APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal involves the discharge of a clerical employee by the Metropolitan Nashville General Hospital. After her discharge was upheld by the Metropolitan Nashville Hospital Authority, the employee filed a petition in the Chancery Court for Davidson County seeking judicial review of the decision to discharge her. The trial court affirmed the discharge, and the employee has appealed. Like the trial court, we have determined that the decision to discharge the employee for deficient and inefficient performance of duties is supported by substantial and material evidence.

The trial court entered a default judgment in favor of Plaintiffs in an action alleging breach of contract, fraud, and violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, and denied Defendant’s Rule 60.02 motion to set aside the judgment. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Plaintiffs Gary and Gail Weaver filed suit against Coldwell Banker Hoffman-Burke, Inc. Realtors (“Defendant CBHB”), Jim Perdue (“Defendant Perdue”), Thomas McCarter (“Defendant McCarter”), and Chip Hunter (“Defendant Hunter”) seeking damages resulting from a failed real estate sale. The Plaintiffs specifically sought damages from Defendants CBHB and Perdue for negligence per se, negligent misrepresentation, and fraud. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs on the issue of liability for all Defendants, but reserved ruling on damages for trial. At trial, the trial court awarded the Plaintiffs damages in the amount of $134,225.06 plus attorney’s fees and held all Defendants jointly and severally liable for the entire award. Both the Plaintiffs and Defendants CBHB and Perdue assert various issues on appeal. For the reasons stated below, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand this case for further proceedings.

The petitioner, Earl Jerome Lee, pled guilty to aggravated kidnapping, attempted felony escape, concealing stolen property, and fraudulent use of a credit card, and he received a total effective sentence of forty years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the sentences imposed were illegal. The habeas corpus court dismissed the petition without appointing counsel or conducting an evidentiary hearing. The petitioner appeals the dismissal. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

This is a summary judgment case. Appellant/Husband and his ex-wife entered into a marital dissolution agreement wherein the ex-wife was awarded the marital residence subject to the condition that should she choose to sell the property Appellant was then entitled to $20,000.00 from the net proceeds of the sale. The ex-wife refinanced the property and executed a Deed of Trust in favor of the Appellee. When ex-wife defaulted on her payments, Appellee foreclosed on the property. Appellant/Husband filed suit against the Appellee seeking enforcement of an equitable lien against the property. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Appellee. We affirm.

Capital Petitioner David Keen appeals as of right the judgment of the Shelby County Criminal Court denying his petition for post-conviction relief. Petitioner Keen pled guilty to first degree felony murder committed in the perpetration of the rape of eight-year-old Ashley Nicole (Nikki) Reed. See State v. Keen, 31 S.W.3d 196 (Tenn. 2000); State v. Keen, 926 S.W.2d 727 (Tenn. 1996). He was sentenced to death. On direct appeal, the petitioner’s conviction was affirmed, but the supreme court reversed and remanded the sentence of death after finding reversible error due to erroneous jury instructions. Keen, 926 S.W.2d at 736. On remand, the jury, again, imposed the penalty of death. Keen, 31 S.W.3d at 202. Our supreme court affirmed the sentence of death on direct appeal. Id. A pro se petition for post-conviction relief was filed on May 3, 2001, which was followed by the appointment of counsel and an amended petition on November 16, 2001. An evidentiary hearing was conducted and, on August 2, 2004, the post-conviction court denied relief and dismissed the petition. On direct appeal to this Court, the petitioner presents for our review the following claims: (1) whether the petitioner was denied a fair trial due to jury misconduct; (2) whether the petitioner received constitutionally effective assistance of counsel at his sentencing hearing; (3) whether the death sentence violates the holdings in Apprendi, Ring, or Jones; (4) whether the prosecutor’s discretion in seeking the death penalty violates Bush v. Gore; (5) whether the imposition of the death penalty is unconstitutional; and (6) whether imposition of the death penalty violates international
law. After a careful and laborious review of the record, this Court concludes that there is no error requiring reversal. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

This is a direct appeal from convictions on a jury verdict of four counts of aggravated robbery. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-402. The Defendant was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to sixteen years for each conviction to be served consecutively in part for an effective thirty-two-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant raises four issues: (1) the trial court erred in consolidating the Defendant’s two indictments for a single trial; (2) the admission of hearsay statements is plain error; (3) the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of aggravated assault; and (4) the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences violated the Defendant’s constitutional rights pursuant to Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The appeal in this capital case arises from the resentencing of Jonathan Wesley Stephenson, who was convicted in 1990 of first degree murder and conspiracy to commit first degree murder for his role in the contract killing of his wife. Following the resentencing hearing, the jury imposed a sentence of death, and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. Upon automatic appeal under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-206(a)(1), we designated the following issues for oral argument:1 1) Do dual sentences of incarceration for conspiracy and death for first degree murder in this case violate double jeopardy; 2) Did the trial court err in admitting the prior testimony of two witnesses, Glen Brewer and Michael Litz; 3) Did the trial court err in not considering the defendant’s motion to suppress his statement to the police; 4) Did the trial court lack jurisdiction to resentence the defendant; and 5) Is the defendant’s death sentence comparatively proportionate and is the sentence valid under the mandatory review of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-206(c)(1). Having carefully reviewed the record and relevant legal authority, we conclude that none of the errors alleged by the defendant warrants relief. With respect to issues not herein specifically addressed, we affirm the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Relevant portions of that opinion are published hereafter as an appendix. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-206(a)(1); Judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals Affirmed.
 

The petitioner, James McClennon, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief in which he asserted various instances of ineffective assistance of counsel. A review of the record reveals support for the findings of the post-conviction court. We affirm.

