APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Petitioner, Ernie Lynnwood Eaton, filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, as amended after the appointment of counsel, alleging that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with the negotiation and entry of Petitioner's plea of guilty to three counts of the sale of less than 0.5 grams of cocaine, a Class C felony. Petitioner also alleged that his effective sentence of four years and six months violates the provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-211(1) and is therefore illegal. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied Petitioner’s petition. In his appeal, Petitioner challenges only the post-conviction court’s finding that Petitioner’s sentence was authorized by law. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Johnny Dee Roberts, appeals from the Davidson County Criminal Court's dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, in which the petitioner had attacked his 2002 convictions of aggravated rape and aggravated sexual battery. The post-conviction court determined that (1) the petitioner failed to establish either the deficient performance of trial counsel or that he was prejudiced by the actions of counsel and that (2) the issue of prosecutorial misconduct had been previously determined on direct appeal. Because the record supports the post-conviction court's ruling, we affirm the denial of relief.

In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether the chancery court erred when it modified the original custody order between the parties. Appellant contends that there are no material changes of circumstances to warrant modification of the original custody order. We affirm.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Anthony D. Brown, was convicted of one count of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and one count of carrying a knife with the intent to go armed, a Class C misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced Defendant to fifteen years for his aggravated burglary conviction and thirty days for his misdemeanor conviction. Defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the convicting evidence or the trial court’s sentencing determinations. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in not declaring a mistrial pursuant to Rule 31(d) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure when one of the jurors indicated to the trial court that she did not agree with the verdicts after the jury had been polled and discharged. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is an appeal as of right from the denial of post-conviction relief. The Petitioner, Mark Medley, was convicted of one count of rape of a child pursuant to a guilty plea. He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to fifteen years imprisonment. The Petitioner now appeals denial of his petition for post-conviction relief raising the single issue of ineffective assistance of counsel. He argues that his trial counsel's failure to inform him that the charge to which he pled guilty may have been time-barred amounted to deficient representation which resulted in prejudice to him. We reverse the post-conviction court's conclusions of law regarding the statute of limitations applicable to this case and remand for further findings of fact pertaining to the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

The defendant, Freddie Eugene Asbury, appeals the Sullivan County Criminal Court's order revoking his probation. On appeal, the defendant claims that although he violated his probation, the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his probation and ordering him to serve his sentence in confinement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal stems from a declaratory judgment action determining the rights of the parties to a life insurance contract. On appeal, the insurer asserts that the chancery court erred when it found that the agent for the insureds was acting outside the course and scope of her authority when she terminated the life insurance contract. Further, the insurer asserts that, even assuming that the agent was acting outside the course and scope of her authority, the insureds ratified her actions. We reverse and declare that the insurance policywas not in effect at the time of Mr. Puckett’s death. We remand for a determination of whether Ms. Puckett’s actions constituted a violation of section 56-53-103 of the Tennessee Code, and if so, the related expenses the insurer is entitled to receive pursuant to section 56-53-103.

The petitioner appeals the Roane County Criminal Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for first degree premeditated murder and resulting life sentence. He contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial attorney (1) failed to file a motion to suppress his statement to police; (2) failed to schedule a hearing to set bond; (3) failed to obtain a second psychological evaluation for him; and (4) failed to file a motion for change of venue. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal involves an employment dispute. Following his termination, the employee filed suit against his former employer in the Circuit Court for Williamson County alleging retaliatory discharge, breach of contract, and conversion. The trial court directed a verdict for the employer at the close of the employee's case-in-chief, and the employee appealed. We have determined that the trial court's decision to grant a directed verdict was proper.

Appellant Bruce Goodman ("Husband") filed for divorce from Appellee Judy Goodman ("Wife") after twenty-six years of marriage. The parties entered into a permanent parenting plan and subsequently went to trial seeking a property settlement and a decree on spousal support. The trial court awarded each party approximately $1.4 million from the marital estate and also granted Wife $4,000 per month in alimony in futuro. Husband appeals the alimony award. We affirm.

William M. Hensley and Mary Hensley ("Plaintiffs") sued Robert Carrier ("Defendant") regarding the use of a driveway. The case was tried without a jury and the Trial Court found and held that it was the intent of the original grantors that the driveway be a joint driveway; that if this holding was incorrect, that the Plaintiffs had established a right to the driveway through adverse possession; that if the prior two holdings were incorrect, that Plaintiffs had proven a prescriptive easement or an implied easement to use the driveway. Defendant appeals claiming that the Trial Court erred in finding a prescriptive easement or an implied easement, and also that the Trial Court erred in not dismissing Plaintiffs' claims based upon the statute of limitations. We affirm.

The Cocke County grand jury indicted the defendant, Joshua Parker, on one count of aggravated sexual battery. Following a jury trial, the defendant was found guilty as charged. He was sentenced to twelve years to be served at 100% as a Range II multiple offender. The defendant appeals this conviction. He argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct in its closing argument. We have determined that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for aggravated sexual battery. Therefore, we reverse and dismiss the judgment of conviction for that offense. However, the evidence is sufficient to support a conviction for attempt to commit aggravated sexual battery and we therefore reduce the conviction to that of attempted aggravated sexual battery, and remand for entry of judgment to that effect and re-sentencing.

