APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This cause came before the court upon the State of Tennessee’s petition for a rehearing, wherein the State posited that the court’s opinion in this cause incorrectly referred to the statutory provision for the writ of error coram nobis in civil cases when a reference to the statute governing criminal cases should have been used. We agree.

This is a declaratory judgment action against the State regarding the use of an easement. The plaintiffs own a parcel of land next to a highway. By deed, the plaintiffs' predecessor in title granted a perpetual easement for “highway purposes” to the State for the Department of Transportation in the strip of land immediately next to the highway. Prior to this litigation, the Department of Transportation asked the plaintiffs to remove advertising signs posted on the land next to the highway because the signs encroached on the State's highway “right-of-way.” In response, the plaintiffs filed a declaratory judgment action against the State, seeking a declaration that the easement for “highway purposes” did not constitute a “highway right-of-way,” and that the State had no authority to require removal of the signs. The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, declaring that the deed conveyed to the State only an easement of ingress and egress and did not grant the right to use the land as a “highway right-of-way.” The defendant now appeals. We vacate the trial court's judgment and dismiss the case, finding that the plaintiffs’ declaratory judgment action is barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.

A formerly licensed practical nurse appeals a default judgment revoking her license by the Board of Nursing and claims, inter alia, that the Board failed to comply with applicable notice requirements. Because the administrative record does not reflect consideration of the rule governing proceedings by default, we reverse.

This appeal involves a writ of certiorari. The plaintiff, a former deputy sheriff for the County, was discharged. After a hearing, the County administrative board upheld the County’s decision to terminate the plaintiff’s employment. The plaintiff then filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the chancery court, seeking judicial review of the board’s decision. The plaintiff then filed a motion to amend the petition to add claims. The trial court never ruled on the motion to amend. After a hearing on the petition, the trial court affirmed the decision of the board. The plaintiff deputy sheriff appeals. We dismiss the appeal, finding that there is not a final judgment over which this Court may exercise appellate jurisdiction.

 We granted this appeal to clarify the applicability of the rule of ademption by extinction and of Tennessee Code Annotated section 32-3-111 concerning the sale of specifically devised property. In August 1994, the decedent Clara Stewart executed her last will and testament in which she left a parcel of real estate to her stepson, the plaintiff in this matter. In November 1994, the decedent executed a durable power of attorney to her natural children, defendants Sewell and Judkins. In January 1997, the decedent’s health had so far deteriorated that she required placement in a nursing home. In February 1997, Sewell and Judkins sold a portion of the devised real estate in order to fund the decedent’s nursing home expenses. After their mother’s death, Sewell and Judkins inherited the remaining proceeds of the sale; the plaintiff inherited that portion of the real estate which had not been sold. Plaintiff sued Sewell and Judkins as well as the purchasers of the real estate, alleging fraud. After a trial, the trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint. On appeal, the Court of Appeals determined that Sewell and Judkins had acted improperly and granted the plaintiff relief.  We granted the defendants’ application for permission to appeal and hold that the specific devise of the real property was adeemed by extinction and that the Court of Appeals erred in applying retroactively Tennessee Code Annotated section 32-3-111 and in imposing a constructive trust in order to avoid that result. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the trial court’s judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s case.

The Defendant, Michael D. Gilliam, appeals from the order of the Montgomery County Circuit Court revoking his probation and ordering that his eight-year sentence be served in the Department of Correction. In December of 2003, the Defendant pled guilty to possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine for resale and received an eight-year sentence. The sentence was suspended following service of twenty days in the county workhouse, and the Defendant was placed on probation. On June 23, 2005, a warrant was issued, wherein it was alleged that the Defendant violated the conditions of his probation. After a hearing, the trial court concluded that the Defendant violated the conditions of his probationary sentence and ordered that his original eight-year sentence to the Department of Correction be reinstated. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his probation and ordering that his sentence be served in confinement. After a review of the record, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Employee claimed an injury to his respiratory system, which the employer denied. The trial court dismissed the action finding that the evidence did not preponderate in favor of a causal connection between the respiratory condition and the employment. After consideration of the evidence, the Workers’ Compensation Panel concludes that the evidence does not preponderate against the finding of the trial court affirms the judgment of the trial court.

