APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The appellants, Kaitlyn Calaway and Kathleen Calaway, have filed a petition to rehear the opinion of this Court issued December 9, 2005. In their petition, the appellants request that the Court give the decision in this case prospective application only. The appellants further request that the Court elaborate on certified questions one and two regarding the recovery of medical expenses where the statute of repose has not run on a minor’s claim.

Upon due consideration, we conclude that the appellants’ petition to rehear is well-taken and should be granted to the extent that it seeks prospective application of the Court’s decision. Accordingly, the Clerk of the Court is hereby directed to substitute and file the attached amended majority opinion in place of the original majority opinion. The petition to rehear is denied to the extent that it seeks further discussion of certified questions one and two.

Also before the Court are two motions filed by potential plaintiffs in an unrelated matter. Karen Crespo and Freddie Crespo have filed a motion for leave to appear as amicus curiae and a motion to file an amicus brief in excess of fifteen (15) pages. According to these motions, the Crespos are the parents of a minor child with a brain injury and are in the process of preparing a medical negligence suit. The Crespos urge the Court to rehear the opinion and allow them to brief the issues. After careful consideration, the Court is of the opinion that both of these motions filed by the Crespos should be denied.

Following a jury trial, Petitioner, Marty Dale Williams and his co-defendant, Daryl Lee Madden, were convicted of felony murder, especially aggravated robbery, and second degree murder. The trial court merged the second degree murder conviction with the felony murder conviction. Madden received an effective sentence of life plus 25 years; Petitioner received an effective sentence of life. On direct appeal, a panel of this court affirmed the judgments of the trial court. See State v. Madden, 99 S.W.3d 127 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2002). Petitioner filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief which the trial court subsequently denied after a hearing. Petitioner now appeals from the trial court's denial of post-conviction relief. In this appeal, Petitioner argues that the trial court erred in finding that Petitioner failed to establish that his trial counsel was per se ineffective and that trial counsel was ineffective under the totality of the circumstances. The judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

The appellants, Kaitlyn Calaway and Kathleen Calaway, filed a motion for rehearing of the opinion of this Court issued February 21, 2006. In their petition, the appellants request that the Court give prospective application of the newly announced rule to cases involving injuries occurring after December 9, 2005, rather than to cases commenced after this date.

Upon due consideration, we conclude that the appellants’ petition is not well-taken and should be denied.

Also before the Court is a motion to rehear filed by the appellee, Dr. Jodi Schucker. Appellee argues violation of her Due Process rights on two grounds: (1) that she was not given the opportunity to respond to the plaintiff’s motion to rehear on the matter of prospective application and (2) that prospective application of the new rule in a manner consistent with Due Process requires this Court to balance the appellant’s reliance interest on the old rule against the appellee’s vested property
interest in the new rule.

After careful consideration, the Court is of the opinion that this motion filed by the appellee should be denied.

Justices Anderson and Holder adhere to the views previously expressed in their previously filed dissent.

The husband appeals from a final decree of divorce challenging the award of divorce to the wife, the distribution of property, and the award of some property as alimony in solido to the wife. Because the husband raises factual issues and there is no transcript or statement of the evidence in the record, we must presume the record would have supported the factual findings of the trial court and accordingly affirm.

We granted review in this workers' compensation case to determine whether the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel erred in reducing the trial court's disability award from 33% to 3%. After reviewing the record and the applicable authority, we conclude that reduction of the trial court's award is appropriate. We further conclude, however, that we are unable to enter an appropriate award based on the record before us. We therefore remand to the trial court to enter an award consistent with this opinion.

A Coffee County jury convicted the Defendant, Willie R. Harris, Jr., of driving under the influence of alcohol ("DUI"). On appeal, he contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction; and (2) the trial court erred when it admitted the results his blood alcohol content test into evidence. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant is an inmate in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction. Appellant filed a Title 42 U.S.C. §1983 claim against the Appellee/Associate Warden and Appellee/Pre-Release Coordinator alleging a violation of the inmate’s civil rights arising from a change in inmate’s custody status. The trial court granted the Appellees’ Tenn. R. App. P. 12.02 Motion to Dismiss. Inmate appeals. We affirm.