The defendant, Cassandra Robinson, was convicted of conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery, aggravated robbery, and aggravated assault. The trial court imposed Range I, concurrent sentences of four years, nine years, and four years, respectively. In this appeal, the defendant asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support her convictions. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The Defendant, Edward Jankowski, Sr., appeals from the sentencing decision of the Sequatchie County Circuit Court. The Defendant pled guilty to one count of incest. The victim was his eighteen-year-old daughter. Pursuant to the terms of the plea agreement, he received a six-year sentence as a Range I, standard offender, and the manner of service was to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the sentence to be served in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by ordering a sentence of total confinement rather than a less restrictive alternative. After review, the sentencing decision is affirmed.

While I concur in part with the conclusion of the majority affirming Stephenson’s convictions, I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority’s opinion concluding that the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation of witnesses and the state constitutional right to confront witnesses “face-to-face” does not apply to capital sentencing hearings. The Sixth Amendment provides: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. Similarly, Article I, section 9 of the Tennessee Constitution provides “[t]hat in all criminal prosecutions, the accused hath the right . . . to meet the witnesses face to face . . . .” It is disingenuous to argue that the sentencing phase of a capital murder case–tried before a jury–is not a critical part of a “criminal prosecution” covered by these provisions.1

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court our findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the
Employer asserts that the trial court erred in finding a heart attack suffered by the Employee arose
out of his employment with the City of Murfreesboro and in awarding medical benefits for the
implantation of intra-coronary stints that the employer alleges is treatment for a pre-existing
condition and not a work-related injury. We agree with the findings of the trial judge and, in
accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated §50-6-225(e)(2), affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Ernest Cunningham, Jr., appeals his convictions for facilitation of sale of cocaine under .5 grams (Class D felony) and possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell (Class B felony). The defendant received concurrent sentences of twelve years for the facilitation offense and thirty years for possession with intent to sell, as a career offender with a 60% release eligibility date. The sole issue on appeal is whether the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions. Our review reveals that the evidence was sufficient. The judgments of conviction are hereby affirmed.

This appeal concerns two related, but distinct, proceedings in Juvenile Court. One was a custody proceeding, and the other a contempt of court proceeding arising from a failure to comply with child support obligations. Separate docket numbers were assigned to each case. After a judgment was rendered in the contempt proceeding, the father filed a notice of appeal. Several months later, another judgment was rendered in the custody modification proceeding. No notice of appeal was filed for the custody modification proceeding. After the case was appealed to the Court of Appeals, the father obtained a consolidation order from the Juvenile Court. On appeal, the father argues only that the Juvenile Court erred in its custody order. Finding that neither of the two orders is final and appealable, we must dismiss the father’s appeal based upon a lack of jurisdiction and remand all proceedings to the Juvenile Court.

A Shelby County Criminal Court jury convicted the appellant of four counts of aggravated robbery against two victims, and the appellant received an effective thirty-six-year sentence. In this appeal, the appellant claims (1) that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions; (2) that the trial court erred by requiring Detention Response Team personnel to sit next to him in the courtroom and while he testified; and (3) that his sentences are excessive. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the four convictions should be merged into two convictions and that the case should be remanded for entry of corrected judgments consistent with this opinion. In all other respects, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The defendant, Robert L. Mitchell, was convicted of especially aggravated kidnapping, two counts of aggravated kidnapping, and assault. Later, the two aggravated kidnapping convictions were merged. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a violent offender to twenty-five years for the especially aggravated kidnapping, twelve years for the aggravated kidnapping, and eleven months and twenty-nine days for the assault. Because the kidnapping sentences are to be served consecutively, the effective sentence is thirty-seven years. In this appeal of right, the defendant claims that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his kidnapping convictions; (2) the trial court erred by admitting evidence of prior bad acts; and (3) his sentence is excessive. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The Petitioner, Ryan James Moran, appeals the lower court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner has failed to allege any ground that would render the judgments of conviction void. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal.

Plaintiff/Appellant filed suit against Defendants/Appellees claiming that Defendants/Appellees had violated the Tennessee Trade Practices Act, the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, and the common law doctrines of good faith and fair dealing, and unjust enrichment in its contracting for commercial waste hauling services in the Memphis area. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants/Appellees on both the statutory violation claims and the common law claims. We affirm.

A prisoner in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction filed a pro se petition for common law writ of certiorari in the trial court seeking to contest the prison disciplinary board’s findings. The department filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, citing the petition’s lack of notarization, its failure to state that it was the first application for the writ, and the prisoner’s failure to file it within sixty (60) days of the administrative action. The trial court granted the department’s motion to dismiss. The prisoner filed a motion for a new trial asserting that he complied with Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 5.06. The trial court denied the motion. The prisoner timely filed an appeal to this court. We affirm the dismissal of the petition.

The trial court terminated the parental rights of Rene V. (“Mother”) to her child, Thomas P. (DOB: September 27, 2000),1 upon finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that grounds for terminating her parental rights existed and that termination was in the best interest of the child. Mother appeals.  We affirm.

The Petitioner, Steven Ray Chance, appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The State’s motion is granted. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Petitioner, Tommy Dixon, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Petitioner has failed to allege any ground that would render the judgments of conviction void. Accordingly, we grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

The Appellant, Chad Michael Knight, appeals the sentencing decision of the Montgomery County Circuit Court. Following a jury trial, Knight was convicted of reckless endangerment, a Class A misdemeanor, and aggravated child abuse, a Class A felony, and sentenced to an effective term of twenty years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days in confinement. On appeal, Knight argues that the trial court erred in: (1) failing to apply various sentencing considerations which would have served to mitigate his sentence, as authorized by Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-113(13) (2003); and (2) refusing to sentence him as an especially mitigated offender in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-109 (2003). After review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.