APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A former employee of the Highland Youth Center appeals the denial of her claim for unemployment benefits. The employee was subjected to a severe assault while at work at the youth center. She attempted to return to work after the incident but was unable to remain at work due to the severe psychological trauma associated with the assault at the workplace. She filed a claim for unemployment benefits, which was denied by the Department of Labor, the Appeals Tribunal, and the Board of Review on the ground she did not have “good cause” to terminate her employment. The Chancery Court affirmed the denial of benefits, and this appeal followed. We reverse finding the employee had good cause for terminating her employment at the Highland Youth Center.

The Defendant, Christopher Nathaniel Richardson, pled guilty to one count of possession of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver, and he was sentenced as a Range II multiple offender to seven years of supervised probation, with the first year to be served on intensive probation. After two probation violation warrants were issued based upon two arrests and other violations, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve his sentence in confinement. It is from this judgment that the Defendant now appeals, contending that, while the trial court was within its discretion to revoke his probation, his violation does not warrant the imposition of his entire sentence. Concluding there exists no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Billy Alfred Mathes, was convicted by a Greene County jury of burglary. On appeal, he alleges there was insufficient evidence for any rational jury to convict him of that crime and that his sentence of six years was excessive. Finding no error exists, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Rickey Hogan, appeals the order dismissing his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, raising two issues: (1) whether his concurrent, forty-year sentences, imposed in 1985 for robbery with a deadly weapon and second degree murder, are void; and (2) whether the Department of Correction has miscalculated the expiration date of his sentences. Following our review, we affirm the habeas corpus court’s order of dismissal.

A Marshall County jury convicted the Defendant, Edgar Lewis Ries, of attempted first degree murder and conspiracy to commit first degree murder. The Defendant was sentenced to concurrent terms of twenty years for his convictions. On appeal, he alleges there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions and that the trial court erred when it sentenced him. Finding no error exists, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Appellant, Michael J. Hart, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief by the Madison County Circuit Court. Hart pled guilty to first degree felony murder, aggravated robbery, and felony evading arrest, and received an effective sentence of life without parole. On appeal, Hart contends that his pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered due to trial counsel’s ineffectiveness during the pre-plea proceedings. Following review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Joseph Hough, appeals the trial court's denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court's order pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petition presents no cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Defendant, Jerral D. Parris, was indicted on two counts of extortion. A Warren County jury convicted the Defendant of two counts of attempted extortion. On appeal, the Defendant alleges the following: (1) attempted extortion is not a crime in Tennessee; (2) there was insufficient evidence to convict the Defendant of attempted extortion; (3) the trial court improperly denied a motion for a change of venue; (4) the trial court erred in refusing to allow the Defendant to test and inspect audio tape evidence; (5) the trial court erred in not declaring a mistrial after the Defendant was compared to a notorious murderer; (6) the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury as to the affirmative defense to extortion; and (7) the trial court erred in sentencing the Defendant. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we determine that attempted extortion is a crime in Tennessee and that there was sufficient evidence to convict the Defendant of this crime. His conviction, however, must be reversed because the trial court improperly refused to allow a jury instruction on an applicable affirmative defense. Thus, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Following a jury trial, Petitioner, Jerome Sawyer, was convicted of aggravated sexual battery and sentenced to eighteen years in the Department of Correction as a Range II, multiple offender. This Court affirmed his conviction. Petitioner then filed a petition for post-conviction relief. After appointing counsel and conducting several hearings, the trial court denied his petition for post-conviction relief. In his appeal, Petitioner argues that he is entitled to post-conviction relief because (1) trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel, and (2) the post-conviction court improperly allowed trial counsel to be examined outside of Petitioner’s presence. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Aggrieved of his convictions of first degree premeditated murder, setting fire to personal property, and abuse of a corpse, the petitioner, Chet Allen Walker, sought post-conviction relief, which was denied by the Hamilton County Criminal Court after an evidentiary hearing. On appeal, the petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to call a particular character witness. We affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The defendant, Jeffery McClennon Morris, was convicted of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony, as well as domestic assault and contributing to the delinquency of a minor, Class A misdemeanors. He was sentenced as a violent offender to fifteen years in the Department of Correction for the felony and concurrent sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days for each misdemeanor. He raises three issues on appeal: (1) the sufficiency of the convicting evidence; (2) whether certain of his statements were admitted at trial in violation of Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(1)(A); and (3) the validity of his indictment for domestic assault. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Michael Bailey, was indicted on four counts of aggravated robbery. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted on all four counts. Because the four counts represented four different theories of prosecution for the same criminal episode, the trial court merged the convictions and sentenced Defendant to thirty years as a career offender. After the denial of a motion for new trial, Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. On appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, the trial court’s decision to admit evidence during rebuttal of another robbery committed by Defendant, the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury on the lesser included offenses of theft and assault and the trial court’s decision to allow the State to impeach Defendant with evidence of his thirteen prior convictions for aggravated robbery. For the following reasons, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and the case is remanded for a new trial.