We affirm the trial court’s award of summary judgment to Defendant physician in this medical malpractice action.

The Defendant, Calvin Fleming, was convicted of attempted first degree murder and aggravated assault. The Defendant was sentenced, as a career offender, to an effective sentence of sixty years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred when it admitted photographs of the victim’s wounds into evidence because the State failed to authenticate them; (2) the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support the Defendant’s convictions for attempted first degree murder because there was no proof of premeditation; and (3) his convictions for attempted first degree murder and aggravated assault violate constitutional principles of double jeopardy. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court as to the attempted murder, but we reverse the judgment as to the aggravated assault because the aggravated assault should have been merged into the attempted murder. Thus, we remand the case for the trial court to enter a judgment consistent with this opinion.

Parris Roofing & Sheetmetal Co. (“Plaintiff”) sued SCR Electric, Inc. (“Defendant”) seeking, in part, payment for work Plaintiff had done pursuant to an alleged agreement between Plaintiff and Defendant. The case was tried without a jury and the Trial Court entered an order finding and holding, inter alia, that Plaintiff and Defendant did not have an enforceable agreement, but that Plaintiff was entitled to recover $3,613.50, from Defendant in quantum meruit. Plaintiff appeals to this Court claiming that the Trial Court erred in finding that the reasonable value of the work performed was only $3,613.50. We affirm.

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court dismissed the employee's complaint. On appeal, the employee contends that the employer had actual notice of his injury on a timely basis. The employee also contends that he sustained a gradually occurring injury and that timely notice of injury was given. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Raymond Earl McKay, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief by the Fayette County Circuit Court. McKay pled guilty to one count of theft of property valued between $1,000 and $10,000, a Class D felony, and was sentenced, as a career offender, to twelve years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he asserts that his plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered due to the ineffective assistance of counsel. After review, we conclude that McKay received erroneous advise from counsel during the plea bargaining process, which resulted in the entry of an involuntary and unknowing guilty plea. Finding both deficient performance and prejudice, the case is remanded to the trial court for withdrawal of the guilty plea.

The State appeals the habeas court’s grant of a petition for habeas corpus relief filed by the Petitioner, Anthony Keshun Goods. The Petitioner alleged in his petition that his sentence was illegal because he was sentenced to concurrent terms when the law required him to be sentenced to consecutive terms. On appeal, the State contends the statutory requirement of consecutive sentences does not apply to the Petitioner, his petition is not yet ripe, and the remedy set out by the habeas court is improper. Finding reversible error in the judgment of the habeas court, we reverse the judgment and dismiss the habeas corpus petition.

The defendant, Jikinte Lashane Morris, was convicted of sale of a schedule II drug, fined $3,000, and sentenced to eleven years and nine months as a Range I standard offender. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence is not sufficient to support his convictions, and that the trial court abused its discretion by denying the jury access, as part of its deliberations, to the surveillance video introduced as evidence at trial. We conclude that the evidence is sufficient and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion regarding the surveillance video. Thus, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Client appeals the dismissal of its legal malpractice action against the attorneys who represented it in a bankruptcy proceeding. The trial court determined that the action was barred by the Statute of Limitations and that there were no grounds upon which the trier of fact could find that the loss alleged by the client was caused by any negligent act or omission of the defendants. We affirm.