A Sullivan County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Robert Lee Roberts, of driving under the influence (DUI), and the trial court sentenced him to eleven months and twenty-nine days, suspending all but six months of the sentence. On appeal, the defendant contends the evidence is insufficient. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Dyer County Grand Jury indicted the defendant for attempting to obtain a controlled substance by misrepresentation fraud, forgery, deception or subterfuge. Following a jury trial on July 28, 2004, the defendant was found guilty as charged. The trial court sentenced the defendant to four years as a Range II multiple offender. The defendant filed a notice of appeal. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction and that the trial court erred in allowing the prosecution to cross-examine her regarding her prior convictions contrary to Rule 609 of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence. We find that there was sufficient evidence and the trial court did not err in allowing the entry of the prior convictions into evidence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Lamario Sumner, was convicted bya Shelby County jury of two counts of aggravated robbery and received an effective forty-year sentence. On appeal, Sumner has raised five issues for our review: (1) whether Sumner’s prior conviction for aggravated robbery was admissible for impeachment purposes; (2) whether the trial court erred by precluding examination of the police investigator regarding exculpatory statements made by Sumner; (3) whether the elements of a prior felony conviction, introduced solely for purposes of impeachment, may be developed through examination of the witness; (4) whether the trial court properly responded to a jury question regarding criminal responsibility; and (5) whether the evidence is sufficient to support the convictions. After review of the record, we find no error and affirm the convictions.

While I concur in most of the majority opinion, I write separately to express my disagreement with a portion of the analysis by the majority. Specifically, I am not comfortable with the analysis pertaining to the trial court’s order requiring DNA testing.

The State appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s grant of post-conviction relief to the Petitioner, Tommy Nunley. In February 1998, Nunley was convicted by a Shelby County jury of aggravated rape and was sentenced to twenty-five years imprisonment. A petition for post-conviction relief was filed alleging grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. Nunley’s principal claim asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to seek state-funded expert assistance for “DNA testing of specimens collected” by the police. At the conclusion of one of the several hearings conducted by the post-conviction court, the court, on its own motion, directed DNA testing of biological specimens shown to be in the custody of the State. The court was subsequently informed that the specimens had been “misplaced and/or destroyed.” Upon learning of this fact, the post-conviction court granted Nunley’s petition for post-conviction relief concluding “that said evidence could and should have been tested at the time of [Nunley’s] trial, and that because said evidence has been lost and/or destroyed, petitioner’s constitutional right to a fair trial was violated.” Because we conclude that the proof fails to establish prejudice under the standards of Strickland v. Washington, the grant of post-conviction relief is reversed, and the judgment of conviction is reinstated.

The petitioner, Leonard Maysonet, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court's summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for carjacking, a Class B felony, and kidnapping, a Class C felony, and resulting concurrent sentences of twelve years in the Department of Correction. He claims the trial court erred in finding his petition was time-barred by the one-year statute of limitations. He asserts that Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), announced a new rule of constitutional law requiring retroactive application to his case. We affirm the trial court's summary dismissal of the petition.

The trial court modified the parties’ decree of divorce, changing custody of parties’ minor child from joint custody to Father, and transferred control of a custodial account from Mother to Father. The trial court also denied Mother’s petition to set visitation and ordered Mother to have no contact with child. Mother appeals. We vacate the trial court’s order regarding visitation and the award of attorney’s fees and remand on these issues. The remainder of the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

The petitioner, Ben Mills, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his first degree murder, aggravated robbery, and attempted first degree murder convictions, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to request a jury instruction on voluntary intoxication. Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the petitioner has failed to meet his burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence that he was prejudiced as a result of any alleged deficiency in counsel’s representation. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of the petition for post-conviction relief.

Plaintiff appeals from failure of the trial court to allow interest on a child support arrearage judgment pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-5-101(A)(5). The judgment of the trial court is reversed.

The defendant, Currie Lee Byrd, pled guilty to arson and vandalism over $60,000 and was sentenced to concurrent terms of three years and eight years, respectively, to be served under the supervision of a community corrections program after serving 140 days in jail. He reserved as a certified question of law whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statements. Following our review, we concur with the trial court’s determination that the motion to suppress was without merit.

The appellant, Joe Mac Pearson, was convicted by a jury in the Marshall County Circuit Court of selling a Schedule II controlled substance, namely oxycodone, and he received a sentence of ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction and the sentence imposed. Upon our review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a divorce case. Husband appeals the trial court’s division of marital property, award alimony in futuro to Wife, naming of Wife as primary residential parent, and child support order. We affirm.

Mr. Chatman was a policeman in Chattanooga. He was fired on September 15, 2003 for untruthfulness during an investigation, and for conduct unbecoming a police officer. He appealed to the Chattanooga City Council which upheld his dismissal. His petition for certiorari was denied and he appeals. We affirm.