APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Petitioner, Ronald Dennis Crafton, appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to reopen his petition for post-conviction petition. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court dismiss the above-captioned appeal, or in the alternative, affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Because Petitioner has failed to properly invoke this Court’s jurisdiction, the above-captioned appeal is dismissed.

The appellant, Jarrod Johnston Slaughter, was convicted by a jury in the Madison County Circuit Court of driving under the influence (DUI), third offense. He received a sentence of eleven months, and twenty-nine days, with 208 days to be served in confinement. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction and the length of confinement imposed by the trial court. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Tammy Hopkins Lindsay ("Mother") and Dwight Kelley Lindsay ("Father") were divorced in December of 2000, but have returned to court numerous times since then. Most of the post-divorce controversy centers around the amount of Father's child support payment and the arrearages which have accrued since the divorce. After the most recent hearing, the Trial Court entered a detailed order resolving competing petitions filed by the parties. The only issue in this appeal concerns that portion of the Trial Court's order which requires Father to pay an additional $50 each time he fails to exercise co-parenting time on a weekend, and an additional $25 for each day that he fails to exercise co-parenting time on a holiday or during the summer. We vacate only this particular portion of the Trial Court's Order, and affirm the order as so modified.

This application for an interlocutory appeal concerns the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court for Rutherford County to consider a mother’s appeal from a decision of the Rutherford County Juvenile Court changing custody to the father. The Circuit Court denied the father’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, but granted mother permission to appeal pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 9. We concur with the Circuit Court that this is an appropriate case for an interlocutory appeal. Because the Juvenile Court’s decision does not arise out of a dependant or neglect proceeding, the appeal of the Juvenile Court’s order lies to this court rather than the Circuit Court. Accordingly, we vacate the Circuit Court’s order and remand the case to the Circuit Court with directions to transfer the appeal to this court.¹

This primary issue on appeal is whether Dwight Kelley Lindsay ("Mr. Lindsay") was properly advised of his constitutional right to counsel before being found guilty on twelve counts of criminal contempt for his failure to pay court ordered child support and health insurance reimbursement payments. All parties to this appeal now agree that Mr. Lindsay was not adequately advised of his right to counsel. The judgment of the Trial Court finding Mr. Lindsay in criminal contempt is vacated.

The Petitioner, Eric Glover, appeals the lower court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner is procedurally barred from pursuing appellate review of the lower court’s denial of post-conviction relief. Accordingly, the above-captioned appeal is dismissed.

On April 15, 1998, the Putnam County Grand Jury indicted Defendant, James Thomas Manning, on one count of aggravated burglary, two counts of aggravated rape, one count of attempted aggravated sexual battery, and one count of aggravated robbery. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of aggravated rape, a Class A felony, and one count of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony. The jury acquitted Defendant of attempted aggravated sexual battery and could not reach a verdict on the aggravated robbery charge. Defendant received concurrent twenty-five year sentences for each of the aggravated rape convictions, and a consecutive six year sentence for the aggravated burglary conviction, for an effective thirty-one year sentence. These sentences were ordered to be served consecutively to a prior sentence out of Sumner County being served by Defendant at the time of trial and sentencing. In his appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by (1) denying his motion to strike expert testimony for failure to lay a proper foundation; (2) excluding evidence that the victim had pending charges for aggravated assault; (3) violating double jeopardy principles in allowing Defendant to be convicted of two counts of aggravated rape; and (4) imposing consecutive sentences. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Cedric Davis aka Cedric Booker, appeals from the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, he argues that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received the effective assistance of counsel. Following our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, including the petitioner’s reply brief, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Jamie Emerson New, was convicted of aggravated sexual battery and sentenced to eight years of incarceration. On appeal, he contends that; (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction, and (2) the two child witnesses who testified against him were not competent to testify. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The plaintiff brought this action against her former employer, alleging that the defendant terminated her employment in retaliation for her pursuit of a claim for workers' compensation benefits. The trial court granted the defendant summary judgment, holding that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge and that she also failed to rebut the defendant's proffered legitimate reason for termination. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict and the denial of alternative sentencing. Following our review, we conclude that the evidence presented was sufficient to support the jury's verdicts and that the denial of alternative sentencing was justified given the defendant's lengthy history of criminal activity and the inability of probation to deter him from such conduct. Therefore, we affirm the convictions and sentences.

