APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is the second time that this case has been on appeal. In this appeal, we are asked to determine if the trial court erred when it granted summary judgment to the defendants. The defendants assert that summary judgment was appropriate based on the claims and defenses raised at trial, including res judicata, law of the case, and statute of limitations. We affirm.

I write separately to voice my dissent to the holding reached by the majority in this case.  The majority concludes that Father expressly waived the issue of whether the trial court correctly determined him to be voluntarily unemployed. Although Father did state in his brief that he is not challenging the trial court’s determination that he is voluntarily unemployed on appeal, I believe the issue should nonetheless be addressed. In doing so, I would hold that the trial court erred in finding that Father was voluntarily unemployed and in imputing potential income to Father on which to base an award of child support.

This appeal involves a dispute between divorced parents over one of their son's college expenses. Their older son became eligible for a substantial tuition discount after his father was employed by the university where he was enrolled. However, the father and son concealed the father's employment and the son's discount from the mother and actually sent her statements that did not reflect the discount. The mother paid one-half of the expenses reflected in these statements until she discovered the tuition discount. She then filed suit against her former husband and her son in the Circuit Court for Wilson County alleging breach of contract and fraud. She also sought a declaration regarding her continuing obligation to pay her son's college expenses. Following a bench trial, the trial court concluded that the father had breached the marital dissolution agreement and ordered the father to pay the mother $2,737.01. The court also found that the mother had breached the marital dissolution agreement by declining to pay her son's college expenses after discovering the tuition discount and ordered her to resume paying her share of these expenses. The mother appealed. We have concluded (1) that the father committed a material breach of the marital dissolution agreement, (2) that the father and the son engaged in fraudulent conduct by concealing the tuition discount from the mother and then pocketing her overpayments, (3) that the mother did not breach the marital dissolution agreement when she stopped paying her son's college expenses, and (4) that the trial court erred in calculating the amount of the mother's overpayment. Accordingly, we have determined that the mother is entitled to recover $3,590 from the husband and that the actions of the father and son warrant terminating her obligation to pay the son's college expenses.

This is the second time that this case has been on appeal. In this appeal, we are asked to determine if the trial court erred when it granted summary judgment to the defendants. The defendants assert that summary judgment was appropriate based on the claims and defenses raised at trial, including res judicata, law of the case, and statute of limitations. We affirm.

This is a child support case. Custody of the minor children was removed from the biological father, and he was convicted of and incarcerated for aggravated sexual battery of his child and the manufacture of methamphetamine. The custodians of the children petitioned to terminate the father’s parental rights, adopt the children, and obtain back child support from the father. The father owned 1500 acres of farmland. The trial court terminated the father’s parental rights, assessed back child support against him, found him voluntarily underemployed and, based on the incomeproducing farmland, imputed an earning potential of $45,000. The custodians appeal, arguing that the trial court erred by not imputing a higher earning capacity to the biological father. We affirm.

The wife died in 1998, and her holographic will was admitted to probate and the estate closed. In 2002, the husband died, and his formally executed will was admitted to probate. Thereafter, his executrix determined that a question existed concerning the ownership interest in the marital residence held by the husband at his death. As a result, the executrix filed a declaratory judgment action in the probate court to construe the wife’s holographic will. At trial, the wife’s daughter by a previous marriage attempted to prove that the wife’s holographic will was a forgery. The trial court determined that the daughter’s proof was not credible, and the court ruled that the wife’s holographic will vested fee simple title of the marital residence in the husband following her death. The wife’s daughter filed a motion for a new trial. While the motion was pending, the daughter filed an action in the chancery court against the husband’s children from a previous marriage asserting, in essence, the same allegations she raised in the probate court action. The probate court subsequently denied the daughter’s motion for a new trial. In turn, the chancery court transferred the complaint to the probate court, and the probate court entered an order dismissing the complaint. The daughter filed an appeal to this Court raising numerous issues related to the declaratory judgment action and the compliant filed in chancery court. As for the declaratory judgment action, we are without jurisdiction to entertain issues related to that case since the daughter failed to file a timely appeal.
As for the complaint the daughter filed in chancery court, we find that it is, in essence, an action to contest the validity of the holographic will of her mother. As such, it is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Therefore, the probate court was correct in dismissing the complaint.  Moreover, we remand this case to the trial court for the entry of an award of damages to the Appellees for the Appellant’s filing of a frivolous appeal.

This is a claim against an estate. The claimant and the decedent had a romantic relationship. After the decedent’s death, the claimant filed a claim against the decedent’s estate, based on alleged promises of financial support by the decedent in the course of their relationship. The estate moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion, ruling that the claimant could not establish the existence of an enforceable contract or a valid gift. We affirm.

