APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Three competing parties claim rights to commercially exploit performances of legendary performer Hank Williams that were recorded and broadcast by WSM Radio in the 1950s. Polygram Records, Inc., claims exclusive phonograph exploitation rights, relying on a contract Williams entered into with its predecessor in interest, MGM Records. Legacy Entertainment Group, LLC., claims rights of exploitation to the recordings under a chain of title. Williams' heirs, Hank Williams, Jr. and Jett Williams, contend neither Legacy nor Polygram have contractual rights to exploit Williams' performances embodied in the WSM recordings, and further contend the rights passed to his heirs. The trial court summarily dismissed the claims of Polygram and Legacy, finding neither own rights to exploit the recorded performances, and the rights belong to Williams' heirs. Legacy and Polygram appeal. We affirm the trial court.

The defendant, Betty Gouge, pled guilty to one count of sale of one-half gram or more of cocaine, a Class B felony, one count of possession with intent to sell one-half gram or more of cocaine, a Class B felony, and one count of possession with the intent to sell less than ten pounds of marijuana, a Class E felony. The Unicoi County Criminal Court sentenced her to eight years for each Class B felony and one year for the Class E felony to be served concurrently as a Range I, standard offender in the Department of Correction. The defendant appeals, contending that the trial court erred in denying her probation or alternative sentencing. We affirm the judgments of the trial court but we remand case number 5337, Count 3, to the trial court for the judgment to reflect that the defendant pled guilty and was found guilty.

The appellant, Tevias Bledsoe, was indicted on one count of premeditated murder, one count of felony murder, one count of especially aggravated robbery, and three counts of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. After a jury trial, the appellant was acquitted of all charges except for the firearm possession charges. The trial court nolle prossed two of the firearm charges and sentenced the appellant to four years as a Range II multiple offender for the remaining conviction.  After the denial of a motion for new trial, the appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court committed plain error by failing to instruct the jury on the defense of duress. We agree and reverse and remand the judgment of the trial court.

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensaton
Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. §50-6-225(e)(3) for
hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this
appeal, the employee asserts the trial court erred in finding that the employee's back surgery and
resulting disability were not causally related to the February 28, 2002, work injury. We conclude that the evidence presented supports the findings of the trial judge and, in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated §50-6-225(e)(2), affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Terrell L. Robinson, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In this appeal of right, he asserts that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered and that he did not receive the effective assistance of counsel. The judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed

This appeal stems from the change of a nine-year-old child's custody. The child was removed from his mother's custody after animal control officers, responding to complaints of animal abuse, discovered deplorable conditions in her home caused by a menagerie of cats. The father filed a petition for change of custody in the Chancery Court for Rutherford County. Following a bench trial, the court granted the father's petition and designated him as the primary residential parent. We agree with the trial court that there was a material change in circumstances warranting modification of the initial custody determination and that it is in the child's best interests for the father to be the primary residential parent.

Defendant, Marlon Orlando Walls, was indicted on one count of first degree felony murder, one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, and one count of second degree murder. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree felony murder and especially aggravated kidnapping, and found not guilty of second degree murder. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment for the felony murder conviction and fifteen years for the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction. The trial court ordered Defendant's sentences to be served concurrently, and Defendant does not challenge the length or manner of service of his sentences. Defendant was granted a delayed appeal. In his appeal, Defendant argues (1) that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; (2) that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on facilitation; (3) that the trial court erred in not declaring a mistrial; (4) that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the natural and probable consequences rule; and (5) that the trial court erred in not allowing into evidence proof that when the victim possessed the handgun, the victim was violating the terms/conditions of his community corrections sentence. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the trial court's judgments.

The defendant, Bowman Robert Russell, appeals from his Loudon County Criminal Court jury verdict resulting in a conviction of driving while under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI), third offense. The single issue on appeal is whether the convicting evidence is sufficient to support the conviction. Because it is, we affirm the judgment of the criminal court.

The petitioner, Joey Lee Smith, appeals from the circuit court's summary dismissal of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review of the parties' briefs and applicable law, we affirm the court's dismissal of the petition.

After fourteen years of marriage, Donita Dale Dowden ("Wife") sued Ronald J. Feibus ("Husband") for a divorce. After trial, the Trial Court entered its Final Decree, inter alia, awarding Wife a divorce, dividing the parties' marital property, and ordering Husband to pay Wife alimony in futuro of $1,000 per month. Husband appeals claiming that the Trial Court erred in awarding Wife alimony in futuro instead of rehabilitative alimony, in awarding Wife 50% of Husband's federal pension when a portion of that pension was earned prior to the marriage, and in dividing an award that Husband received from a personal injury lawsuit. We affirm.

Inmate filed a petition for certiorari contesting his housing placement while incarcerated at WTSP.  The trial court dismissed the petition under the doctrine of mootness in view of the fact that inmate, during the course of the proceedings below was incarcerated at another penal institute. The trial court further  determined that the placement in housing was an administrative decision by the prison authorities and Petitioner’s rights were not violated by their decision. We affirm the dismissal under the doctrine of mootness.