The Petitioner, James Mario Starnes, entered an open guilty plea in the Bedford County Circuit Court to attempted second degree murder and especially aggravated robbery. He received an effective sentence of twenty-five years. He subsequently petitioned for post-conviction relief. In this appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief, the Petitioner argues (1) that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel, (2) that he entered an involuntary guilty plea, and (3) that an insufficient factual basis exists for his plea. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This administrative appeal arises out of the termination of Officer Lenora Armstead’s (Officer Armstead) employment with the Memphis Police Department (the Department). The City took this action as a result of a public altercation between Officer Armstead and another off-duty police
officer. It found that Officer Armstead had violated DR-104 Personal Conduct and terminated her employment because of this violation and other disciplinary proceedings previously brought against her. The Civil Service Commission of the City of Memphis (the Commission) reversed the City’s decision to terminate her employment because it found the action to be unreasonable. The City appealed to Shelby County Chancery Court, where the chancellor reversed the Commission’s decision, finding it to be arbitrary and capricious. We find that the City proved a violation of DR-104 but that the Commission’s decision was supported by substantial and material evidence. We reverse and remand.

The defendant, Phillip Eugene Johnson, was convicted by a Tipton County jury of statutory rape and sexual battery and was sentenced to an effective term of two years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and argues that prosecutorial misconduct caused the jury to render an adverse verdict. Following our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Clifford Bryant Johnson, was convicted of one count of aggravated robbery, a class B felony, and sentenced to nine years in prison as a Range I, standard offender. The defendant appeals his conviction, claiming that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. We conclude that the evidence is sufficient and affirm the defendant’s conviction.

A small contractor entered into an oral agreement to install brick facades on new houses in a Mt. Juliet subdivision. He did brickwork on eleven houses pursuant to the agreement, and was paid in cash for the work on an irregular basis. Because he believed the other party to the agreement did not pay him in full, he walked off the job and brought suit for breach of contract. A bench trial in Circuit Court ultimately resulted in a net judgment for the plaintiff in the amount of $397.50. He argued on appeal that the evidence showed that he was entitled to receive over $10,000 on his claim. We affirm the trial court.

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that Vasquez and Garza are entitled to coram nobis relief. In my view, the impeachment evidence in this case does not merit coram nobis relief as to any of the defendants.

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court awarded the employee benefits based on permanent partial disability awards of fifty percent (50%) to each arm. On appeal, the employer contends that the trial court erred in making the fifty percent (50%) permanent, partial disability awards. The employee contends that she should be awarded damages for a frivolous appeal. We affirm, as modified, the judgment of the trial court.

Our grant of the applications for permission to appeal filed by the State of  Tennessee and certain of the defendants was for the purpose of  determining (1) whether the evidence at trial was sufficient to support the convictions for conspiracy to possess with intent to sell more than seventy pounds of marijuana within one thousand feet of a school zone; (2) whether the waiver of lesser-included offense instructions under  Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-18-110 violates constitutional principles; and (3) whether the Court of Criminal Appeals applied the proper standard in affirming the grant of coram nobis relief to Vasquez and Garza, reversing the trial court, and denying the relief to Vasques,  Hernandez, and Alonzo. We conclude that the trial evidence was sufficient  to support the convictions and that the statutory waiver of the entitlement to complete jury instructions does not violate the right to a jury trial or the separation of powers principle. We also hold that Vasquez and Garza are entitled to a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence and that  Vasques, Hernandez, and Alonzo are not entitled to coram nobis relief. In consequence, the judgments of the Court of Criminal Appeals are affirmed.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. On this appeal, the sole issue presented is whether the trial court erred by failing to cap the recovery of the employee, Sherwood Dowd, at 2.5 times the medical impairment as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(a)(1). The trial court found Mr. Dowd’s retirement, based, in part, upon his fear of re-injury, was reasonably related to his injury and awarded compensation amounting to four times his medical impairment rating. Finding the employer offered employment that Mr. Dowd had the ability to perform and
demonstrated a willingness to accommodate his medical restrictions, we find Mr. Dowd’s decision to retire on the basis of an apprehension of re-injury was, within the framework of the statute, unreasonable. We reverse.

