APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, Chuncy L. Hollis, originally pled guilty to possession of cocaine greater than .5 grams with intent to sell, a Class B felony, in exchange for a sentence of eight years. Thereafter, he filed and was denied post-conviction relief. The petitioner now appeals the post-conviction court’s order, claiming that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel which resulted in an unknowing and involuntary plea.

The defendant, Johnny E. Porter, was convicted of possession of over .5 grams of a Schedule II controlled substance (cocaine) with intent to sell, a Class B felony, and possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor. He received concurrent sentences of nine years and eleven months, twenty-nine days on the charges, respectively. On appeal, the defendant contests the sufficiency of the evidence and contends that the trial court erred in enhancing his sentence on Count One from eight years to nine years based solely upon his prior criminal record. Upon review, we affirm the conviction and sentence.

The defendant, Tammy Marie Wilburn, pled guilty to one count of attempted aggravated arson, a Class B felony. The Blount County Circuit Court sentenced her to an eight-year sentence as a Range I, standard offender to be served in the Department of Correction. The defendant appeals, contending the trial court erred in denying her alternative sentencing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The plaintiff sought workers’ compensation benefits for pain in her lower back and hip resulting from a work-related accident. We conclude that the Commissioner erred in finding the evidence insufficient to establish that the plaintiff’s injury was permanent and in dismissing the plaintiff’s claim. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Claims Commission and remand the case to determine the extent of vocational impairment and the reasonableness and necessity of medical expenses paid by the plaintiff.

Following his convictions for two disciplinary infractions, the prisoner filed a pro se petition for a common law writ of certiorari in the chancery court. While he attempted to verify the petition by stating that it constituted his first application for such writ and that its contents were true and correct to the best of his knowledge, the prisoner failed to swear to the contents of the petition under oath by having the petition notarized. The Tennessee Department of Correction moved to dismiss the petition for its lack of a proper verification and for being filed beyond the applicable statute of limitations. The trial court granted the state’s motion on both grounds. The prisoner filed a pro se appeal to this Court. We affirm.

Billy Suddarth, Jr. and Angela Suddarth appeal the summary dismissal of their action, which was dismissed on the grounds of res judicata, collateral estoppel, the Full Faith and Credit Clause, and the compulsory counterclaim rule of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In the former action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois wherein the Suddarths were defendants, Household Commercial Financial Services, Inc. alleged the Suddarths breached a guaranty agreement by failing to pay a deficiency owing on the underlying credit agreement they had guaranteed. Household prevailed on the merits in the former action against the Suddarths. In the present action in the Circuit Court of Davidson County the Suddarths allege fraud, fraudulent inducement and civil conspiracy against Household and two other defendants concerning the guaranty agreement that was the subject of the former action in the United State District Court. The present claims by the Suddarths arose out of the same transaction or occurrence that was the subject of Household's action in the United State District Court; therefore, it was compulsory that the Suddarths' claims be presented in the former action. The Suddarths failed to do so. Therefore, we affirm the dismissal of this action.

The Defendant, Shirley A. Rudd, was convicted by an Obion County jury of sale of a controlled substance. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that: (1) the trial court erred when it did not declare a mistrial because two witnesses made improper and prejudicial statements about the Defendant’s prior bad acts; (2) there was insufficient evidence to support her conviction; and (3) the trial court erred when it denied the Defendant’s counsel the right to question a witness about her motive for testifying. Finding that there exists no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

David Randal Smithson ("Father"), a Tennessee resident, is a pilot for a major airline and his job duties require him to fly to Bolivia, South America. During one of these trips to Bolivia, Father became romantically involved with Marie Soledad Torrico (Morales) ("Mother"), a citizen and resident of Bolivia. In April of 2001, Mother gave birth in Bolivia to the parties' son, who is a citizen and resident of Bolivia and has been since his birth. After obtaining a temporary Visa authorizing her to come to the United States, Mother filed this paternity action in the Wilson County Juvenile Court. Based on DNA test results, the Juvenile Court enter an Order establishing Father as the biological father of the child. The Juvenile Court later entered an order requiring Father to pay child support based on the Tennessee Child Support Guidelines. Father appeals claiming, among other things, that the Juvenile Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter an order requiring him to pay child support when the child was conceived in Bolivia, born in Bolivia, and when both Mother and the child are citizens and residents of Bolivia. We hold that the Juvenile Court had subject matter jurisdiction over the proceedings but erred in applying Tennessee law. The judgment of the Juvenile Court is, therefore, vacated and this case is remanded for further proceedings.

The State appeals the Knox County Criminal Court's dismissal of a presentment charging the defendant, Bradley Noble, with the rape of a five-year-old child at a day care center. The presentment charged the defendant, a former employee of the center, with digitally penetrating the victim's anus on an unspecified day in March 1999. In a subsequent bill of particulars, the State narrowed the time of the offense to between 3:20 and 5:29 p.m. on March 10, 1999. During the defendant's first trial, which ended in a mistrial, defense counsel revealed in opening arguments that he intended to prove that the defendant had not been alone with the victim during the time alleged in the bill of particulars. Following the mistrial, the State filed a "Superceding Bill of Particulars," which reverted back to the general time frame of the presentment. The defendant moved to dismiss the presentment, and the trial court granted the motion. We reverse the order of the trial court, reinstate the presentment, and remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The defendant pled guilty to driving while under court order not to operate a motor vehicle because he had been declared an habitual motor offender. The trial court sentenced the defendant to six years as a Career Offender. The defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in not granting him probation and in sentencing him as a career offender. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a termination of parental rights case. Mother/Appellant appeals from the order of the Juvenile Court at Madison County terminating her parental rights. Specifically, Appellant asserts that the ground of persistence of conditions is not supported by clear and convincing evidence in the record, and that termination of her parental rights is not in the best interest of the minor child.  Because we find clear and convincing evidence in the record to support the trial court's findings, we affirm.