The petitioner, Randall Carver, pled guilty in the Sumner County Criminal Court to one count of attempted especially aggravated kidnapping and aggravated assault. He received a total effective sentence of eight years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Lake County Circuit Court. The habeas corpus court denied the petition, and the petitioner now appeals. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we remand the case to the habeas corpus court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

We granted permission to appeal these cases and then consolidated them to determine a question common to both: whether the admission at trial of an unavailable witness’s “excited utterance” to law enforcement officers at the crime scene violated the defendant’s right to confront witnesses against him. We conclude that—depending on the particular facts of a case—an excited utterance can be “testimonial.” If the statement is determined to be “testimonial,” then under Sixth Amendment analysis as outlined in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), and under Article I, Section 9 of the Tennessee Constitution, which guarantees the defendant’s right to “meet the witnesses face to face,” it is inadmissible unless the witness was unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination. If the statement is not testimonial, then admissibility is governed by the standards of Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). We reverse the Court of Criminal Appeals in State v.Maclin and dismiss charges against the defendant for reckless aggravated assault; we affirm the lower court’s conviction in State v. Anderson of the defendant for burglary of a building other than a habitation.

The plaintiff sought workers' compensation benefits for both cognitive impairment and a disfiguring scar resulting from a work-related accident. We conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court's conclusion that the plaintiff did not suffer cognitive impairment as a result of the accident. With regard to the benefits for disfigurement, the trial court erred in calculating benefits as an award to the body as a whole pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-207(3)(F) (1999). Injuries for disfigurement are instead governed by Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-207(3)(E) (1999), which limits the benefits for disfigurement to 200 weeks. Because the plaintiff's disfigurement may not be classified as an injury to the body as a whole, the trial court erred in limiting the award to two and one-half times the impairment rating as set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(a)(1) (1999). After an independent review of the evidence, we conclude that the evidence supports a vocational disability of 20% due to the disfigurement. Accordingly, the trial court's judgment is affirmed as modified, and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Following a revocation hearing, the trial court revoked the probation of Defendant, John Allen, Jr., and ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. In his appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in finding that he had violated the terms of his probation, and in revoking his probation and ordering that the sentence be served by incarceration. After a review of this matter, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Joseph Brown, pled guilty in the Shelby County Criminal Court to facilitation of first degree murder and two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping. The trial court sentenced him to fifteen years for each conviction and ordered that the sentences be served concurrently.  Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming that he did not knowing, intelligently, and voluntarily enter his guilty pleas. The post-conviction court denied relief.  Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we must dismiss the petitioner’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

The trial court determined a material change of circumstances had occurred which warranted modification of the parties’ child visitation scheduled. Father appeals. We affirm.

The petitioner was convicted of one count of aggravated rape, two counts of aggravated kidnapping, two counts of aggravated burglary, and one count of sexual battery and received an effective sentence of eighty-four years as a multiple offender. His convictions were affirmed and his sentence was reduced to eighty years on direct appeal by this court. State v. Andrea Spencer, No. W2002-01483-CCA-R3-CD, 2003 WL 22204526, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 18, 2003), perm. to appeal denied (Tenn. Jan. 5, 2004). On February 24, 2004, he filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief.  Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, the petitioner argues that he was denied effective assistance at trial because his counsel failed to properly investigate and prepare the defense. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Eric Fields, was convicted of the following offenses and received the following concurrent sentences: aggravated robbery of Yousef Nahhas, a Class B felony, twelve years; conspiracy to possess more than three hundred grams of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver, a Class A felony, twenty-five years; attempted second degree murder of Officer Dariet Wallace, a Class B felony, twelve years; aggravated robbery of Officer Wallace, a Class B felony, twelve years; and unlawful possession of a handgun, a Class E felony, two years. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range I, standard offender, for his conspiracy drug conviction, and as a Range II, multiple offender, for his remaining convictions. The convictions were the result of a jury trial, and the total effective sentence of twenty-five years was the result of a negotiated agreement of the parties done in lieu of a sentencing determination by the trial court. In his appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Tyrus A. Rogers, appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief from his conviction for attempted second degree murder. Because the petitioner has failed to allege a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief, we affirm the denial of the petition.

In this quo warranto action contesting annexation by the City, the Trial Could held landowners were not entitled to a jury trial and they had the burden of proof to contest in the annexation. Following trial, the Court held landowners had carried the burden of proof to invalidate the annexation. On appeal, we affirm the Trial Court's preliminary rulings, but reverse the invalidation of the annexation.

This appeal involves the imposition of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 11 sanctions against a lawyer. The lawyer filed a civil rights suit in the Circuit Court for Davidson County against five state judges seeking monetary damages to punish the judges for their judicial actions in a prior case. The judges filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) motion to dismiss and a motion for sanctions under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 11. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss and later imposed monetary and other sanctions against the lawyer. The lawyer insists on this appeal that the trial court erred by imposing Tenn. R. Civ. P. 11 sanctions against him. We have determined that the Tenn. R. Civ. P. 11 sanctions fashioned by the trial court are carefully tailored and are clearly warranted by the lawyer's conduct.

This matter is before the Court upon the State's motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court by memorandum opinion pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petitioner has appealed the trial court's order summarily dismissing the petition for the writ of habeas corpus. In that petition, the petitioner alleges that his judgment was void and that his sentence was illegal. Upon a review of the record in this case we are persuaded that the trial court was correct in summarily dismissing the habeas corpus petition and that this case meets the criteria for affirmance pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Defendant in this divorce case appeals asserting that the trial court erred in failing to treat his admittedly untimely Motion for a New Trial and to Alter and Amend the Divorce Decree as a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60 Motion. We affirm the action of the trial court.

Petitioner, William T. Yelton, filed a petition for habeas corpus relief attacking his Bedford County theft of property conviction. The trial court dismissed the petition without an evidentiary hearing. Petitioner has appealed, and the State has filed a motion pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals to affirm the judgment of the trial court. Finding the motion to have merit, we grant same and affirm the judgment of the trial court.