A Roane County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Vincent A. Hester, of attempted first degree murder, a Class A felony, and felony reckless endangerment, a Class E felony, and the trial court sentenced him to twenty years for the attempted murder and two years for the reckless endangerment to be served concurrently in the Department of Correction. The defendant appeals, claiming that the evidence is insufficient and that the trial court failed to perform its duty as the thirteenth juror pursuant to Rule 33(f) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In this post-divorce case, Richard Austin Demonbreun ("Father"), filed a petition to modify the parties' visitation arrangement, seeking additional time with one of the parties' three children. Rhonda Fay Demonbreun ("Mother"), the primary residential parent of the children, countered with a petition requesting an increase in child support and the imposition of an obligation upon Father to pay the children's unreimbursed medical expenses. In addition, Mother sought one-half of the refund associated with the parties' 1998 income tax return, and an award of her attorney's fees and court costs. Following a bench trial, the trial court (1) denied Father's petition to modify visitation with his oldest son; (2) increased Father's child support obligation and his share of non-covered medical expenses; (3) awarded Mother one-half of the 1998 income tax refund; (4) awarded Mother $5,000 in attorney's fees; and (5) ordered Father to pay all court costs. Father appeals all of the trial court's decrees, and Mother seeks an award of attorney's fees for the filing of a frivolous appeal. We affirm in part and reverse in part, but do not find this appeal to be frivolous in nature.

The appellant, Joseph Vermeal, was convicted by a jury in the Warren County Circuit Court of attempted aggravated sexual battery and was sentenced to four years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant complains that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, the trial court erred in refusing to permit his expert witness to testify, and the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing. Upon our review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Joshua Schaeffer, was convicted of aggravated robbery. The trial court imposed a Range I sentence of eight years in the Department of Correction. In this appeal as of right, the defendant alleges (1) that the evidence is insufficient; (2) that the trial court provided an incorrect definition of the term "deadly weapon" in its instructions to the jury; (3) that the trial court committed plain error by giving the "result-of-conduct" definition of "knowingly" in its instructions to the jury; (4) that the trial court improperly allowed into evidence a newspaper headline related to the offense; (5) that a detective impermissibly referred to the crime as "robbery" during his testimony; (6) that the prosecutor's closing argument was improper; and (7) that the cumulative effect of the errors deprived him of the right to a fair trial. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Defendant, Markettus L. Broyld, appeals the judgment of the trial court revoking his probation. Because the notice of appeal was untimely filed, this appeal is dismissed.

The Petitioner, Lakeisha Jones, was convicted of second degree murder, and the trial court sentenced her, as a violent offender, to fifteen years in prison. The Petitioner’s conviction and sentence were affirmed by this Court. Subsequently, the Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, which was later amended by appointed counsel. After a hearing, the trial court dismissed the petition. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the trial court erred when it dismissed her petition for post-conviction relief because she received ineffective assistance of counsel at her trial. Finding that there exists no reversible error, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

The defendant, Timothy Wright, appeals from his Tipton County Circuit Court jury conviction of aggravated assault, which resulted in a four-year sentence to be served through 220 days’ confinement, with the defendant placed in a community corrections program for the balance of the sentence. The defendant’s single issue on appeal is his claim that the trial court erred in permitting the victim/prosecuting witness “to remain in the courtroom and testify last at trial.” Because we discern no reversible error in the proceedings in the circuit court, we affirm the conviction.

In this appeal, we are called upon to review the trial court’s order entering summary judgment in favor of the bank. After one of its customers deposited a counterfeit check into its account at the bank, the bank filed a claim with its insurance company to recover for its loss under a bond.  Specifically, the bank sought coverage under two provisions in the bond. The bank filed its first motion for summary judgment on one of the bond’s provisions. The insurance company responded by agreeing that, for purposes of ruling on the motion for summary judgment, the bank’s customer intended to commit a fraud when he deposited the check. By doing so, the insurance company sought to trigger an exclusion provision in the bond. Thereafter, the bank filed a second motion for summary judgment on the other provision in the bond. In response, the insurance company, in an effort to create a disputed issue of material fact as to this provision, asserted that the customer did not intended to commit fraud when he deposited the check. The trial court granted the bank’s motions for summary judgment. In regards to the bank’s motions for summary judgment, we reverse the trial court’s award of summary judgment to the bank and find that genuine issues of material fact remain to be decided, therefore, summary judgment is inappropriate.