The Appellant, Richard D. Wiggins, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief by the Davidson County Criminal Court. Wiggins pled guilty to attempted especially aggravated robbery and, as provided by the plea agreement, received an eight-year split confinement sentence requiring service of one year in the county jail followed by seven years probation. On appeal, Wiggins contends that his plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered due to trial counsel's ineffectiveness in: (1) failing to have Wiggins evaluated for mental competency; (2) failing to fully investigate the case; (3) advising Wiggins how to answer the trial court's questions during the plea colloquy; and (4) failing to fully explain the nature and consequences of his guilty plea. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

In this capital case, the defendant, William Glenn Rogers, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder, two counts of first degree felony murder, especially aggravated kidnapping, rape of a child, and two counts of criminal impersonation in connection with the 1996 abduction, rape, and murder of nine-year-old Jacqueline Beard. The trial court merged the felony murder convictions with the premeditated murder conviction. Based on four aggravating circumstances, the jury imposed a sentence of death for the murder. The trial court sentenced Rogers to an effective sentence of fortyeight years for the other convictions. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. On automatic appeal under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-206(a)(1), we designated the following issues for oral argument:¹ 1) whether the trial court erred in failing to suppress Rogers’ statements to law enforcement officers; 2) whether the trial court erred in supplementing the appellate record with mental health and social services records pertaining to the victim’s brother, Jeremy Beard; 3) whether the trial court violated Rogers’ constitutional rights by limiting cross-examination of Jeremy Beard; 4) whether the trial court committed harmful error in its instruction defining “intentionally”; 5) whether the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions for first degree murder, kidnapping, and rape; 6) whether the evidence is insufficient to support the aggravating circumstances; and 7) whether the sentence of death is disproportionate or invalid under the mandatory review of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-206(c)(1). Having carefully reviewed these issues and the remainder of the issues raised by Rogers, we conclude that they do not warrant relief. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The Appellant, Simon Avalos Villagomez, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, Villagomez argues that his guilty plea for felony possession of seventy pounds or more of marijuana for resale was not knowing and voluntary due to the ineffective assistance of counsel. After review of the record, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The defendant, James Wesley Martens, was convicted by a Humphreys County jury of aggravated robbery and evading arrest. The defendant was sentenced to concurrent sentences of fourteen years and three years, respectively, in the Tennessee Department of Correction as a Range II multiple offender. On appeal, the defendant challenges the trial court's denial of his request for a continuance and the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Following our review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Dorris Lee Markum, was indicted on two counts of aggravated burglary, two counts of arson and two counts of theft of property under five hundred dollars. After a jury trial, the appellant was convicted of all charges. As a result, he was sentenced as a Range II multiple offender to an effective sentence of twenty years. After the denial of a motion for new trial, the appellant appeals, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his arson convictions and that the trial court improperly instructed the jury on arson. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Kelvin Jermaine Dowell, was convicted by jury of first degree murder and abuse of a corpse, see Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-202(a)(1), -17-312 (2003), for which he received a life sentence. Aggrieved of his convictions, the defendant brings the instant appeal challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and the trial court’s denial of his request for a continuance. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the lower court.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Jason Curtis Johnson, was convicted of one count of first degree premeditated murder and one count of second degree murder for the killing of Christy Waller and her unborn child, respectively. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment for his first degree murder conviction and twenty-five years for his second degree murder conviction, with the sentence for second degree murder conviction to be served consecutively to his life sentence. On appeal, Defendant argues (1) that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress; (2) that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence autopsy photographs of the victim’s fetus; (3) that the evidence was insufficient to support Defendant’s convictions; and (4) that the trial court erred in its sentencing determinations. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner filed a writ of habeas corpus in Marshall County, the county in which he was convicted. He is incarcerated in Wayne County. The trial court dismissed his petition for writ of habeas corpus because it was not filed in the county in which he is located and because the petition did not state sufficient grounds. We affirm the decision of the habeas corpus court.

The appellant, Kamal Muhammed, was indicted with second offense driving under the influence. After a jury trial, the appellant was convicted of the indicted offense. As a result, he was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days. All but seventy-five days of the sentence were suspended. The appellant challenges his conviction on appeal, arguing that the State failed to prove venue and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following a revocation hearing, the trial court revoked the probation of defendant, Jerry Eldridge, and ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. In his appeal, defendant argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance during the revocation hearing, and that the trial court erred in finding that he had violated the terms of his probation. After a review of this matter, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Dorothy Pryor, appeals the sentencing decision of the Sumner County Criminal Court. The defendant pled guilty to five counts of burglary and three counts of Class D felony theft. Pursuant to the plea agreement, she received an effective eight-year sentence for the burglary convictions and an effective eight-year sentence for the theft convictions. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the burglary and theft sentences to be served consecutively to one another and consecutively to a prior eight-year sentence, for a total sentence of twenty-four years in the Department of Correction as a Range III, persistent offender. On appeal, the defendant argues that consecutive sentencing was improper. After a review of the record, we affirm the sentencing decision of the trial court.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Willie Wilson, was found guilty of two counts of aggravated robbery. He received concurrent sentences of nine years for each conviction. In his appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the aggravated robbery convictions should be merged into a single conviction and the case remanded for entry of corrected judgments consistent with this opinion. In all other respects, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Appellant, Jason Earl Hill, proceeding pro se, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court's summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. In 1995, Hill pled guilty to aggravated burglary and received a three-year suspended sentence. In February 2005, Hill filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief collaterally attacking the 1995 conviction. While acknowledging that the petition was filed outside the statute of limitations, Hill asserts that due process requires that the statute be tolled and that his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and an unknowing and involuntary guilty plea be addressed. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition as time-barred without addressing the merits of Hill's substantive claims. On appeal, Hill asserts that the court erred in: (1) dismissing the petition as untimely; (2) dismissing the petition without addressing the whole subject matter as to all causes of action involved; and (3) dismissing the petition because due process requires vacating the conviction due to his innocence. After review, we conclude that the facts of this case do not warrant tolling the post-conviction statute of limitations. Accordingly, we affirm the post-conviction court's summary dismissal of the petition.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Tyler Stout Smith, was convicted of vehicular homicide by recklessness. Defendant was ordered to pay a fine of ten thousand ($10,000) dollars and was sentenced to four (4) years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant argues that (1) the evidence presented was insufficient to establish the element of recklessness beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) Defendant's due process rights were violated when the trial court did not allow him to present evidence that the victim was influenced by an intoxicant which may have influenced her ability to avoid the collision; and (3) the trial court improperly increased the Defendant's sentence from three years to four years. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal stems from a contract dispute between an employee doctor and her employer where the employer alleged that the doctor anticipatorily breached a covenant not to compete provision in the employment agreement between the parties. In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether (1) the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the doctor was proper; (2) the trial court’s denial of summary judgment to the employer was proper; (3) the trial court’s grant of the doctor’s motion to stay discovery was proper; (4) the doctor’s voluntary nonsuit of her counter claims while the employer’s motion for summary judgment was still pending was proper; (5) the chancery court erred when it returned interpled funds back to the doctor; and (6) the chancery court abused its discretion when it denied the employer’s motion to amend its complaint. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

The defendant, Paul O. Dickens, Sr., was convicted by a Rutherford County jury of attempted voluntary manslaughter (a Class D felony), reckless endangerment (a Class E felony), and two counts of coercion of a witness (a Class D felony). On direct appeal to this court, the defendant contends that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict; and (2) his convictions for attempted voluntary manslaughter and reckless endangerment violate the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. Upon review of the record, briefs of the parties, and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

After a bench trial, the Defendant was convicted of burglary, a Class D felony, and theft of property under the value of five hundred dollars, a Class A misdemeanor. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§39-14-402, -103, -105(1). After conducting a sentencing hearing, the Defendant was sentenced as a Range III, persistent offender to serve ten years in the Department of Correction for his burglary conviction.  He received a concurrent sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days in the county jail for his theft conviction. In this appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to support his convictions and that the trial court erred by ordering him to serve a mid-range sentence for the burglary conviction. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.