The Petitioner, Donte Montgomery, pled guilty to one count of possession with the intent to sell more than 0.5 grams of cocaine, and the trial judge imposed a sentence of six years in the workhouse as a standard offender. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which was dismissed by the post-conviction court after a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner contends he was not afforded the effective assistance of counsel, and his guilty plea was not voluntarily entered. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Jimmy Wayne Green, was indicted for theft of property and two counts of assault. In accordance with a plea agreement, he submitted a best interest plea to one count of assault in exchange for the State dismissing the other count of assault and the theft charge. The trial court accepted the plea and sentenced the Defendant to eleven months and twenty-nine days, thirty days of which was to be served in confinement with the remainder to be served on probation. The Defendant now appeals, contending that the trial court erred when it sentenced him. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Jim Corbett Corder, was convicted of attempted voluntary manslaughter and sentenced to four years in prison. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence is not sufficient to support his conviction. We conclude that the evidence is sufficient and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Demond Gardner, filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief claiming that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After appointing the Petitioner counsel and holding a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. The Petitioner filed this appeal, contending that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Richard Madkins, filed a February 2005 Davidson County Criminal Court petition for habeas corpus relief from his 1994 jury-tried conviction of especially aggravated robbery, for which he was originally sentenced to a term of 60 years and re-sentenced in 2003 to a term of 25 years. Before the habeas corpus court, the petitioner argued that he was illegally re-sentenced because the 1994 jury verdict and conviction were void and because, instead of re-sentencing, he should have been immediately released from custody. Following a hearing, the habeas corpus court dismissed the petition, and we affirm.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Frank Lee Tate, was convicted of aggravated rape, a Class A felony, and incest, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range III, career offender, to concurrent sentences of sixty years for his aggravated rape conviction and fifteen years for his incest conviction. In his pro se appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence, the trial court’s evidentiary rulings, and his classification as a career offender for sentencing purposes. The State argues on appeal that the trial court erred in not sentencing Defendant to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole after finding that Defendant was a repeat violent offender. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm Defendant’s convictions and his sentence for his incest conviction. We set aside the sentence for aggravated rape, and remand this matter for a new sentencing hearing on the sole issue of whether Defendant should be sentenced as a repeat violent offender or as a career offender for his aggravated rape conviction.

The Defendant, Marvin D. Nance, was convicted of aggravated sexual battery, and the trial court sentenced him to ten years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the State failed to elect a set of facts upon which it was relying to sustain his convictions; (2) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction; (3) the trial court erred by not granting him a mistrial after the State made allegedly improper argument; (4) the State committed a discovery violation; and (5) the trial court erred when it sentenced him. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Zachary V. Henning, was convicted at a jury trial in Lauderdale County Circuit Court of aggravated robbery, aggravated assault, and theft of property valued between $1,000 and $10.000.  He was sentenced, as a Range I offender, to 10 years for aggravated robbery, three years for aggravated assault, and two years for theft of property. The trial court merged the conviction of aggravated assault with the aggravated robbery conviction and imposed the theft sentence to run concurrently with that for aggravated robbery, for an effective sentence of 10 years. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and complains that his sentence is excessive. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s guilty verdicts but that multiple convictions for aggravated robbery and theft violate double jeopardy protections. Accordingly, the defendant’s conviction judgments for aggravated assault and theft are vacated, and the jury’s “guilty verdict” for the theft is merged into the judgment of conviction of aggravated robbery. The defendant’s aggravated robbery sentence is affirmed, and we remand solely for the correction and entry of an appropriate judgment consistent with this opinion.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found that the employee was entitled to a permanent partial disability award of eighty-five percent (85%) to the left lower extremity. The employee contends that the trial court erred by (1) finding that the employee was not permanently and totally disabled, and (2) commenting upon the reputation of an expert witness. The parties also raise the issue of the apportionment of liability to the Second Injury Fund if the employee is found to be permanently and totally disabled. We affirm the trial court in all
respects.

The appellant, Timothy Jowers, pled guilty to robbery and possession of contraband in a penal facility. As part of the plea agreement, the trial court approved a concurrent sentence of five years for each conviction. The appellant was ordered to complete a six-month inpatient treatment program for drug and alcohol abuse prior to serving the balance of his sentence on probation. Subsequently, a probation violation warrant was issued against the appellant, alleging that he failed to complete the six-month program as required by the trial court. The appellant filed a motion to revoke his own probation, asserting that he was incarcerated in Oklahoma serving a five-year sentence for a conviction in that state and admitting to the probation violation. The trial court denied the motion to revoke probation because the warrant had not yet been served on the appellant due to his incarceration in Oklahoma. After the warrant was finally served on the appellant, an amended probation violation warrant was filed and served on the appellant. The trial court held a hearing on the matter, revoked the appellant’s probation, and awarded the appellant jail credits for time served in Tennessee prior to his plea and for time served in incarceration after service of the probation violation warrant. On appeal, the appellant complains that the trial court improperly denied retroactive jail credits for time served in Oklahoma.