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated _5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employer contends that the trial court erred by (1) finding that the employee suffered any vocational disability; and (2)finding that the employee was entitled to the twenty-five percent (25%) bad faith penalty for certain medical expenses. Finding that the evidence preponderates against the finding of any vocational disability in this case, we reverse the trial court's award of permanent partial disability benefits. Because the employee never asserted a claim for the bad faith penalty prior to the trial in this case, we reverse the award of the bad faith penalty. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (1999) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Macon County Chancery Court, Reversed in part, Affirmed in part, and Remanded. JEFFREY S. BIVINS, SP. J., in which ADOLPHO A. BIRCH, JR., J, and CLAYBURN PEEPLES, SP. J., joined. Richard Lane Moore, Moore, Rader, Clift & Fitzpatrick, Cookeville, Tennessee, for the Appellants, CNA Insurance Company and TRW Commercial Steering Division. William Joseph Butler, E. Guy Holliman, Farrar, Holliman & Butler, Lafayette, Tennessee, for the Appellee, Jason Key. MEMORANDUM OPINION I. Facts The Plaintiff, Jason Key ("Key"), was thirty years of age at the time of the trial in this action. He graduated from high school. He had learned some welding skills in high school. Otherwise, he had no other certificates, degrees, or special training. His work history consists primarily of physical labor, including farm work, welding at a factory, and production work at TRW Commercial Steering Division ("TRW"), one of the defendants in this action.1 Mr. Key's job with TRW required him to set up assembly lines and keep them running. On July 15, 23, Mr. Key was attempting to repair a machine on the assembly line. While he was repairing this machine, he was hit in the head with a steel bar approximately five-eighths of an inch in diameter and between twelve and fourteen inches long. Key suffered a laceration to his forehead as a result of this accident. The laceration measured one inch or 2.2 centimeters in length. Key was taken to the emergency room where Dr. John Butcher treated him. Dr. Butcher irrigated the wound and used five stitches to close the cut. Dr. Butcher then released Key to return to work. Key returned to work the day following the accident. Key never missed a day of work as a result of the accident. Key subsequently requested additional medical care from TRW. As a result of that request, Dr. Roy Johnson, an occupational medical specialist, evaluated Key on November 13, 23. Dr. Johnson also referred Key to a plastic surgeon. On March 22, 24, Key was examined by Dr. J.D. Rosdeutscher, a plastic surgeon. Dr. Rosdeutscher examined Key and recommended surgery to revise the scar and remove a cyst that had developed. On April 7, 24, Dr. Rosdeutscher performed the surgery. Due to the size of the cyst, Dr. Rosdeutscher had to perform an open "complex closure" on the wound. Dr. Rosdeutscher felt Key made an excellent recovery. Key did complain of some sensation problems or numbness around the injury site. Dr. Rosdeutscher felt the issues were due to injury to the supraorbital nerve. The supraorbital nerve gets sensation to the forehead. Dr. Rosdeutscher testified that the supraorbital nerve is purely a sensory nerve. It does not provide any motor function. Therefore, it would not cause any loss of function in the muscles in the forehead. Dr. Rosdeutscher concluded that Key suffered a partial sensory loss, but this did not cause any functional impairment. Dr. Rosdeutscher also did not place any permanent restrictions on Key. Finally, Dr. Rosdeutscher opined that Key had no permanent impairment and that this nerve injury would not affect Key in any way vocationally. Key also saw Dr. Robert Landsberg, a board certified orthopaedic surgeon. Dr. Landsberg concurred with Dr. Rosdeutscher's diagnosis that Key suffered an injury to the supraorbital nerve. Dr. Landsberg opined that the nerve injury was permanent. In contrast to Dr. Rosdeutscher, Dr. Landsberg assigned Key seven percent (7%) impairment to the body as a whole due to his discomfort, numbness, and loss of sensation. 1Although CNA Insurance Co. also is a named defendant in this case, we will refer to both defendants as "TRW " for the sake of simplicity. 2

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers'
Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) (2005) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Employee appeals an award of 35% vocational disability to the left arm, and asserts that he is permanently and totally disabled. We vacate the judgment of the trial court, and remand for a new trial.