Joan Oates (“Plaintiff”) was employed by the Chattanooga Publishing Company (“Defendant”) for approximately twenty-three years. In January of 2004, Plaintiff was observed on Defendant’s security camera making obscene gestures with her middle finger toward the camera and then covering the security camera with a cup for a period of time. Defendant terminated Plaintiff’s employment. Plaintiff filed this lawsuit alleging that she was terminated because of a disability. Plaintiff also claimed that she was subjected to a hostile work environment and malicious harassment while employed by Defendant. Plaintiff also sued for intentional and/or negligent infliction of emotional distress. The Trial Court granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on all of Plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff appeals, and we affirm.

The petitioner, Jonathan Ellis, appeals pro se from the Johnson County Criminal Court's dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief from his convictions for thirteen counts of aggravated rape, a Class A felony, and resulting sentences of twenty-five years on each conviction to be served concurrently as a Range I, standard offender in the Department of Correction. He claims his judgments of conviction are void because they classify his release eligibility status at thirty percent in violation of statute. We conclude that four of the sentences are illegal. Therefore, we affirm the trial court's judgment in part, reverse the judgment in part, and remand the case.

The petitioner, Victor Thompson, appeals the denial of habeas corpus relief contending that: (1) his sentence was outside the applicable range and was, therefore, illegal; and (2) that the indictment was fatally defective. Upon review, we conclude that the defendant’s sentence was within the agreed range and that the remaining issue is waived, as it is raised for the first time on appeal. Therefore, we affirm the denial of habeas relief in accordance with Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Following a bench trial, the Defendant, Terrance Yves Smothers, was convicted by the Montgomery County Circuit Court of aggravated robbery, misdemeanor theft, and two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping. The Defendant received an effective twenty-year sentence for these convictions. The single issue presented for our review is whether the testimony of the accomplice was sufficiently corroborated. After a review of the record, we find that the evidence is insufficient to corroborate the accomplice's testimony and, therefore, reverse and dismiss the judgments of conviction.

Petitioner, Leonard Masonet, filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging that the length of his sentence contravened the Criminal Sentencing Reform Act of 1989 and was therefore void. The trial court summarily denied the petition without an evidentiary hearing, and Petitioner now appeals. After a review of the record, we affirm the trial court's dismissal of Petitioner's petition for writ of habeas corpus.

A Roane County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Dennis D. Plemons, Sr., of driving under the influence, a Class A misdemeanor, and the trial court sentenced him to eleven months and twenty-nine days with all but five days suspended. On appeal, the defendant contends the evidence is insufficient. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

An Anderson County Criminal Court jury convicted the appellant, Adam F. Wester, of first degree felony murder in the perpetration of aggravated child abuse, and the trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment. The appellant appeals, claiming (1) that the trial court erred by allowing the jury to hear about prior injuries to the victim; (2) that the trial court improperly admitted into evidence photographs of the victim's body; (3) that the trial court improperly instructed the jury on the mens rea element of the crime; (4) that the trial court erred by refusing to give a special jury instruction on "accident"; (5) that the trial court erred by giving sequential jury instructions; and (6) that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Shelby County terminated the employment of Eric Thomas and James Stroud. Upon writ or certiorari, the Shelby County Chancery Court reversed, and Shelby County appeals. We reverse.

The petitioner, Bruce M. Vann, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, contending that the trial court erred in finding that counsel rendered effective assistance at trial.  Upon review, we conclude that the sole issue raised by the petitioner on appeal has been waived for failure to support it with argument or citations to the appellate record. Therefore, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief, pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

An Anderson County grand jury indicted the defendant, Shannon A. Holladay, for one count of vehicular homicide by intoxication, a Class B felony, and one count of vehicular homicide by recklessness, a Class C felony. Before trial, the defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the air bag sensor module in the defendant’s car, which the Anderson County Criminal Court granted. The state appeals, contending that the trial court erred in granting the defendant’s motion to suppress. We dismiss this case for lack of jurisdiction.

The Petitioner, Lorenzo Porter, appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to reopen his postconviction or, in the alternative, requesting habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner has not established that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief. Moreover, this Court is not vested with jurisdiction to entertain a request for an appeal of a denial of a motion to reopen a post-conviction petition. Accordingly, we grant the state's motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

In this appeal, T.M.B.K. ("Mother") contends that the trial court erred in terminating her parental rights and that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the initial child custody proceeding. After careful review of the evidence and applicable authorities, we hold that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction and the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court's finding by clear and convincing evidence of abandonment and substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan. We futher hold that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding by clear and convincing evidence of a failure to remedy persistent conditions. Therefore, we affirm in part and reverse in part.

This is an election contest. The plaintiffs were unsuccessful candidates for office in a municipal election held on May 19, 2005. On June 3, 2005, they filed this election contest. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the lawsuit based on the special ten-day statute of limitations for election contests, which is set out in T.C.A. § 2-17-105. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss. The plaintiffs now appeal. We reverse, concluding that, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 6.01, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays are excluded from the computation of the time in which the plaintiff must file suit.

The defendant, James H. Carter, pled guilty to two counts of burglary, Class D felonies; two counts of vandalism over $1,000 but less than $10,000,Class D felonies; and one count of resisting arrest a Class B misdemeanor. The trial court imposed Range I sentences of four years for each burglary, which were to be served consecutively, and four years for each vandalism, to be served concurrently. The six-month sentence for resisting arrest was also ordered to be served concurrently. The effective sentence is, therefore, eight years. In this appeal, the defendant asserts that the trial court erred by ordering his sentences for the two burglary convictions to be served consecutively. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed.