APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Appellant, David Jones Milton, was convicted by a Carroll County jury of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony, and sentenced to a term of fifteen years in the Department of Correction.  On appeal, Milton raises the single issue of whether the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction. After review of the record, we affirm the judgment of conviction.

The parties were divorced in October of 1999. The final decree of divorce incorporated the parties’ marital dissolution agreement which provided a formula for establishing the father’s child support obligation. The father subsequently filed a petition to modify his child support obligation, which culminated in the entry of a consent order incorporating a permanent parenting plan utilizing essentially the same formula for establishing the father’s child support obligation found in the marital dissolution agreement. Shortly thereafter, father retained new counsel and filed another petition to modify his child support obligation seeking to have it set at $2,100 a month pursuant to the child support guidelines. In response, the mother filed a motion to dismiss the petition for, among other reasons, failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. At a hearing on the mother’s motion, the father presented several exhibits which were considered by the trial court, thereby converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. The trial court dismissed the father’s petition for, among other reasons, failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted.  The father timely filed an appeal to this Court. On appeal, the mother requests her attorney’s fees incurred in defending this appeal. We affirm the trial court’s decision, and we remand this case to the trial court for the entry of an order awarding the mother her reasonable attorney’s fees.

These appeals find their genesis in a collision between a Georgia school bus and a CSX freight train in Polk County, Tennessee, just north of the Georgia state line. As a result of the collision, three children were killed and four others on the bus were injured. All of the children were minors. Three wrongful death actions and three personal injury actions – as well as other actions not involved in this appeal – were filed in the trial court. The cases before us named as defendants, Rhonda Cloer, the driver of the bus; the Murray County [Georgia] School District (“the School District”); and other entities. Regarding two of the wrongful death claims against the School District, the trial court held that the claims were barred by the personal injury one-year statute of limitations. As to all of the claims arising out of the collision, the trial court held that the School District’s liability could not exceed $300,000, the total amount of the coverage for one incident under the School District’s vehicle liability policy. We affirm.

I concur with the results of the court’s opinion in this case. However, I write separately to emphasize a point regarding the valuation of marital property that is only briefly addressed in the court’s opinion.

Dr. Johnson (“the wife”) and Dr. Melvin (“the husband”) were married in October 1988 while the wife was pregnant with the parties’ first child. That child born in 1989 and the second child born in 1991 are the only minor children of this marriage. Husband filed a complaint for divorce, claiming inappropriate marital conduct. The wife counterclaimed in that action. The actions of the trial court from which the wife appeals, and with which both parties raise issues on appeal, include the Decree of Divorce issued August 6, 2004; the interlocutory order and memorandum entered July 28, 2004; and three post-trial orders and one memorandum. Issues raised on appeal concern distribution of marital property, award of alimony and child support, and refusal to award the wife attorney fees and costs. We affirm the judgment of the trial court in all respects.

The Appellant, Donald Franks, appeals the Hardin County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, Franks argues that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. After review of the record, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

In this case, the trial court terminated a mother’s parental rights to her biological child upon grounds that she committed severe child abuse and that termination was in the child's best interest. The mother asserts that clear and convincing evidence was not presented that she committed severe abuse or that termination was in the best interest of the child. Mother argues that the judgment of the trial court should be vacated and the case remanded for new trial because of the unavailability of either a transcript of the proceedings below or a statement of the evidence. We vacate the order of the trial court as to termination of the parental rights of the mother and remand for new trial because the record provided this Court is insufficient to allow proper appellate review.

The defendant, Kevin Young, was convicted of one count of possession of more than one-half ounce of marijuana with intent to sell and one count of possession of more than one-half ounce of marijuana with intent to deliver. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-417(a) (2003). The trial court merged the two counts into a single conviction and sentenced the defendant, a career offender, to six years in the Department of Correction. In this appeal, the defendant asserts (1) that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions and (2) that the trial court provided an incorrect supplemental instruction to the jury. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This appeal relates to the plaintiffs’ challenge to the constitutionality of Tennessee Code Annotated section 7-51-1402 (1998), which regulates the hours during which adult-oriented establishments may remain open and, if violated, results in criminal penalties. We must determine 1) whether the trial court had jurisdiction to issue a temporary injunction barring enforcement of the statute; and 2) whether the trial court erred in consolidating the request for injunctive relief with the declaratory judgment action and addressing the constitutionality of the statute. We conclude that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief. Furthermore, the trial court erred in addressing the constitutionality of the statute without providing notice to the parties that the court was consolidating the action for injunctive relief with the declaratory judgment action. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the trial court for a trial on the merits of the declaratory judgment action.

The Appellant, Joe Mac Pearson, was convicted by a Marshall County jury of the sale and delivery of a Schedule II controlled substance and the sale and delivery of a Schedule III controlled substance. As a result of these convictions, Pearson received an effective sentence of twenty-five years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Pearson argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. After review of the record, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient. We remand, however, for merger of offenses and for entry of corrected judgments of conviction.

The defendant, Coy Pierce, was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI), fourth offense, a Class E felony, and driving on a revoked license, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court imposed sentences of two years for the DUI and eleven months and twenty-nine days for the driving on a revoked license. The trial court ordered that the sentences be served concurrently and that the defendant serve seven months in confinement with the remainder to be served on community corrections. On appeal, the defendant contends that he was denied a fair trial (1) as a result of prosecutorial misconduct and (2) as a result of the trial court’s ruling that the defendant could not enter a photograph into evidence. We affirm the judgments of the trial court in part but remand the driving on a revoked license case for entry of a corrected judgment.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation
Appeals Panel of the Tennessee Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated
section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the supreme court of findings of fact and
conclusions of law. The trial court awarded Plaintiff 100 percent permanent disability. On appeal,
Defendant argues (1) the trial court was in error in finding Plaintiff’s headaches and depression were caused by the accident and, (2) the evidence does not support a finding of total permanent disability. The judgment is affirmed.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation
Appeals Panel of the Tennessee Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated
section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the supreme court of findings of fact and
conclusions of law. The trial court awarded Plaintiff 100 percent permanent disability. Defendant
contends that Plaintiff’s pre-existing cancer and not a work-related event was the cause of his
disability. Plaintiff argues the trial court was in error in failing to provide that all medical expenses
be paid directly to the Plaintiff. Judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The record reflects that the trial began on the morning of December 16, 2004, and testimony was heard through 9:00 p.m. that evening. Closing arguments and jury instructions followed.  Deliberations began at 11:20 p.m. The jury returned a verdict at 3:35 a.m. the next morning. Just before examination of the final witness, the trial court announced as follows:

In consultation with the attorneys, we have reached a conclusion that the earliest we could possibly be able to get . . . this case to you tonight would be midnight.  We don't think that is fair to you, to the defendant or to the state.  For that reason, our plan is to complete the proof tonight. We have one final witness to go. Then at the end of that, to break until 9:00 in the morning. Then in the morning you could get the arguments of counsel and the charge and the case would be turned over to you in the morning.  I think being realistic that is the best we can do to be fair to everybody. . . .

The Petitioner, Ronald McCray, appeals the lower court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner failed to file a timely notice of appeal and this Court cannot conclude that justice requires waiver of this jurisdictional requirement.  Accordingly, the above-captioned appeal is dismissed.

The Defendant, Joel Marshall Jones was convicted of aggravated burglary, theft of property valued at less than $500.00 and of theft of property valued at more than $1000.00. The Defendant was sentenced to prison for fifteen years as a Range II offender. On appeal, the Defendant contends that:  (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) the trial court erred when it did not allow a witness to testify; and (3) the trial court erred when it extended the hours of the trial. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Madison County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, Charles Ivory Smith, of burglary and evading arrest. The trial court imposed a twelve-year sentence for burglaryand an eleven-month and twenty-nine-day sentence for evading arrest and ordered the defendant to serve the sentences consecutively as a career offender in the Department of Correction. The defendant asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred in ordering consecutive sentences. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, LaQuenton Monger, appeals the lower court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Because the Petitioner has failed to comply with the statutory requirements for seeking habeas corpus relief, we conclude that the trial court properly dismissed the petition. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal.

The defendant, Kenneth W. Thompson, Sr., pled nolo contendere to one count of attempted aggravated sexual battery, and the trial court sentenced him to five years, to be served at thirty percent. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied his request for alternative sentencing. Finding that there exists no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Thomas H. Pleasant, pled guilty in the Davidson County Criminal Court to second degree murder, attempted first degree murder, and aggravated robbery, and he received a total effective sentence of eighteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the 1989 Sentencing Act is unconstitutional under Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). The habeas corpus court summarily denied the petition, and the petitioner appeals. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The defendant, Brian Keith Stanley, was convicted of driving under the influence, first offense. The trial court imposed a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days, with ninety days to be served in confinement. After determining that the defendant had violated the implied consent law, the trial court revoked his driver's license for two years. In this appeal, the defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for driving under the influence. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Appellant, Marlon Hayes, appeals the Tipton County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, Hayes collaterally challenges his guilty pleas for first degree felony murder and aggravated robbery upon grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. After review of the record, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

This is a termination of parental rights case. This is the second appeal in this matter. In the first appeal, the trial court had terminated the father’s parental rights based on abandonment for failure to support his two children. On appeal, this Court reversed the termination on that ground, but remanded the case for further proceedings on the ground of persistent conditions. On remand, the trial court conducted further proceedings and determined that clear and convincing evidence established persistent conditions that prevented the children’s safe return to the father. The father now appeals. We affirm, finding that the ground of persistent conditions was established by clear and convincing evidence.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation
Appeals Panel of the Tennessee Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated
section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the supreme court of findings of fact and
conclusions of law. The Employee suffered a carpal tunnel injury to both hands. Surgery was
performed on both hands with good results. The same medical impairment was awarded for each arm, but the trial court awarded 8 percent vocational disability to the left arm, and 32 percent to the right arm. The Employer appeals arguing that there is no factual basis for the 400 percent difference. We affirm.

This a termination of parental rights and adoption case. Before the minor child at issue was born, the biological father was sentenced to ten years imprisonment in a correctional facility. The biological mother and her husband filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of the biological father and permit the mother’s husband to adopt the minor child. The trial court granted the petition.  We affirm, finding grounds for termination established by the father’s confinement to prison for a ten year sentence when the minor child was less than eight years old, and finding clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion that termination was in the best interest of the child.