthur T. Copeland, was convicted by a Blount County jury of one count of first degree premeditated murder. The jury found that the state proved one aggravating circumstance: The defendant was previously convicted of one or more felonies involving violence to the person. Upon its further finding that the aggravating circumstance outweighed the mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury sentenced the defendant to death. In this appeal as of right, the defendant raises issues regarding the sufficiency of the evidence; the exclusion of jurors; an invalid indictment; the admission of certain testimony; the exclusion of expert testimony; his right to testify in his own defense; the denial of due process; the denial of his motion for continuance; the denial of his motion to suppress; error by the trial court during voir dire; the denial of a change of venue; prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument in the guilt and sentencing phases; discovery violations by the prosecution; error in allowing the introduction of certain photographs; denial of a request for a special jury instruction; the failure to charge the jury on a self-defense theory; the refusal to disqualify the district attorney's office; the refusal to excuse trial counsel from post-trial representation of the defendant; the failure to grant a new trial based on newly discovered evidence; improper jury instructions; the denial of expert funding for development and use of mitigation evidence; the admission of photos of the victim; the cumulative effects of errors during the guilt and sentencing phases; and various constitutional challenges to the death penalty and to the statutory capital sentencing procedure in this state. After review, this court concludes that reversible error attended the trial court's response to defendant's decision not to testify and that the death penalty in this case is disproportionate to the particular offense. We therefore reverse the conviction and sentence.

The defendant, Roger Gene Davis, stands convicted of aggravated assault and robbery, for which he was ordered to serve an effective six-year sentence. Aggrieved of his convictions and sentences, the defendant brings this instant appeal challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions and the trial court's imposition of consecutive sentences. After reviewing the record, we affirm the judgments of the lower court.

Before the court is an appeal by the State as of right pursuant to Rule 3(c) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. The defendant, Justin Paul Bruce, moved to suppress evidence seized during a search of his automobile. The trial judge concluded that the evidence had been illegally seized and granted the motion to suppress. We affirm the judgment of the trial court and remand this case for further proceedings.

This appeal arises from a trial court's order granting Appellee's motion which was labeled a motion to dismiss but treated as a motion for summary judgment. The trial court determined that Appellant lacked standing to bring her cause of action, and, alternatively, was barred from bringing her claim by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Appellant seeks review by this Court, and, for the following reasons, we affirm.