Donna Renee Morgan ("Mother") filed a complaint for divorce from her husband of 11 years, Jeffrie W. Morgan ("Father"). The trial court awarded Mother a divorce and designated her as the primary residential parent of the parties' minor child. In addition, the trial court divided the parties' property and awarded Mother alimony and child support, basing its child support award on an annual salary for Father of $110,000. Father appeals, arguing that he should have been awarded primary residential parent status and contending that the trial court erred in its determination of his annual income. We affirm.

The petitioner, Stephen Lajuan Beasley, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. In this appeal, he alleges that his conviction is void because the indictment was defective and because the sentence was illegal. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Fourteen members of a church filed a complaint against the church leadership seeking an injunction to prevent the church from renewing the pastor’s contract and to enjoin the church leadership from utilizing church funds in a manner which displeased them. The parties ultimately settled the case by entering into a settlement agreement, which the chancery court incorporated into its order dismissing the case with prejudice. Shortly thereafter, the members filed a petition seeking to hold the church leadership in contempt for violating the terms of the settlement agreement. The chancellor found the church leadership to be in civil and criminal contempt of the order dismissing the case and imposed fines and jail time. The church leadership appealed to this Court. After reviewing the record in this case, we hold that the chancery court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this case from the outset. Accordingly, the resulting order, which served as the basis for the chancery court’s finding of contempt, is void. We reverse the chancery court’s ruling in this case and dismiss the case in its entirety.

In this conservatorship case, we are asked to evaluate the probate court's decision that an elderly female was mentally disabled and in need of the court's assistance. The elderly female executed two powers of attorney for health care; one in 1996 and the other in 2003 after the nieces of the elderly female filed their petition in this case to appoint a conservator. The attorney-in-fact under both powers of attorney filed a counter-petition asking the probate court to appoint her conservator over the elderly female. The probate court ruled that the power of attorney executed in 1996 was void due to improper execution and that the power of attorney executed in 2003 was void because it was executed while the elderly female was mentally disabled. The probate court found that the elderly female's nieces and the attorney-in-fact should not serve as conservators in this case. Instead, the probate court appointed the public guardian to serve as the elderly female's conservator. The attorney-in-fact and the elderly female filed an appeal to this Court. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

This medical malpractice case focuses on the correct interpretation of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 3 as we attempt to ascertain whether this suit, filed pursuant to the saving statute, was pursued so as to “toll the running of [the] statute of limitations.” The trial court held that, since no process was issued within 30 days of the filing of the plaintiff’s complaint 1 and since the process that was eventually issued and later served on the defendants was not issued within one year of the filing of the complaint, the plaintiff’s suit was filed outside the one-year statute of limitations. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint. She appeals. We affirm.

This is a divorce case. The parties, Donna Lynae Watson ("Wife") and Harold Guy Watson ("Husband"), ultimately stipulated to the existence of grounds for divorce and reached an agreement pertaining to the disposition of much of their marital property. A bench trial was held to resolve the parties' disputed issues, which, among other things, included the issue of how the marital real property should be disposed of in the overall division of the parties' marital property. The trial court awarded the marital real property to Wife, subject, however, to the mortgage on the property; Husband appeals this action by the trial court. We affirm.

The petitioner, James McKinnon, pled guilty to aggravated burglary and especially aggravated robbery. As a result, he was sentenced to an effective sentence of seventeen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction to be served at 100%. The petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court denied the petition. Following our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the post-conviction court.

This appeal involves the division of property upon divorce where there existed a valid Antenuptial Agreement that included provisions governing such distribution. Because we find that the trial court's distribution was consistent with the terms of the agreement and supported by the record, we affirm.

In this appeal, we are asked by the appellant to determine whether the chancery court erred when it granted summary judgment to the appellees, finding that there was no consideration to support the Pastor’s Spouse Benefits agreement between the parties and that the theory of promissory estoppel is inapplicable in this case. On appeal, the appellant asserts that her presence as first lady of the church, her loss of benefits previously received from the Church, and/or the restraint of marriage provision in the agreement constituted legally adequate consideration for the Agreement. In the alternative, the appellant asserts that the doctrine of promissory estoppel is applicable in this case.  We affirm.

After being indicted for aggravated assault and vehicular assault, the defendant, Andrew Boone, was convicted by jury of reckless aggravated assault, a Class D felony. He was sentenced as a standard offender to four years in the county workhouse, and his driver’s license was suspended for one year for violating the implied consent statute. On appeal, he presents five issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred in admitting irrelevant evidence; (2) whether the trial court properly
instructed the jury as to the elements of reckless aggravated assault; (3) whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on reckless driving as a lesser-included offense of reckless aggravated assault; (4) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction for reckless aggravated assault; and (5) whether the trial court erred in determining the length and the manner of service of his sentence. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.