The Defendant, Willie J. Simmons, was convicted of rape and sexual battery. The Defendant received an effective eight year sentence in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Erika Louise Bunkley Patrick, appeals the post-conviction court’s dismissal of her petition for post-conviction relief in which she alleged that her pleas of guilty were not voluntarily and knowingly entered into and that her trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in the negotiation and entry of her pleas. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Amy Lynelle Gardner appeals the post-divorce modification of child support provisions.  Father, Richard Wendell Gardner, petitioned the court for modifications claiming the child support provisions were unconscionable, in part due to the fact the parties used one attorney for the divorce proceedings from which the child support provisions emanate. The trial court found Father was not properly represented and that certain provisions were unconscionable. As a result, the trial court relieved Father of the contractual obligation to pay support for a child past majority, required that Mother apply her state employee discount to the child’s college tuition, and awarded Father the tax deduction for the years he paid tuition. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court.

In this action arising from a vehicular accident, the issues presented are whether the trial court erred in allowing into evidence deposition testimony of a Defendant pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 32.01, and whether the amount of the jury verdict was supported by material evidence. We hold the trial court did not err in its discretionary decision to admit the deposition testimony, and that there is material evidence supporting the duly approved jury verdict. Consequently, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Kristi Dance Oakes, stands charged in the Sevier County Circuit Court with one count of statutory rape. The district attorney general denied her application for pretrial diversion, an action upheld by the trial court upon certiorari review of that decision. The defendant obtained an interlocutory appeal from this court via Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 10. Following our review, we vacate the order upholding the denial of pretrial diversion and remand the case to the trial court.

This is an appeal as of right from the summary dismissal of a petition for post-conviction relief. The trial court dismissed the amended post-conviction petition because the court found the petition was not verified under oath and failed to include the factual basis upon which relief was sought. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Barnes & Robinson Co., Inc. filed this action against two related companies claiming breach of contract, failure to negotiate in good faith, and promissory estoppel. The claims arise from negotiations pursuant to two letters of intent and subsequent representations upon which Barnes & Robinson contends it relied to its detriment. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss contending Barnes & Robinson failed to state any claims upon which relief could be granted, which the trial court granted. Barnes & Robinson appeals. Finding no error, we affirm.

The defendant, Efrain Murillo Ramirez, who is serving an eight-year Department of Correction sentence for a Greene County Criminal Court jury conviction of possession of one-half or more grams of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver, appeals and challenges the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress the cocaine seized from his automobile. Because the suppression issue has been waived by the failure to file a timely motion for new trial, the judgment is affirmed.

Pfizer, Inc. challenges the assessment of the additional rate of business tax under Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-4-709(b)(2)(B). It contends the sales in question, which were from one wholesaler to another wholesaler, were not within the definition of “wholesale sales” as the term is defined in Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-4-702(a)(19), and thus not subject to the additional business tax. The State of Tennessee contends sales, whether a “sale at retail” or a “sale at wholesale,” are taxable pursuant to the percentages set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-4-709(b)(2)(B). The facts are not disputed. Based upon a statutory interpretation, we find sales from one wholesaler to another wholesaler are not subject to the additional business tax under Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-4-709(b)(2)(B).

This appeal arises from a custody dispute involving an eleven-year-old boy. After the parties agreed to end their marriage, the father filed a complaint for divorce in November 2001 in the Chancery Court for Cheatham County. In addition to the complaint, the father filed a marital dissolution agreement and a parenting plan designating the mother as the primary residential parent. The child remained in the mother's custody until October 2002 when the trial court awarded the father temporary custody of the child. Following a hearing in July 2003, the trial court entered an order in September 2003 declaring the parties divorced and designating the father as the primary residential parent. The mother has appealed. Despite the father's conduct following the parties' separation, we have concluded that the trial court's decision to designate him as the child's primary residential parent does not fall outside the spectrum of rulings that might reasonably result from a correct application of the governing law to the facts established by the evidence in this case. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

A Sevier County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, Bruce E. Olson, of rape of a child, a class A felony, and the trial court sentenced him to serve twenty years at one hundred percent in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient, that the trial court erred in not excluding the defendant's statement to police based upon the state's delay in providing him a redacted copy, and that the state violated his right to due process by withholding exculpatory evidence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Mark Griffin, appeals from the Anderson County Criminal Court's dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, through which he had challenged his conviction of first degree felony murder. On appeal, the petitioner claims that ineffective assistance of trial counsel and certain due process violations invalidate his convictions. We disagree and affirm.

The petitioner, Thomas Alvin Carter, appeals from the Monroe County Criminal Court's dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from his guilty plea to theft over $500 but less than $1000, a Class E felony. He contends that his guilty plea was unknowing and involuntary and that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This workers compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Worker’s Compensation
Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-225 (e)(3) for hearing and
reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the
employer asserts the trial court erred in finding that the employee suffered permanent, total
disability as a result of an injury, which occurred on April 15, 1993, during the course of his
employment with Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company. We conclude that the evidence presented supports the findings of the trial judge and, in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated §50-6-225(e)(2), affirm the judgment of the trial court.